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Thesis Abstract:  This dissertation represents an investigative critique of the philosophical 
approaches to defining health and disease, going beyond pure conceptual analysis and straight 
into historical-philosophical analysis in an attempt to unpack the very discourse which 
underpins the discussion. Drawing on the notion of language as a medium of social instruction, 
it problematizes various specific features of the debate’s intellectual format, for example 
pointing out that its preoccupation with linguistic precision ought to be replaced with a focus 
on expressing the complex multidimensional nature of disease in a relatable manner. After 
presenting evidence of clinical reasoning’s inherent susceptibility to bias, the thesis exposes 
naturalism’s historical roots as an ideologically driven counter-reaction to nineteenth century 
vitalism, thereby discrediting the ideal of neutrality. Despite this skeptical start, it rejects 
eliminativist positions that philosophical attempts to produce health/disease definitions are 
pointless and unnecessary, and argues that the debate needs to be maintained due to such 
discussions’ important implications for medical and social identities, patient narratives, the 
negotiation of treatment objectives, or even the effectiveness of public health programmes 
(as a population’s inclination to comply with state-mandated public health measures is directly 
influenced by the notions it holds about health and disease). This is followed by an exploration 
of the conceptual limitations faced by the most commonly applied strategies of defining 
disease, after which their advantages are re-combined in an optimized hybrid account of 
disease supported by a philosophical distinction between the categories of ‘symptoms’ and 
‘clinical signs’. Finally, this account is tested on a wide range of problematic cases, to ensure 
its capacity to deliver the promised results whilst also overcoming challenging influences such 
as the ones posed by bias, discursively shaped diagnostic labels, or unwarranted 
pathologization. 
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1.  An Introduction: The Goals of Disease Definitions, and The 
Problem with Naturalism 
 
‘A great gulf now exists between the way we think about disease as physicians and the way we experience it as 
patients’ ~ Richard Baron1 
                                                                                                                                                       
1. 1. Introduction.
Of all the biologically-informed cultural concepts that influence our lives and our notions of 
‘normality’, there is a couple which have stubbornly resisted reinterpretations and continue 
to pose challenges for those who attempt to define, analyze or re-model them. ‘Health’ and 
‘disease’ have proved more than just a couple of terms with fuzzy boundaries – if anything, 
they should be regarded as the paradigm examples of such terms. The goal of this dissertation 
is to identify the main difficulties with which philosophers are confronted during their 
attempts to pin down these terms, to explain their origins via historical-philosophical analysis, 
and to propose solutions. This chapter will serve the purpose of listing the abovementioned 
difficulties (by order of degree of influence), while the latter chapters will address them
separately and advise on countermeasures. 
 
Working on topics such as health and disease, and especially engaging in conceptual analysis 
of these terms, has required a lot of un-learning and un-doing on my behalf: attempting to 
abandon stereotypes and clichés in favour of unbiased thinking, investigating whether there 
is such a thing as a transhistoric, transcultural concept of illness, and exploring different 
cultural tropes of health, just to name a few examples. Over time, I have gradually come to 
the conclusion that Western medical thinking‘s preoccupation with objectivity and 
quantifiability, as well as its deliberate effort to remain culturally blind, are themselves a form 
                                                          
1 Baron, R. J., ‘An introduction to medical phenomenology: I can’t hear you while I’m listening’, Annals of Internal 
Medicine, 1985, Vol. 103, p. 609 
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of bias and the result of a very specific cultural climate. This has made me deeply skeptical 
about the possibility of a value-free account of health/disease, and led me to question the 
very usefulness of such an account, if it were to be devised. Furthermore, it has also increased 
my sensitivity to the strong connections between rigid naturalist/objectivist standards of 
‘normality’ and a wide range of undesirable social phenomena such as the exclusion and 
discrimination faced by ill people, the increased paternalistic control and surveillance they 
experience, the stigmatization and negative stereotyping to which they are sometimes 
subjected.  
 
In a culture obsessed with ‘fitting in’, competing against one another and ‘overachieving’, 
persons whose life stories differ from those artfully structured socially acceptable narratives 
are often made to feel inadequate, disvalued and isolated (especially when the very features 
which make them stand out are used as a justification of the limited opportunities these 
persons are given to interact with others and contribute to society). Discrimination based on 
health status is not a myth, but a sad reality experienced by many: a reality that could be 
cemented by a discourse on disease as an objectively measurable deviation or deficiency.  
 
These issues have received insufficient attention in health/disease definition debates, where 
the focus lies predominantly on a proposed account’s sophistication and applicability to the 
purposes of policy-making, rather than its potential impact on the way ill persons are treated 
or perceived in social situations (both in a clinical context and outside it). Therefore my first 
task in this chapter will be to convince my readers that the problem presented above deserves 
serious consideration, to explain what its underlying causes are, and to suggest an effective 
strategy based on the notion that language is, first and foremost, a means of instruction that 
we could shape and use to our advantage.
 
1. 2. Between ‘neutral’ concepts, positive ideals, and negative stereotypes. 
The term ‘beauty’, though also notoriously hard to pin down, has been dealt with successfully 
as early as the 18th century when transcendental idealism decidedly rejected the very notion 
of ‘things-in-themselves’. After Immanuel Kant declared that aesthetic judgments were 
11 
 
 
‘judgments of taste’ rather than cognitive judgments about objective properties2, other 
philosophers quickly followed suit, with Friedrich Schlegel expressing skepticism regarding the 
possibility of unified external rules for reviewing works of art3, and early romanticist Fichte 
discussing the ‘indeterminate character’ and ‘floating’ form of beauty.4 It was elusive, 
arbitrary, out of reach. 
 
While German Idealism allegedly failed in postulating subjectivity as one of philosophy’s main 
principles, there can be little doubt that its attitudes towards aesthetics can be translated and 
incorporated into contemporary debates about beauty standards in order to encourage 
diversity and acceptance. Our criteria as to what constitutes aesthetically pleasing appearance 
are being re-shaped every moment, as demonstrated by the ever-increasing number of 
models that are plus size, past the days of their youth, have undergone unusual body 
modification procedures, or show visible signs of disease or disability. Western thinkers and 
activists have also initiated a process of revolutionizing the concepts of gender, sexuality, 
reproduction, and family in order to make sure that the generations to come will never have 
to choose between facing moral judgment or sacrificing their personal happiness in order to 
avoid it. One might argue that now, more than ever, we can allow ourselves to be optimistic 
regarding our own capabilities of conquering the double-edged sword of sociocultural 
concepts and subordinating its considerable power to the purpose of improving social 
climates. The problem lies within a certain hesitation to acknowledge and explore the hidden 
potential of pluralism; a certain fear to take responsibility and face the fact that there are no 
stereotypes or ideals beyond those which we ourselves create and attribute. 
 
Feminist writers have worked hard to show how the members of a society can be held jointly 
responsible for the existence of harmful culturally perpetuated stereotypes. Books like The 
Beauty Myth5 have successfully argued that even seemingly unimportant individual choices 
                                                          
2 Kant, I., Critique of Judgment, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1985 
3 Pinkard, T., Hegel: A Biography, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, p. 99 
4 ‘According to Fichte’s conception of a beautiful form as “form without form”, what makes [a certain] unity 
relevant from an aesthetic point of view is its indeterminate character, its floating (schweben) among many 
different forms’, see Cecchinato, G., ‘Form and Colour in Kant’s and Fichte’s Theory of Beauty’ in Breazeale, D. 
and Rockmore, T. (Eds.), Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism, Rodopi, Amsterdam, 2010, p. 78 
5 Wolf, N., The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty are Used Against Women, Vintage Books, London, 1991 
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can have permanent consequences on others by intensifying  the pressure to fit into a 
potentially destructive collectively shaped societal ideal – like that of attractiveness. It has 
been proposed that instead of adapting to harmful concepts of beauty or normality, we should 
strive to change them from within and promote self-acceptance. As already discussed, 
evidence suggests that this may currently be happening, as recent developments in media and 
the fashion industry show a great difference between the way the ‘abnormal’ body was 
portrayed a decade ago versus how it is presented today. But while there appears to exist 
general agreement that beauty is meant to remain ‘in the eye of the beholder’, that does not 
seem to be the case with categories like ‘health’, where deviation from the ‘norm’ more often 
than not can bear negative connotations. Occasionally, the difference between ‘health’ and 
‘disease’ could mean – quite literally – the difference between life and death (for instance in 
the context of screening, diagnosis and prognosis). In that sense, in science-centric societies 
(i.e. the majority of Western and industrialized societies), statistics and standards are often 
perceived as more reliable assessment tools than subjective experiences. They also hold the 
further benefit of lending credibility to the judgments they underpin; of providing them with 
additional dimensions like measurability, verifiability and manageability. 
 
1. 3. Quantifiability, objectification and the rhetoric of deviation. 
We have come to believe in the quantifiability of natural biological phenomena in order to 
gain a sense of control over them, because it is convenient to think that if something is 
measurable, it should also be manageable, predictable, understandable.6 Traditional Western 
philosophical ideals like autonomy and freedom mix with a sort of contemporary cult for 
science and fact-fetishization (as presented by Bruno Latour in his works On the Modern Cult 
of the Factish Gods and We Have Never Been Modern), making us epistemically dependent on 
certified scientific and professional authorities, yet oddly confident that we are independent 
thinkers and – exactly because we have unprecedented access to information – that we are 
free individuals in control of our own choices. However, this ideal does not appear to extend 
                                                          
6 King, L., ‘What is disease?’, Philosophy of Science, 1954, Vol. 21, pp. 193-203. See p. 195, which reads: ‘To 
understand health or disease we must have some objective measurements in addition to the introspective 
account. If we can weigh or measure something, then we have a little more confidence, and we feel more firmly 
grounded in objective reality.’ 
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to those among us who have been marginalized as ‘invalid’ or ‘deviant’ and who, because of 
this, have very limited power in society. 
 
Feminist author Jenny Morris – a disabled woman herself – has famously noted that disabled 
people’s self-image is dominated by the non-disabled world’s reactions to them7, as is every 
disability-related public policy in existence.8 Disease and disability conditions alike are locked 
in a fatal embrace with the rhetoric of deviation, deformity, incompleteness; the ensuing 
assumptions about incapacitated autonomy often serve as justifications for invading the 
affected person’s privacy,9 providing little support (if not outright limiting the available 
options) for their educational, professional and social development, or judging their lives as 
‘not worth living’. Most importantly, this divisive rhetoric and the behaviours that result from 
it all contribute to the corrosion of an already strained relationship – the one between patient 
and practitioner. Here I will outline the inherent imbalance already present in this relationship, 
and examine the ways in which it is modified by the application of different conceptual 
frameworks, in order to show how attitudes to patients and ‘sufferers’ are subject to the 
influence of language, and language-borne concepts and notions. This approach reflects the 
simple truth that doctors do not heal body parts – they heal patients: persons, living, thinking 
and feeling human beings. Even when focusing on the technical aspects of diagnosis, prognosis 
and treatment, they still have to consider the patient as a whole – how will the treatment of 
one organ or body system affect other parts or the monolithic whole of the organism? How 
will the patient function as a result of the treatment? Will there be any undesirable side-
effects of an emotional or social nature? 
 
1. 4. Language, epistemic profiles, and ‘webs of significance’ as mediums of instruction.  
The majority of meaningful social interactions in the human world rely on language as a 
                                                          
7 Morris, J., Pride Against Prejudice: Transforming Attitudes to Disability, The Women’s Press Ltd., London, 1991, 
p. 28 
8 Ibid, p. 118: ‘Those who make and implement public policy, whether they be politicians, administrators or 
professionals, have historically worked with a set of assumptions about disabled people which makes segregation 
inevitable.’ 
9 Ibid, p. 29: ‘Our physical difference makes our bodies public property…’ 
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medium of communication, instruction and shared understanding.10 Productive 
communication occurs through the channel of a shared language, but in the clinical context, 
there are two distinct types of language, which appear to address two separate social and 
epistemic realities. Ideally, the reality of disease would be a mutual one where practitioner 
and patient share similar observations and opinions over the phenomenon of disease, and 
express them through the same language, leaving little room for disagreement or doubt. 
However, due to a variety of factors – such as differences in social ‘situatedness’ and inhabited 
cultural ‘webs of significance’11, or the epistemic rift and power imbalance inherent to the 
interpersonal dynamic of the professional relationship between expert and layman (physician 
and patient) – the languages employed by the two can sometimes differ dramatically. In his 
monograph The Discourse of Medicine12, Elliot Mishler talks about the conflicting ‘voice of 
medicine’ (which acts as a normative force in debates as it is usually construed as the more 
formal and reliable one) and ‘voice of lifeworld’ (which is perceived as an irrelevant and even 
disruptive influence because of its biographical, contextual nature). In clinical judgement, 
there is a strict hierarchy of relevance which prioritizes the ‘voice of medicine’ as a source of 
‘proper’ evidence, while the ‘voice of lifeworld’ resides at the level of mere testimony, and is 
considered to be lacking in terms of legitimacy. Even the events that physicians and patients  
address in their acts of speech seem to belong to two separate spheres of reality, as the 
patient visits with a complaint about ‘abdominal pain’ but is instructed that she has a ‘pelvic 
inflammatory disease’ upon examination. Some authors, like Toombs, have attributed these 
confusing features of patient-physician communication to a ‘fundamental disagreement 
about the nature of illness’13, and others – to a supposed double relation between 
                                                          
10 And this notion has not escaped the attention of some physician-philosophers, as seen by the following excerpt 
from Cassell’s book on the goals of medicine: ‘We are able to speak together only because of a common language 
for objects and events. A common language for something implies a common interpretation of the events 
signified by the words; the more exact our use of language, the more exact our common interpretation’, see 
Cassell, E. J., The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, p. 5 
11 Kirkengen, A. L., ‘Encountering Particulars: A Life in Medicine’, The Permanente Journal, Summer 2005, Vol. 9, 
No. 3, p. 19: ‘Human beings are suspended in webs of significance they themselves have spun. Every person, be 
s/he healthy or sick, patient or doctor, is situated; that is profoundly shaped and influenced by the cultural time 
and place s/he inhabits.’ 
12 Mishler, E. G., The Discourse of Medicine: Dialectics of Medical Interviews, Praeger, 1985  
13 Toombs, S. K., ‘The Meaning of Illness: A Phenomenological Approach to the Patient-Physician Relationship’, 
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1987, Vol. 12, p. 219 reads: ‘In discussing my illness with physicians, it 
has often seemed to me that we have been somehow talking at cross purposes, discussing different things, never 
quite reaching each other. This inability to communicate does not, for the most part, result from inattentiveness 
or insensitivity but from a fundamental disagreement about the nature of illness.’ 
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sociocultural meaning and embodiment, suggesting that a person’s body and bodily 
experiences at once influence and are influenced by the meaning assigned to them by that 
person – a meaning which provides lived bodies with a ‘specific logic’ and rationality. Thus 
acquiring a good grasp of this significance must necessarily be instructed by the act of 
‘unfolding’, i.e. making explicit, the personal context of the experienced symptoms.14  
 
Of course, symptoms often represent but a fraction of what occurs in the diseased body, and 
the physician’s professional training understandably includes instructions about seeking the 
‘hidden’ source of disruption from ‘normal’ functioning, and examining reliable objective signs 
rather than counting on patient testimony to determine it. In another chapter (Chapter 5) I 
intend to show how this line of thinking, which suggests that proper diagnosis is essential for 
optimizing cure prospects, is almost directly inherited from the legacy of nineteenth century 
physiologists like Bernard, for whom there was little doubt that structure defined function. 
Here it suffices to state that, as a result, quite often even seemingly basic concepts like ‘health’ 
and ‘disease’ are viewed and defined differently by practitioners and their patients, since the 
former continue to rely on a very ‘still’ and artificial15 (and arguably antiquated16)  disease 
theory, while the latter define illness idiosyncratically, and therefore unreliably. However, 
while expertise, especially one supported by a solid education in the biomedical sciences and 
by related professional experience, is without doubt worthy of recognition, we have already 
seen that the first-hand knowledge of the chronically sick, frequently hospitalized in-patient, 
cannot be dismissed lightly. Indeed, some have suggested that practitioners’ understanding 
of disease can be facilitated through the application of phenomenology – integrating patients’ 
lived experiences of disease, and using them instructively, as an interpretive frame of 
reference.17 
 
The patient relies on first-person utterances and describes unique, existentially meaningful, 
subjective symptoms – personal experiences of which she tries to ‘make sense’, and to which 
                                                          
14 Ibid, p. 19-20 
15 Ibid, p. 9: ‘Structure is an idea that has everyday utility, but is an artificial one and what pathologists discuss, 
not what actually happens to sick people. It’s still, whereas the body is changing.’ 
16 Ibid, p. 7 
17 Kirkengen, A. L., Op. cit., p. 21 
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she tries to adapt in order to prevent their overwhelming effect on her physical well-being, 
social functioning and emotional life.18 In order to instruct her physician, she employs an 
‘involved’ language of concern – mostly concern about the way her life will change in relation 
to the diagnosis. Practitioners, on the other hand, adopt the detached, objective third person 
point of view during their pursuit of reliable, tangible signs, and use a professional language 
that may seem abstract and unclear to the layman whom it objectifies and instructs in a 
unified, general, standardized way. Preoccupied with tasks like diagnosis, detecting, observing 
and correcting deviant physiological functions, they are in particular subject to quantification 
tendencies, even framing prognosis in terms of calculation-based estimates (e.g., ‘survival 
chance’, ‘expected quality of life’), rather than terms borrowed from the patient’s language of 
pain, discomfort or everyday tasks and abilities. They are not overly concerned about the 
patient’s social performance or emotional state, unless it is either integral to the purposes of 
diagnosis and treatment (as is the case with psychiatry and clinical psychology, for example), 
or has very drastic effects on the patient’s overall ‘quality of life’. The ‘personal life experience’ 
aspect of the patient’s complaint is, more often than not, irrelevant to the physician’s essential 
task, and thus patient narratives and histories hold little instructive power over the way 
physicians’ conceptual resources and explanatory models are constructed. Therefore one 
cannot reasonably expect a significant conceptual overlap between these two distinctively 
separate realities, since patients and physicians do not share similar conceptualizations of 
illness.19 Furthermore, their conceptualizations appear to stem from their allegedly different 
‘instructions’ – finding answers and solutions to a problem (patient), and providing a diagnosis 
and treatment for a physical condition (physician).20 How, then, are we expected to construe 
a single unified account of health/disease that will acknowledge the multidimensionality of 
the phenomenon it tries to define without sounding vague? 
 
1. 5. Health and disease as complex, multidimensional phenomena. 
                                                          
18 This Husserlian notion about the uniqueness of the world of immediate experience appears to be shared by 
most authors writing on phenomenology and its applications to the medical context, but is most explicitly stated 
in the works of S. Kay Toombs. [See Toombs, S. K., Op. cit., p. 221] 
19 Toombs, S. K., Op. cit., p. 220 
20 Ibid, p. 224. Also p. 227: ‘The physician defines the “problem at hand” in light of certain goals of medicine: 
diagnosis, treatment and prognosis. These goals appear to be shared with the patient. However,… the patient 
defines the “problem at hand” in terms of different goals.’ 
17 
 
 
Most noteworthy attempts to define health/disease have been unsatisfactory, either because 
they have failed to reflect it as a truly complex, multilayered concept, or because they went 
too far in their attempt to achieve the latter, and resulted in vague, over-inclusive definitions 
(see, for example, the World Health Organization’s definition, according to which health is ‘a 
state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease 
or infirmity’21). These difficulties have usually been attributed, depending on the accuser’s 
own ideological commitments, to the attacked author’s allegiance to either normativism or 
naturalism, and thus to their conviction that values or scientific objectivity respectively can 
lead us to the ‘correct’ definition. However, by focusing exclusively on the big philosophical 
debate we have boiled the matter down to the level of conceptual disagreement and lost sight 
of the very simple, yet very important practical notion that even formal legal definitions (on 
which laws and policies are based, and which are presumably the ultimate goals of such 
debates22) are just as preoccupied with functionality as they are with accuracy;  that, 
unfortunately, by obsessing over the latter, we have overlooked the former.23 As a result, most 
accounts are not well adapted to serve their intended purpose, as they have been rendered 
dysfunctional by their own ideological influences, which produce simplified one-dimensional 
views on what is otherwise a complex, multilayered phenomenon. 
 
Disease is neither purely a discursively shaped value-laden concept, nor simply an objectively 
existing natural category; it is both and neither. Among the challenges faced by philosophy of 
medicine, an especially problematic one is the rather common assumption that only these two 
approaches (or any hybrid combinations thereof) are likely to produce plausible results. An 
additional difficulty arises from the pressure to ‘pick a side’ – an unnecessary constraint 
imposed on thinkers who engage with this topic, as the two sides of the debate have far too 
                                                          
21 Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International Health 
Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States (Official 
Records of the World Health Organization, No. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 April 1948 
22 Although some philosophers have argued that public health policy and law do not require a definition of 
disease in order to function, but should rather be conceived of in terms of promoting other goals – such as 
‘physical safety’, for instance. For a relatively recent example, please see Stephen John’s article ‘Why “Health” is 
not a Central Category for Public Health Policy’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, May 2009, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 129-
143 
23 I am not trying to suggest that linguistic precision should not be among our priorities. Rather, I am suggesting 
that an optimal philosophical account of disease would also have other, more practically significant goals – 
such as being socially progressive. Chapter 4 will discuss this in more detail. 
18 
 
 
much in common to be rightfully posited as the radically opposing polar extremes they are 
made out to be. I would like to suggest that there is no real need for discussions of disease 
definitions to be restricted by the artificially created framework of the naturalism-normativism 
dispute. Before one even considers engaging in the arduous task of providing an account of 
disease, one would need to: 1) break away from the constraints of this intellectually misleading 
format, and 2) be realistic in one’s expectations about what naturalism can achieve. One of 
the main goals of my dissertation will be to demonstrate that naturalism is not, nor should it 
be, value-free, and that we should give up the futile ambition of defining phenomena which 
have strong moral implications in a neutral, detached way. Instead, we should be aiming to 
frame definitions in terms which promote and cultivate the values that are fundamental to our 
purposes within the clinical context – and outside it. We should also bear in mind that there 
are certain practical characteristics of health/disease phenomena which make them 
impossible to interpret fully, in their entire complexity, through the lens of naturalism alone. 
The characteristics in question can be roughly grouped in three categories, which I will refer to 
as the ‘moral charge’ characteristic, the ‘multidimensionality’ characteristic, and the ‘dynamic 
polarity’ characteristic. 
 
1. 6. The Moral Charge Characteristic: Phenomena which elicit emotionally and morally 
charged responses are much more difficult to define in neutral terms. 
A possible objection against forced attempts at value-free discussions of the body and anything 
that relates to it could be derived from the body’s complex status in the phenomenological 
life-world. The body is not simply our gate into the life-world that phenomenologists speak of; 
it does not serve only as a medium of experiencing. It is also the way we present ourselves to 
others, the way we partake into the shared moral world of meaningful social interactions.  
 
Acting both as seats and as instruments of human rationality and will - of autonomy, freedom, 
moral principles, beliefs and passions - bodies have logically been granted a special moral 
status in Western cultures. The Western body is seen – with slight variations across cultures – 
as a precious ‘vessel’ (even ‘sacred’, depending on the context), or as an embodied ‘soul’ or 
‘personality’. Universally, though, its moral standing as the ultimate limit and physical 
19 
 
 
boundary between Self and Other is recognized without a shadow of doubt, and discussions 
about freedom, choice, autonomy and self-determination are, almost without exception, 
carried out within a discourse shaped by the belief that moral actions necessarily involve an 
aspect of physicality, i.e. that they are the physical acts of finite biological beings, which can 
influence other finite biological beings.  
 
Therefore the body, with its crucial interactive role, is valued highly and perceived as 
something worthy of protection and care, as any physical threat to it is also an existential threat 
to our presence in the life-world. Consequently, states that can be interpreted as a threat to 
the body’s ‘default’ state of life and health are disvalued.  
 
While that does not mean that every physical threat disvalued by society is automatically a 
disease, it does mean that, no matter how we define the terms ‘health’ and ‘disease’, they are 
bound to elicit (and be shaped by) the same emotionally and morally charged psychological 
responses. The (positive and negative, respectively) connotations attached to these concepts 
will not vanish simply because we have replaced the terms with new ones; instead they are 
much more likely to ‘stick’ with newer terminology and resist our forced attempts to create 
new meanings (see, for example, Christopher M. Fairman’s critique of the US debate on the ‘r-
word’24). Most importantly, it is rather difficult to define a strongly (albeit implicitly) morally 
charged phenomenon such as health or disease in an entirely value-free way - though that 
does not mean we should not try to avoid terms with overtly negative connotations, such as 
Cooper’s ‘bad’, ‘unlucky thing to have’25,  or Megone’s ‘incapacitating failure’26, where ‘failure’ 
is problematic due to its implication that someone or something was unsuccessful, did 
something wrong, or is somehow ‘deficient’.  
 
Normativist accounts of disease have a long history of associating disease with predominantly 
                                                          
24 Fairman, C. M., ‘The case against banning the word “retard”’, Washington Post, 14 February 2010 
25Cooper, R., ‘Disease’, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biology and Biomedical Sciences, 33, 2002, pp. 
263–282  
26 Megone, C., ‘Mental Illness, Human Function, and Values’, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, March 2000, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 45-65 
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negative experiences, whereas new works on the philosophy of illness (such as Carel’s ‘Can I 
be Ill and Happy?’27, or Kidd’s ‘Can Illness be Edifying?’28), along with works from the related 
field of philosophy of disability (like Jenny Morris29), attempt to resist negative stereotypes and 
promote ethical and political correctness. Therefore defenders of normativist accounts should 
still exercise a degree of caution when choosing how to express their philosophical stance, or 
risk creating a definition that neither patient nor physician would willingly relate to. 
 
1. 7. The Multidimensionality Characteristic: A more ‘factual’ approach may fail to grasp the 
complexity of health and disease phenomena in real life. 
Accounts of disease do not necessarily have to take the form of an undisputed fact or a 
scientific endeavour in order to be successful, and are even hindered by such approaches. 
Values are always present (whether explicitly or implicitly) in choices, and designing a unified 
account of health, for example, necessarily involves settling with a specific selection of 
characteristics universally present across all specimens who exhibit the property of health, 
and effectively reducing health to this selection. The process of selection will be guided by 
values just as much as by rational judgements based on epistemic factors.  
 
A somewhat similar objection has already been raised in a paper written by the philosopher 
Kingma, in which she critiqued the most influential naturalist definition of disease – the one 
proposed by Christopher Boorse;30 three decades before this, Reznek correctly pointed out 
that scientific methodology and reliance on facts can be of little use when dealing with what 
is essentially a non-scientific question.31 As already stated, philosophers of medicine ought to 
be striving to provide a functional and relatable account of health/disease which will be well-
adapted to the purposes of social interaction, clinical practice, law and policy making. 
                                                          
27 Carel, H., ‘Can I be Ill and Happy?’, Philosophia, 2007, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 95-110 
28 Kidd, I. J., ‘Can Illness Be Edifying?’, Inquiry – Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences, 2013, 
Vol. 55, No. 5, pp. 496-520 
29 Morris, J., Pride Against Prejudice: Transforming Attitudes to Disability, The Women’s Press Ltd., London, 1991; 
also see Morris, J., ‘Impairment and Disability: Constructing an Ethics of Care That Promotes Human Rights’, 
Hypatia, Autumn 2001, Vol. 16, No. 4, Part 1, pp. 1-16 
30 Kingma, E., ‘What is it to be healthy?’, Analysis, 2007, Vol. 67, No. 294, pp. 128-133 
31 Reznek, L., The Nature of Disease, Routledge, London, 1987 
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A possible objection needs to be addressed here. Let us first consider that in the shared reality 
of social interaction, meaning is shaped by context, and an utterance can carry a wide variety 
of moral nuances, ranging from negative through neutral to positive connotations and 
anything in-between. This could present a challenge to my claim that the ideal of an objective, 
impartial account of disease is an unattainable one. Practically every word can be used both 
neutrally and with added value, though not in the same sense or theoretical framework. The 
success of that use, however, will necessarily depend on the goals of the project.  
 
Arguably the primary purpose of definitions, for example, is to make a concept epistemically 
‘clear’ and ‘distinct’, i.e. not only to introduce the term to those unfamiliar with it, but also to 
explain the underlying phenomenon in an understandable manner, thus making it 
epistemically accessible. There can be little doubt that even value-laden terms such as 
‘disability’ can be used in neutral protocol sentences to make simple factual observations in a 
value-free manner, as in these examples: 
1) ‘Dyslexia is not disabling in cultures which do not rely on written speech.’ 
2) ‘Severe nearsightedness is a disability in cultures which do not possess the means to 
counteract its effects, like glasses or contact lenses.’ 
These observations may rely on non-value-neutral terms, but they express established aspects 
of certain practical realities, rather than generalized personal opinions, moral judgements, or 
socially conditioned beliefs. Applied to their specific contexts, they would hold true in front of 
every person, regardless of her ideological or professional commitments. The real difficulty 
arises when there are attempts to make universal or near-universal generalizations with the 
same undisputable epistemic truth-value and to regard those as value-neutral factual 
observation. What works well with small-scale observation-based generalizations will not work 
quite as well for large-scale generalizations (such as ‘All dysfunctions are necessarily harmful’), 
due to their lack of specificity and contextualization.  
 
1. 8. The Dynamic Polarity Characteristic: Accounts of health/disease need to reflect the 
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biological truth that bodies are flexible, adaptable entities which actively respond to 
internal and external stimuli. 
Last but not least, the majority of health/disease accounts present a static model that has little 
in common with the ‘biological normativity’ or ‘dynamic polarity’ (term coined by 
Canguilhem32) of life. For example, Christopher Boorse’s famous naturalist definition (which 
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters 3 and 5), for all its preoccupation with evolution 
theory, teleological explanations and causal contribution factors, conveniently ignores the 
evidence that ‘unhealthy’ bodies do not necessarily stay that way. 
 
Virtually everything we know today – either from personal experience or from science-based, 
peer-reviewed evidence – seems to point to the fact that the diseased body is capable of 
devoting considerable resources and applying most amazing strategies to its own recovery, 
and will almost definitely do so on most occasions. Homeostasis – a term referring to the 
model of life originally coined by biologist Walter Cannon – has often been used to describe 
this continuous cycle of balance-seeking self-maintenance, during the process of which bodies 
actively respond to influential factors from their environment, while also regulating their own 
internal milieu. 
 
For highly intelligent life forms like humans and other primates, being well attuned to one’s 
bodily signals may be just another part of this sophisticated self-preservation system, with 
clusters of symptoms representing perhaps a similar function to that of pain mechanisms in 
helping the organism detect, avoid or otherwise counteract potentially threatening exterior 
influences. Symptoms could be better described as the person’s unique reactions to the 
changes she experiences under the influence of disease. For example, the nausea and loss of 
appetite experienced by sufferers from gastroenteritis are provoked by an inflammation of 
the intestines due to viral or bacterial infections of the digestive tract. 
 
Symptoms, however, have a psychosomatic component and thus are also influenced by the 
                                                          
32 Canguilhem, G., The Normal and the Pathological, Zone Books, New York, 1991 
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subject’s unique psychological constitution, attitude, emotions and expectations about their 
condition. For instance, a gastroenteritis sufferer with low bacteria counts might still 
experience severe nausea due to stress, fear, discomfort at the thought of disease, or a low 
tolerance for pain and suffering, while another person with the same signs (i.e., same bacteria 
counts) might not experience any nausea at all. In addition, introducing the notion of 
symptoms as reactivity can help develop an account of disease that captures ‘mental’ 
illnesses, some of which are notorious for their difficult diagnosing and conceptualization due 
to the frequent lack of observable objective signs (e.g., a person suffering from a severe case 
of narcissistic personality disorder would have a different social experience in the ‘life-world’, 
and a lot of the time her activities and interpersonal relationships would be limited under the 
influence of her condition; at the same time, brain scans performed on this person may never 
reveal anything out of the ordinary).  
 
An obvious problem arises when we define symptoms and reactivity in relation to 
homeostasis, as Boorse has already argued successfully that many life functions are not 
homeostatic and even upset the organism’s balance rather than maintain it (perception, 
growth and pregnancy are examples of this), and that there is no point in ‘trying to view 
corresponding diseases such as deafness…, dwarfism…, or sterility as homeostatic failures’.33 
Secondly, another difficulty with health-as-homeostasis accounts lies in their inflexibility, 
which does not allow for health in puberty – or in old age, where changes in the organism are 
just as abundant and frequent as they are during active growth.  
 
Therefore I shall suggest that we look back to Canguilhem, whose theory depicts life and 
health as a type of reactivity, ‘dynamic polarity’ or ‘biological normativity’ in which certain 
things or states are avoided, while others are sought, and these all change over time in 
accordance with the organism’s evolving needs. This phenomenon is best represented not by 
homeostasis, but by the similar yet more sophisticated concept of homeorhesis (originally 
coined by developmental biologist C. H. Waddington). The term ‘homeorhesis’ describes 
systems regulated around certain factors and ‘points’ which do not remain fixed, but instead 
                                                          
33 Boorse, C., ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, Philosophy of Science, December 1977, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 550 
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gradually change over time, i.e. in the natural process of aging. Diseases often appear as 
results of the more drastic or peculiar changes which are not a part of the organism’s growth, 
metamorphosis or aging. 
 
1. 9. Summarizing the goals of a philosophical account of disease. 
In sum, the solution we are looking for needs to reflect a biologically, psychologically and 
socially complex, multi-layered phenomenon. I have demonstrated why this is more difficult 
to attain via value-neutral discussion. A ‘hybrid’34 account, which combines philosophical 
astuteness with a relatable ‘language of pain and reactivity’ (with which patients will readily 
associate), can present the sought-after solution. As already stated, the task of a disease 
account would be to ‘unify’ the two distinctive languages of physician and patient, and to 
make their separate practical realities overlap for the sake of effective communication; that 
would make for a fully functional definition to which the two sides can relate, and which can 
therefore be applied effectively for the purposes of law and policy making, without generating 
misunderstandings or instances of political incorrectness, and without contributing to social 
oppression, manipulation, or covert control. 
 
Having made this long exposition of my objectives, I will now introduce my methodology and 
the manner in which I plan to deliver the intended results. Chapter 2 will show that 
practitioners and scientists, as well as philosophers whose methodology operates within 
similar theoretical frameworks (naturalists), are not the best equipped candidates for this task 
due to their tendency to equate biological normativity to strict natural laws; inspired by Alvan 
Feinstein’s concept of ‘intellectual infirmity’ in clinical judgment, it also exposes the threat of 
covert bias masquerading as neutrality or ‘cultural blindness’ in medical thinking. The third 
chapter is going to develop this line of reasoning further and contextualize naturalism by 
linking its ideological roots to those of the broader traditions of disease objectification and 
quantification in medicine, both of which originated as a counter-reaction to 19th century 
                                                          
34 I am using the term ‘hybrid’ rather loosely here, as I have already stated why I do not consider naturalism as a 
legitimately value-free approach; therefore on this particular occasion the term ‘hybrid’ is applied only for 
convenience rather than descriptively. 
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vitalism. These first three chapters will thus serve the additional role of caveats, ensuring a 
clear point of observation from which to approach the disease definition debate. 
 
Subsequent chapters will address the conceptual difficulties encountered by each of the main 
approaches and attempt to propose solutions. For instance, Chapter 4 will tackle eliminativism 
by reframing the issue of ‘centrality’ in medical discussions, invalidating the argument about 
values and normative judgments as unnecessary ‘distractions’ in clinical decision-making, and 
demonstrating that health/disease definitions also double as labels, thus determining the 
moral, social and political dimensions of living as an ill person and affecting selfhood through 
the creation of medical identities. Chapter 5 is going to contribute to the latter interpretation 
through a comprehensive overview of contemporary philosophy’s discussion of health and 
disease, with a pronounced focus on normativism and hybridism, which I criticize for failing to 
reflect biological normativity (and especially the dynamic aspects of disease as a phenomenon 
involving adaptation and compensation on behalf of the affected). Chapter 6 will deal with 
phenomenological approaches, suggesting that although they may be superior in that regard, 
they could benefit from a clear-cut distinction between the categories of ‘clinical signs’ and 
‘symptoms’ to help accommodate Havi Carel’s ideas about well-being in illness and the 
edifying potential of morbid states – two ideas which are closely aligned with my 
understanding about the reactive nature of disease, and which can challenge negative 
stereotypes about living as a sick person. 
 
Based on this philosophical distinction and the analysis presented shortly beforehand in 
Chapter 5, I will construct an account of disease relying on the following criteria: 1) … that the 
patient exhibit clinical signs of deviation from her own usual health parameters (as opposed 
to clinical signs of deviation from a statistically defined average) that cannot be explained with 
growth, pregnancy, or aging; 2) … that the patient consider her symptoms as obstacles to her 
physical and emotional integrity and comfort, or to her participation in society. The naturalist 
element in this account is contained in the first condition, which operates on the assumption 
that clinical signs of deviation from one’s usual health parameters could point to the presence 
of pathology, while the normativist and phenomenological elements of the account are 
exemplified by the second condition’s focus on subjective experiences and evaluative 
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judgments. To the extent that the account will have incorporated all these approaches, it will 
be considered an example of hybridism. To the extent that it will also have met the 
requirements outlined in Chapters 1 and 3, it will be considered an optimized version of 
hybridism, designed to reflect the phenomenon of ‘dynamic polarity’ and ‘biological 
normativity’, bridge the communication gap between patient and practitioner, and represent 
disease in rhetorically neutral terms which capture its complex multidimensional nature 
without explicitly relying on negative stereotypes (like many of the associations that Western 
culture tends to make between diseased states and ‘harm’, ‘failure’, ‘incapacitation’, 
‘deficiency’, or ‘defects’). 
  
Finally, Chapter 7 is going to analyze the related issue of the conceptual challenges posed by 
psychiatric conditions’ diverse aetiology and manifestations, which can make them elusive to 
most philosophical accounts of disease. This tension will be resolved by means of thematizing 
the somatic disease /‘mental illness’ dichotomy as existing for purely nosographical purposes. 
The thesis will then close with a chapter recapping its results and proposed solutions, 
ultimately arguing in favour of a revised version of hybridism that incorporates 
phenomenological input in the form of a philosophical distinction between the categories of 
subjectively experienced ‘symptoms’ and ‘clinical signs’. 
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2. The Intellectual Infirmity Threat 
 
‘Physicians generally view themselves as realists who disdain all theorists and philosophers. Clinicians tend 
to focus on other things – the practical, or what “works”. They do not seem to believe that there is a theory 
for clinical practice. Unfortunately, when doctors dismiss theory, they often do things with unhappy results, 
because they do not really know why they are doing them.’35 ~ E. Cassell 
 
‘Within the context of the universe of science, illness is rendered thematic in terms of “objective”, 
quantifiable data. Disease is thus reified as a distinct entity residing in, but in some way separated from, the 
one who is ill.’36 ~ S. K. Toombs 
‘[P]hysicians’ political and social philosophy about public health only gave more far-reaching expression 
to what they believed to be true for the more intimate interpersonal context: that lay persons, like 
patients, had little to contribute to medical decision making, that fundamental inequalities between 
doctors and the laity created an unbridgeable chasm.’ ~ J. Katz37 
 
2. 1. Medicine‘s theoretical and operative framework: specialization, objectification, 
orientation. 
 
The postulates of medical thinking rely on many vehicles to get around, but the most effective 
one to this day remains institutionalized knowledge. The intellectual ‘legacy’ passed down 
from every generation of physicians and biomedical scientists onto the next one, while a 
crucial part of the learning process, can also be ripe with bias, clichés, outdated views, or 
flawed representations of the sociocultural reality it needs to be contextualized in. That, 
however, is just the first link in a very long chain.  
 
There are many factors which can distort, impoverish, or otherwise threaten the success of 
scientific endeavours, clinical judgements and patient-practitioner communication, which is 
                                                          
35 Cassell, E. J., The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, p. 5 
36 Toombs, S. K., Op. cit., p. 228 
37 Katz, J., The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 30 
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precisely why the critical thinking cultivated by philosophy needs to ensure a clearer 
observation point for medicine, rather than the other way around. This is the main argument 
in this chapter, which will approach the discussion from a position developed by the 20th 
century physician-philosopher Alvan Feinstein – that certain types of ‘intellectual infirmity’ are 
very common in medical thinking. The rest of Section 2. 1. is going to problematize complex 
issues such as labour division in science and clinical practice, and its implications for the 
theoretical frameworks of medical thinking. After that, I will move on to Sections 2. 2. and 2. 
3., which will discuss examples of flawed reasoning in clinical judgement and scientific 
judgement, respectively.  
 
Section 2. 4., then, will speculate whether the professional jargon developed by physicians and 
scientists may have exacerbated the lack of conceptual clarity in medical thinking, while 
Sections 2. 5. to 2. 6. Will explore how the public’s idealized notions about the physician as a 
seemingly endlessly empathetic and omniscient figure of authority may have contributed to 
the long life of certain intellectual dogmas and outdated views. Section 2. 7. will propose a 
solution in the guise of philosophy, which I will argue can help us detect, resist and question 
such views, while Section 2. 8. will suggest an appropriate target for it – namely the ideal about 
the infallibility of science. Section 2. 8. will thus set up the ground for the next chapter, which 
will discredit this myth through the use of historical-philosophical analysis. All of this will be 
done in order to show that the skills, methods and tools that are taught, applied and valued 
by philosophy are not only crucial for maintaining intellectual rigor in science and clinical 
practice, but also necessary for building a successful account of disease. 
 
For all its flaws, the contemporary debate about disease definitions has led to some 
outstanding contributions to our understanding of health and disease, without which the 
profoundly human aspect of these phenomena would likely never have received the insightful 
philosophically underpinned examination it deserves. The term ‘intellectual infirmity’ has 
been borrowed from Alvan Feinstein’s 1967 book Clinical Judgment, where it refers to a variety 
of biases encountered in medical thinking and reinforced by formal medical education and 
training. It is a fact that physicians are interested in providing diagnosis and cure for their 
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patients rather than exploring and (re)defining the concepts of health and disease. Within the 
context of medical practice curing seems to be understood more as a matter of restoring 
disturbed functions back to a certain norm from which they have deviated, and not so much a 
matter of actively pursuing health per se. Thus within the framework of medicine the operative 
opposition lies between objectified, dehumanized ‘normality’ and deviation from the norm, 
and not between ‘health’ and ‘disease’. An interesting result is that debates about the exact 
meaning of terms like ‘health’ and ‘disease’ have largely been left to others, for instance 
philosophers and scholars in the field of medical humanities. This chapter shall analyze the 
possible causes and suggest that instances of intellectual infirmity are just as abundant among 
biomedical scientists and clinical practitioners as they are among laymen, despite the strong 
associations between intellectual rigor, high epistemic standards and the sciences.  
 
As I have already argued in the introduction, health and disease ought not to be treated or 
explained solely from the perspective of science. It is time to provide more depth to my claim 
by demonstrating how three of scientific and clinical medicine’s most essential characteristics 
(namely specialization, objectification and their orientation) make them ill-equipped to 
provide an answer to such questions. 
 
A) Specialization38 – The development of both medical science and medical practice in the 
past two centuries has been marked by specialization. Roughly said, specialization is an 
irreversible tendency in modern science which results in scientific research breaking down 
into many different disciplines covering different areas of scientific enquiry. Typically a 
scientist or physician cannot specialize in all of these. An ophthalmologist may be well aware 
what a perfectly healthy eye is, and an otorhinolaryngologyst may have vast knowledge about 
ear and throat conditions, and quite often also facial plastic and reconstructive surgery or 
                                                          
38 Although this chapter is more concerned with the conceptual difficulties created by specialization than it is 
with specialization’s historical roots, exploring the latter can provide further testimony to my claim that 
developments in science obey socioeconomic factors and ‘administrative rationality’ as well as epistemic values 
such as rigor. See George Weisz’s essay on medical specialization in the 19th century which presents specialization 
as ‘a result of the realization of two preconditions: First, a new collective desire to expand medical knowledge 
prompted clinical researchers to specialize; only specialization, it was believed, permitted the rigorous 
observation of many cases. Second, administrative rationality suggested that one could best manage large 
populations through proper classification…’ [Weisz, G., ‘The Emergence of Medical Specialization in the 
Nineteenth Century’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine, Fall 2003, Vol. 77, No. 3, pp. 536-574] 
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head and neck oncology, but it is doubtful that they would be willing or capable of defining 
health or disease per se.39 What physicians typically do is to detect and correct an organ or 
(sub)system’s deviation from statistical normality: for instance, patients with ocular 
hypertension40 get special treatment with pilocarpine or timolol eye drops in order to reduce 
the pressure and avoid optic nerve damage, etc. 
 
B) Objectification – As already stated, the operative opposition in medicine is between 
statistical ‘normality’ and deviation from the norm, and not between health and disease. As 
noted by Gadamer in one of his essays on the enigma of health, ‘the scientific approach is 
concerned with quantifiability, with weighing and measuring. What we esteem in science is 
that capacity for objectification which is fundamental to the acquisition of knowledge,’41 but 
‘the physics of our century has taught us that there are limits to what we can measure. …This 
is even more the case when we are concerned not just with the quantifiability of nature but 
with living beings.’42 Hormonal levels, bone density or intraocular pressure and other 
biomedical parameters measured during examinations are all evidence that there is an 
objectively measured side of disease, but this does not mean that there is nothing more to it. 
In everyday human experience disease is not simply a dysfunction in an organ or body system. 
It could be an extremely unpleasant, debilitating or painful experience, a life-transforming 
event, an obstacle preventing our accomplishments and goals. In other words, disease could 
be a situation with complex social, economic and emotional consequences for the one 
affected and the people around them. With scientists, physicians and naturalist philosophers 
the focus is often on objective parameters and departure from the norm, and subjective 
experiences hold no significance in the quest for ‘objective truth’. What is more, some even 
consider them to be needless distractions.43 However, some philosophers argue that this view 
                                                          
39 Of course, one could always argue that the jobs of general practitioners require them to have vast knowledge 
of multiple medical disciplines. My response would be that general practitioners do specialize – in prevention, 
early detection and referral to specialized care.  
40 Eye pressure higher than 22 mm Hg. 
41 Gadamer, H. G., The Enigma of Health, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 105 
42 Ibid, p. vii 
43 See Lefever, R.,  ‘“Decision Making” in Medical Care: Is It a Consumer Good?’, IEA Health Unit Paper No. 8, 
London, The IEA Health Unit, 1990; p. 76 reads: ‘It might be believed that all doctors are always interested 
primarily in the lives of the patients in front of us. I do not believe that to be true. I believe that more commonly 
our interest primarily focuses on demonstrating our own professional skill. That is the way many of us were 
trained and it is still reflected in many aspects of the professional medical culture.’ 
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is not complete and that disease cannot be fully captured in a third-person perspective.44 Even 
Canguilhem, himself a physician, raises the question: ‘in what sense are laboratory 
standardization and mensuration appropriate to serve as the norm for the living being’s 
functional activity considered outside the laboratory?’45 
 
C) Orientation (different topics and concerns) - From Aristotle’s works Nicomachean Ethics 
(Book I, Part 7) and Eudemian Ethics (Book II, Part 1), where we can find explanations about 
the functions of natural kinds46, to the World Health Organization’s website, there have been 
hundreds of attempts at defining health and disease. The vast majority of them have one thing 
in common – they were not produced by physicians or scientists. Medicine is problem-
oriented and does not ponder the meaning of things, analyze concepts, or attempt to create 
precise, sophisticated definitions. Its definitions are working definitions which serve the 
purpose of naming, localizing or classifying systems or conditions pertaining to the body. 
Scientific medicine, despite its advanced state, has neither explained nor defined health and 
disease per se. The focus appears to be on problems and solutions rather than broad 
generalizations about the nature of health and disease; on descriptions of specific illnesses 
rather than an overall account of disease. It has been suggested that ‘modern natural science… 
means not so much knowledge as know-how’ or, even better said, ‘a knowing mastery of 
nature’ and a technology.47 Thus it looks like the purely theoretical task of defining health and 
disease has been left to, or is better left to, people like philosophers of medicine rather than 
physicians or scientists. However, it might be helpful to investigate why this is the case before 
one engages with the task. 
                                                          
44 I am referring to the phenomenological approach to disease. More will be said on this matter in Chapter 5. 
45 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 83 
46 ‘The basic idea we are left with then is that human beings, like members of other natural kinds, have a function 
in the sense that some of their behavior, but not all, is teleologically explicable, that is, can be understood as 
achieving some natural goal or purpose, something that is, from some point of view, good. 
Such an account of the human function is necessarily evaluative, but it is also necessarily factual since it is tied 
to what a human being essentially is. Aristotle claims that the human function is, within this account, the life of 
the fully rational animal. Illness is any incapacitating failure to realize (actualize) this human function.’ See 
Megone, C., ‘Mental Illness, Human Function, and Values’, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, March 2000, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 45-65 
47 Gadamer, Op. Cit., p. 6 
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2. 2. ‘Intellectual infirmity’: Feinstein‘s critique of clinical judgment. 
A possible cause has been examined in the book Clinical Judgment, where physician and 
philosopher Alvan Feinstein presents a rigorous analysis of what he calls the ‘intellectual 
infirmity in our current state of clinical science’, as well as a thorough investigation of the exact 
obstacles met. He introduces the latter as ‘a group of hallowed beliefs, transmitted as 
intellectual legacies by teacher to student, and from one medical generation to the next… like 
an axiom … which, though not a necessary truth, is universally accepted,’48 which are, 
nonetheless, ‘either inappropriate, obsolete, or mistaken.’49 Several decades later, insightful 
physician-philosophers like Eric Cassell50 and Anna Luise Kirkengen51 have expanded this 
criticism, revealing that in addition to its notable dogmatic tendencies, medicine may also be 
guilty of overemphasizing its scientific foundations and failing to integrate patient experiences 
of illness as an important part of clinical practice – two issues perhaps best captured by 
Kirkengen’s and Eriksen’s following observation:  
 
‘The subjective world of human life and experience has no given place in a naturalist bio-
medical perspective where objectivization and standardization are key concepts. The effects 
of psychological, relational and sociocultural aspects on human health and morbidity have 
therefore remained systematically marginalized in the knowledge production of this science. 
Consequently, researchers as well as clinicians run the risk of helping to disregard, conceal or 
reject significant sources of disease.’52 
 
Indeed, medicine’s constant striving for clarity and rigid rationality may have resulted in a very 
                                                          
48Feinstein, A., Clinical Judgment, The Williams and Wilkins Company, Baltimore, 1967, p. 54 
49 Ibid, p. 55 
50 Cassell, E., Op. cit., p. 27: ‘Science cannot be the dominant force in medicine because it is in the service of 
something larger than itself. Science, properly understood, must be conceived as being as fully responsive to 
human needs as possible.’  
51 Eriksen, T. E., Kirkengen, A. L. et al, ‘The medically unexplained revisited’, Medicine, Health Care and 
Philosophy, August 2013, Vol. 16, No. 3, p. 594: ‘The established medical ways of thinking the elaborate 
terminology and the sophisticated, quality-controlled methodologies are perceived as sufficient for the 
investigation and handling of the matter [of illness].’   
52 Ibid, p. 598 
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narrowly construed view of disease. While physicians like Cassell remain open to the notion 
that ‘social and cultural forces’ may affect health53, and resist oversimplified formulations of 
morbidity, a significant number continue to apply the ‘axioms’ listed by Feinstein – especially 
the belief that there is a strict causal connection between abnormal structures and abnormal 
functions in illness.54 Feinstein decidedly opposed this disease theory, noting how ‘different 
anatomic lesions can produce identical abnormalities in clinical function’55 and reminding his 
readers that form and function (or, as he would rather refer to them, ‘clinical manifestation’ 
and ‘laboratory manifestation’) can often diverge,56 producing errors in both reasoning and 
communication57 in cases where ‘the diagnostic name of a disease is inadequate to distinguish 
the diverse functional effects that can occur in different patients who have the same 
pathologic lesion.’58 59 Without a doubt, Feinstein was highly percipient towards identification 
issues, like the picture presented by such ‘incomplete diagnostic phrases’ – a picture not so 
much deficient in accuracy as lacking in detail and insufficient as far as the patient’s personal 
clinical situation is concerned. His insight is further developed by authors like Kirkengen and 
Cassell, who have proved themselves to be just as sensitive to the multifactoriality of disease 
and the fragmentary, delimited nature of ‘the various medical specialties’ grasp of “the 
matter”’.60 Their work serves well to consolidate my first two arguments, outlined in the 
beginning of the chapter – the argument about specialization and the argument about 
objectification. However, the issue with objectification needs to be illuminated further. 
 
The comprehensive chapter on the axioms of medical thinking in Clinical Judgment is a rather 
clear testimony that Feinstein finds medicine’s preoccupation with measurability 
understandable, yet problematic, as many clinical phenomena (especially the ones observed 
by the bedside) are irreducible to dimensional expressions. However, it is not entirely clear 
                                                          
53 Cassell, E., Op. cit., p. 11 
54Feinstein, Op. cit., p. 55 
55Ibid, p. 67 
56Ibid, p. 68 
57Ibid, p. 69 
58Ibid 
59 My own example would be that of kidney failure, a very widely used diagnosis which does not really say much 
about the specific expressions, or about the underlying cause of the condition (e.g. whether the reason behind 
it is a kidney stone, the intake of nephrotoxic drugs, scleroderma, or something altogether different). 
60 Eriksen, T. E., Kirkengen, A. L., Op. cit., p. 594 
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whether this particular difficulty should be attributed to the elusive nature of bedside 
phenomena or to the (still quite limited) tools available for measuring variables like levels of 
personal discomfort and other subjective reactions or sensations. Feinstein seemed eager 
enough to point out both of these flaws, yet hesitant to identify only one of them as the main 
culprit for the frequent discrepancies between obtained data and observed phenomena; 
instead he stated that ‘a clinician… could never escape his inability to find dimensional 
expressions for many phenomena of the bedside.’61 Yet elsewhere he underlined that the ever 
developing technologies have already made (and will likely continue to make) possible the 
quantifiability of things previously thought to be non-measurable.62 It is only halfway through 
the book that we are given a precise answer – that the methods of contemporary medicine 
are bound to produce such mistakes; for instance, through the very means of diagnosis, the 
clinician already ‘[obliterates] his patient’s distinctions by consolidating them into a short 
identifying phrase…’63  
 
What is more, upon deeper reflection it turns out that the risk of receiving a wrong diagnosis 
is higher than generally thought.  Feinstein’s explanation is brilliant exactly because of the 
elegant simplicity with which it manages to capture and enlighten a complex problem such as 
the consequences of divided labour for scientific credence and reliability: ‘the clinician has 
transferred many of his old criteria problems to other diagnosticians – radiologists, …, clinical 
pathologists, and laboratory technicians,’64 and as a result the cognitive tasks surrounding a 
diagnosis are now allocated to other rational agents who may or may not be performing them 
correctly.65 Another author – Marilynn Rosenthal, has also pointed out the ‘permanent 
uncertainty’ surrounding clinical practice due to these organizational problems, as well as 
other variables such as human limitations.66 But another, more serious risk, concerns the 
purely theoretical aspects of clinical reasoning. Feinstein has argued that even when the 
                                                          
61Feinstein, Op. cit., p. 61 
62Ibid, p. 67 
63Ibid, p. 70 
64Ibid, p. 89 
65Ibid, p. 90, especially the part which mentions ‘all the potential errors of people, machines, or people using 
machines.’ 
66 Rosenthal, M. M., The Incompetent Doctor: Behind Closed Doors, Open University Press, Buckingham, 1995, p. 
17. Also see p. 19, which reads: ‘If there is permanent uncertainty in everyday medical practice, then there must 
be fallibility in what the doctor does.’ 
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cognitive procedure itself (involving the collection, examination, interpretation, 
synchronization and transfer of various kinds of clinical data) has been carried out correctly, 
the results would still be inadequate when it comes to identifying the ‘illness’ of the ‘host’, and 
therefore unsatisfactory: ‘within the “universe” of each “disease”, there is still a diverse 
spectrum of illnesses and hosts to be classified, and the clinician cannot be a therapeutic 
scientist until he has reproducibly identified these other elements that characterize the 
material he treats.’67 This pessimism  regarding the adequacy of clinical medicine is also 
expressed by the British writer and physician Lefever:  ‘My belief in the homeostatic potential 
of the human organism is not based upon fear of antibiotics and reverence for vitamins but 
rather upon skepticism for the whole charade of clinical medicine. Frankly I do not believe that 
patients’ lives are invariably improved by medical intervention. A fair amount of what I was 
taught in medical school has turned out to be dogma or even hogwash. … … I do not deny that 
there have also been dramatic clinical advances. However, my fear is that the fact that doctors 
can do something may lead to them doing it when perhaps they should not.’68 
 
Classifying the sick person’s illness, as it turns out, has been disregarded in favour of classifying 
the host’s personal features (age, race, sex, etc), the disease’s features (organs, tissues, cells, 
cellular content, etc) or the ‘agents of treatment.’69 Thus, explains Feinstein, the clinician is 
found to be lacking in ‘formal means of classifying clinical observations’, as well as in a ‘place 
to put the information when he communicates.’70In other words, the clinician simply does not 
seem to possess an adequate ‘taxonomic’71 vocabulary to suit his needs of classifying the 
distinctions that make up an illness in the ‘diseased host.’ What makes this situation 
particularly ironic according to the author is the otherwise strictly organized, effective, 
eloquent use of language in most scientific environments which clashes with the clinician’s 
verbal impotence (compared by Feinstein to a certain kind of aphasia): ‘in the midst of the 
                                                          
67Ibid, p. 124 
68 Lefever, R.,  ‘“Decision Making” in Medical Care: Is It a Consumer Good?’, IEA Health Unit Paper No. 8, London, 
The IEA Health Unit, 1990, p. 74 
69Feinstein, Op. cit., p. 126 
70Ibid 
71My use of the word ‘taxonomy’ here is not accidental; Feinstein appears to be quite open about his fondness 
of this term, despite its contemporary associations with zoology and botany. 
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articulate science …, the clinician is left scientifically aphasic, cacophonous, or mute… no 
syntax for a language in which to express his own clinical knowledge.’72 
 
However, the most important consequence of these unfortunate conditions is that the speech 
block encountered at the level of expression translates into (or rather originates from) a 
mental block on the intellectual level, preventing most clinicians from truly successful 
unobstructed theorizing about their observations. Feinstein is rather skeptical not only 
regarding the adequacy of the language used by doctors, but also regarding their actual critical 
abilities. He appears convinced that the average clinician ‘cannot speak his clinical distinctions 
well, or think about them clearly.’73 Several decades later, this skepticism regarding the medic’s 
successfulness as a thinker, truth-giver, theorist and rational moral agent continues to be 
echoed by physician and author Eric Cassell in his The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of 
Medicine, where he states that ‘physicians generally view themselves as realists who disdain 
all theorists and philosophers.’ 74 Instead, they are concerned about optimizing clinical practice 
by virtue of ensuring it has been permeated by science. Historian Reiser has linked the 
twentieth century’s increasing overdependence on medical technology to the latter’s 
presumed capacity to deliver accurate evidence, which was perceived as a solution to the 
unreliability of human judgement at the time: ‘[the] attachment to machine-produced 
evidence during the twentieth century originated in part from the contemporary faith in 
science and technology, and a belief that a scientific spirit entered clinical practice through 
technology’.75 It is, then, the false hopes produced by our own dependence on science and 
technology that we have to blame for most instances of ‘intellectual infirmity’ – or bias – in 
medical thinking. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will identify and discuss those of 
types of bias or inclinations that tend to affect the way scientists, practitioners, and naturalist 
philosophers perceive and conceptualize the phenomenon of disease. For instance, the next 
section will deal with the tendency to focus only on those aspects of biological normativity 
which can be explained via scientific laws; I will then move on to the intentional use of obscure 
                                                          
72Feinstein, Op. cit., p. 126 
73Ibid 
74 Cassell, E. J., The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004, p. 5 
75 Reiser, S. J., Medicine and the Reign of Technology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 161 
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language, the desire to impose a complete separation between facts and values, and the 
unquestioning attitude towards institutionalized knowledge.  
 
2. 3. Biological normativity vs. scientific laws. 
The idealized notion of scientific medicine as an enterprise concerned solely with discovering 
and applying the strict laws of phenomena has helped forge a particular brand of open 
determinism where correction is welcome only insofar as it comes from a related discipline 
sharing a similar methodology. Canguilhem has noted that collaborations between disciplines 
like physiology and pathology, for example, are perceived by most scientists as welcome 
potentially rectifying influences on physiological concepts – a position very much in line with 
that of philosophers like Whitehead, who has suggested that most sciences assume or 
presuppose other sciences and their results.76 But what if biological normativity and laws are 
not the same thing? What if life operates in ways that cannot all be reduced to the confirmable 
that scientists are trying to establish through their investigations? Cartwright has already 
rejected the ‘facticity’ of natural laws in physics (i.e. the notion that natural laws reflect the 
literal truth about facts without exception), arguing that laws have an explanatory task and 
must therefore be ‘given a metaphorical reading’. 77  
 
Whether or not we may be placing too much epistemic trust on the hard sciences is an issue 
which falls beyond the scope of this chapter. A question that does need to be asked, however, 
is whether the same thought patterns that take place behind the compositions of ‘laws’ and 
scientific theories ought to be seen as the only appropriate intellectual resources for 
explaining important aspects of human existence. Yet this approach seems so well supported: 
from the dawn of contemporary physiology and biochemistry in the late nineteenth century 
to now, theories have obeyed determinist assumptions about the presence of fixed input-
output causal connections in all biological phenomena. In his book The Normal and the 
Pathological, Canguilhem briefly turns his attention to Claude Bernard’s determinist 
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77 Cartwright, N., ‘Do the Laws of Physics state the Facts’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1980, Vol. 61, p. 77 and 
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philosophy of science, critiquing his ‘reduction of quality to quantity which is implied by the 
essential identity of physiology and pathology’, and expressing disbelief that one would 
reduce the difference between healthy persons and diabetics ‘to a quantitative difference of 
the amount of glucose within the body.’78 What is especially perplexing about this line of 
reasoning is that it both presupposes an ‘essential identity of physiology and pathology’ in the 
living organism (allowing for quantitative, but not qualitative variations) and, at the very same 
time, separates the results of their respective scientific disciplines, insisting that the 
development of physiology and pathology progresses in a form of isolation where neither of 
them can inform or correct the other (i.e. adopting the meta-scientific position of ‘closed’ 
determinism).79  
 
This contradiction, coming from Bernard’s otherwise tremendously well-informed and 
philosophically inclined mind, is by no means an isolated case in medical thinking. It is not the 
claim about the ‘essential identity of physiology and pathology’ that we should be surprised 
by, as the notion that quality is reducible to quantity has been around for centuries now and 
can be detected in various philosophical disciplines such as ethics, political theory, and 
philosophy of science. Indeed, when Canguilhem examines Bernard’s version of it, he recalls 
Hegel’s idea that quantity changes into quality by growth or diminution – a notion that has 
been successfully applied in the explanatory strategies of science, which manage to 
theoretically reduce the complex phenomenon of colour to a quantitative difference of 
wavelengths.80 The problem, therefore, does not lie in this lack of acknowledgement for the 
ontological distinction between the categories of quantity and quality. It lies within the lack of 
awareness that this position is accompanied by other theoretical commitments that seem to 
clash with Bernard’s (and his colleagues’ or followers’) purpose to explain physiological 
phenomena and pathological phenomena, as the implicit argumentative structure inevitably 
leads to the conclusion that ‘normal and pathological have no meaning on a scale where the 
biological object is reduced to colloidal equilibria and ionized solutions’.81 
                                                          
78 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 106-110 
79 Ibid 
80 Ibid 
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As seen in the above example, despite having been shaped by some of the brightest minds in 
the history of mankind, theoretical medicine and physiology have never lacked examples of 
logical fallacies, bias, errors, vague language, poor phrasing and unsystematic thinking. 
Feinstein, Canguilhem and Cassell have all attempted to demonstrate this from an insider’s 
perspective, and if their observations are correct, one ought to wonder about the reasons 
behind the inarticulacy and inconsistency they describe. Could the confusion be due, perhaps, 
to medicine’s peculiar multidimensionality, to its simultaneous existence as theory, practice, 
science and art all at once? Or could it be simply that the medical language is inadequate for 
theorizing and communication as it was developed more out of need for a ‘vehicle of 
professional recognition’82 rather than a means of conversation? It is very likely that both 
factors have contributed in their own way to the inaccessibility of physician speech, but here I 
will turn my attention the latter, underexplored one. 
 
2. 4. Additional purposes of medical language. 
On one hand there are the opinions that medicine is characterized by inherently unsystematic 
thinking, like the kind typically attributed to the arts, humanities and ‘soft sciences’. For 
instance, in one of his works Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler develops an interesting theory 
regarding the peculiar style of interaction typical for some medics.  According to Bleuler 
‘autism is by no means limited to schizophrenia, but … characterized the anthropocentric 
thinking of man throughout history in his drive for knowledge, his theories as to the creation 
of the world, causes for inexplicable phenomena, thousands of theories lacking any basis in 
reality, and the manifold attempts to change fate by magic and prayer. Autistic thinking has 
been extensively applied to explain disease, and unfortunately is fostered by the physician as 
he attempts to delude the patient and himself…’  83  
                                                          
82Quotation from Cardwell, D. S. L., The organization of science in England, London, 1972, as quoted by Lawrence, 
C. ‘Incommunicable Knowledge: Science, Technology and the Clinical Art in Britain 1850-1914’ in Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 20, No. 4, October 1985, p. 504 
83Garfield Tourney, ‘Eugen Bleuler. Autistic undisciplined thinking in medicine and how to overcome it’, Journal 
of the History of the Behavioral Sciences , 1973, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 414-416 
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On the other hand, there are the opinions which explain the obscure language and thought 
pathways of medics with theories about intentional segregation, achieved through the 
adoption of specifically produced codes of conduct. Social historians confirm that during the 
nineteenth century the public’s attitude towards medicine and the rising medical profession 
changed from suspicion to acceptance,84 and in the process, physicians’ main focus as an 
occupational group shifted away from securing their profession a respectable position in 
society, and onto addressing the problem of competition against other practitioners of the 
trade.85 According to Lawrence, for example, for a long time the professional authority of 
medical practitioners largely depended not only on their ability to advertise their skills, but 
also on their rhetorical practices – more specifically, on the way they ‘brought to public notice 
the cultured practitioner of arcane skills’ and protected the clinician’s interests ‘against 
competition.’86  
 
For instance, the sophisticated language used by gentlemen medics in the nineteenth century 
was to ensure that their community would not be reduced to a mere group of professionals, 
but rather come to be presented as a very élite and special society whose word meant more 
than that of regular practitioners.87 It was considered a demonstration not only of their 
authority as doctors, but also of their superior qualities as people; of their more refined and 
delicate nature. Physicians were almost comparable to ‘secular priests’88; figures whose 
unique influence just kept getting underscored further and further during the final stages of 
medicine’s transformation from art to science, and ‘whose authority and expertise 
                                                          
84Larson, M. S., The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis, University of California Press, 1979 
85 Of course, there have also been opinions that their common goals served to unite rather than divide all groups 
of medical practitioners; that the struggle for authority was essentially a struggle to break free from lay control, 
and to establish domination over the lay populace itself. See Katz, J., The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 33: ‘The early and close ties among the “educated” groups created a 
small but powerful elite that had the ear of kings, and, later, of Parliament, city councils, and other legislative 
bodies. United in the common pursuit of authority and power over ordinary citizens, these groups tended to 
support one another, particularly in relation to the wide world of patients, clients, lay healers and lay advisors 
whom, like the rest of mankind, they considered uneducated and of little consequence.’ 
86Lawrence, Op. cit., p. 504 
87Ibid 
88 Williams, S. J., and Calnan, M., ‘Modern Medicine and the Lay Populace: theoretical perspectives and 
methodological issues’ in Williams, S. J. and Calnan, M. (Eds.) Modern medicine: lay perspectives and experiences, 
UCL Press, London, 1996, pp. 1-31 
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encompassed not only bodily ailments but also prescriptions on a “good, virtuous and healthy 
life.”’89 Sharma has remarked on physicians’ various and sometimes conflicting roles as 
diagnosticians and technicians, but also as advice givers and counsellors; as persuaders and 
negotiators.90  
 
This portrayal of the trade, with its overstated focus on prestige and high esteem of personal 
characteristics, seems to be rejected by the contemporary tendencies set by evidence-based 
medicine. EBM ‘places a lower value on authority than the traditional paradigm of medical 
practice,’ says an article from the year 2000 prepared for the Evidence-Based Medicine 
Working Group,91 because it accentuates the importance of systematic approaches to 
evidence examination and of formal sets of rules within clinical decision making. On the other 
hand, it is also obvious that to this day non-clinical skills are still greatly valued in doctors and 
medical staff. Communication, social skills, listening skills, compassion, ‘sensitive 
understanding of the patient’ and many other similar qualities deemed important in the 
process of obtaining patient history are still regarded as crucial for those among us who aspire 
to achieve a successful career in medicine,92 as also confirmed by Calnan and Williams.93 
 
2. 5. Exploring the objections to humanistic ideals about clinical practice and medical 
thinking.  
It would have been convenient to regard humanistic approaches to medicine as a solution to 
the ‘intellectual infirmity’ threat described by Feinstein, if not for the fact that these 
approaches carry their own brand of risk. Authors like Jane Macnaughton and R. S. Downie 
remind us that while it is ‘recognized that the doctor must acknowledge the patient's humanity 
… through the adoption of the attitude of beneficence or compassion without losing any of 
                                                          
89 Gabe, J. et al, Introduction to Challenging Medicine, Routledge, London, 1994, p. xii 
90 Sharma, U., Complementary Medicine Today: Practitioners and Patients, Routledge, 1991, p. 169 
91Guyatt, G. H. et al., ‘Evidence-Based Medicine: Principles for Applying the User’s Guides to Patient Care’, Journal 
of the American Medical Association, 13 September 2000, Vol. 284, No. 10, pp. 1290-1295, quote is from p. 1291 
92Ibid, p. 1293 
93 See the first chapter in Williams, S. J. and Calnan, M. (Eds.) Modern medicine: lay perspectives and experiences, 
UCL Press, London, 1996. Page 17 reads, as follows: ‘… it is… clear that, beyond their technical competence, the 
personal qualities and communication skills of the doctor are the attributes that are valued most highly among 
the lay populace.’ 
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the essential technical elements in the doctor's attitude’94, quite often this is not only an overly 
demanding task for the busy medic, but also a hidden threat to the patient's autonomy, as it 
facilitates paternalistic attitudes in this setting of ‘deep caring.’95 Nevertheless, Macnaughton 
and Downie admit that clinical judgement should be a unity of both technical and humane 
judgement96, and that it is irreplaceable despite the ‘secure foundation’ provided for clinical 
decisions by the development of evidence-based medicine.97 Thus it appears that the big issue 
presenting itself in front of clinicians is neither a lack of humane judgement nor an 
incapacitated technical (or even theoretical) thinking per se, it is the difficulty to combine 
those two elements in fruitful ways that do not: 
1) … rob the medic of precious time for work with patients by introducing too many social 
and ethical rituals or stages within the doctor-patient relationship; 
2) … place too much moral burden on the medic by requiring her to establish deep human 
interaction with the patient; 
3) … impair the delicate epistemic balance of the medical investigation by focusing either 
only on technical aspects like diagnosis and aetiology or only on the human aspect 
(communication, exploring the patient's own history, characteristics and personality traits, 
etc.). 
 
Such dire conditions could present psychological obstacles in front of clinicians, both in clinical 
judgement and on higher levels of judgement, such as theorizing about the broader or more 
philosophical aspects of medicine. The responsibilities and demands faced by clinicians on a 
daily basis could easily render any rational agent unwilling to spend any more time than is 
absolutely necessary on reflections; they could also leave said rational agent confused, 
frustrated or reluctant to accept any more additions to her already extensive list of 
professional duties – especially if those newer additions do not concern the technical, but only 
the ethical aspects of the job. Therefore it is not too hard to understand why representatives 
                                                          
94Downie, R. S. and Macnaughton, J., Clinical Judgement: Evidence in Practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2000, p. 83 
95Ibid 
96Downie and Macnaughton, Op. cit., p. 104 
97Ibid, p. ix 
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of clinical medicine, with its very practical orientation and its focus on effective treatment 
rather than deep compassionate care, might see little use in exploring or creating meta-
theories about medical thinking. In his paper on clinical decision making, London general 
practitioner Robert Lefever provides a simple explanation why physicians prefer to follow the 
safety of routines in their day-to-day work: ‘Indeed, it is very much in the patient’s interest 
that I should follow a disciplined routine; it is only by following my routines that I remember 
what I should do, regardless of whether I am bright or tired, happy or sad, busy or slack and 
so on. The safety of routines is that they remove an important variable: me. That is not to say 
that I become a robot. Far from it, it means that I am wide awake when something does not 
fit the standard pattern.’98 
 
Naturally, whatever the psychological reasons behind this tendency that Feinstein chooses to 
call 'inarticulacy', it is clear that they are but part of the problem. There have been claims that 
medical professionals could benefit greatly from adopting a so-called 'humane attitude', the 
cultivation of which depends on education just as much as on moral virtue, or even entirely 
relies on education to provide the necessary basis for developing virtues. However, Williams 
and Calnan’s study on lay evaluative criteria99 suggests that there may simply be too much 
conceptual distance between patients and physicians in terms of what is to be considered as 
a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ treatment option. While the majority of ideas about what is ‘good’ may 
conceivably overlap with those of physicians (‘life-saving’, ‘quality of life enhancing’, 
‘necessary’, ‘restores independence’, etc), some patient ideas about what is ‘bad’ can leave a 
lot of room for disagreement with doctors who may perceive them as irrelevant and either too 
trivial or too abstract (a ‘bad’ treatment was associated with qualities such as being 
‘unnatural’, ‘immoral’, ‘unnecessary’, ‘promoting addiction or dependence’, or a ‘waste of 
money’). In addition, it has also been suggested that in most cases the programmes designed 
by contemporary medical school systems are too narrowly framed and only provide a basic 
                                                          
98 Lefever, R.,  ‘“Decision Making” in Medical Care: Is It a Consumer Good?’, IEA Health Unit Paper No. 8, London, 
The IEA Health Unit, 1990, p. 69 
99 Calnan, M. and Williams, S., ‘Images of Scientific Medicine’ in Sociology of Health and Illness, 1992, Vol. 14, pp. 
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technical  training instead of the broader education needed for building a truly wide and 
flexible cognitive outlook.100 
 
2. 6. Societies as opponents or enablers of authoritative medical models.  
This idea that there might be a fault in the institution of medical education can be rather 
challenging for those of us brought up in an atmosphere of complete epistemic reliance upon 
health care professionals. In a traditional East European society, where the majority of people 
still have comparatively little exposure to internet, computers and other sources of quick 
unlimited information, it seems almost perfidious and cruel to suggest that the doctor – a 
widely recognized figure of epistemic trust and respect – could be lacking in perspective or 
education, fallible, requiring further improvement or skill development.  
 
Meanwhile, in the West more and more patients each day independently browse information 
on their conditions by surfing the web or researching specialized literature; they make 
decisions and demand specific treatments, seek out second opinions, refuse to follow their 
practitioner's advice if they disagree with it, and even sue doctors for refusing to provide them 
a particular treatment that they require for themselves. Strong, for example, claims that the 
general public is becoming ‘increasingly skeptical about the value of modern medicine’, and 
more ambivalent towards doctors.101 In other words, the Western patient has broken free from 
the immobilizing, silencing role of a passive receiver of care and advice, and has come to regard 
herself as almost equal with the doctor in terms of cognitive credibility and active decision 
making. 
 
Due to their old historical roots, the causes underlying this turn in the evolution of social 
epistemology are more subtle than their obvious effects on hierarchy and ethics, and could 
easily go unnoticed by most. But if one chooses to venture into the history of Western 
medicine, the reasons reveal themselves in a long series of crucial events spread throughout 
                                                          
100Downie and Macnaughton, Op. cit., p. 174, p. 180 
101 Strong, P., ‘Sociological imperialism and the medical profession: a critical examination of the thesis of medical 
imperialism’, Social Science and Medicine, 1979, Vol. 13 A, No. 2, pp. 199-216   
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the recent past (especially the 20th century), which might have helped lead to a decrease in 
the public's overall trust in the (epistemic) infallibility of medics.102 As observed by Giddens, 
late modernity is an information-based era, and its society is a society of clever people who 
prefer to keep track of events by taking full advantage of whatever sources have been made 
available to them.103 Thanks to global media development during the past century, Western 
societies have been able to keep track of medical disasters in the making – such as the 
indiscriminate practice of lobotomy in both children and adult psychiatric patients in the USA 
which had left the brains of over 40000 people ‘irreparably vandalized by doctors’104 by the 
year 1955, or the wide use of dubious treatments like electroconvulsive therapy for 
schizophrenia and other psychiatric conditions up until the late 1950’s.105 
 
While so-called ‘bad medicine’ (a term for which I choose to credit Youngston and Schott) has 
undoubtedly existed since the dawn of time, it is in this age of free access to information and, 
coincidentally, of an ever-increasing importance of patient rights and freedom of choice, that 
we are more aware and less accepting of it than ever. The same social, ethical and political 
factors are shaping both the moral code of contemporary clinical practice and society’s 
expectations of practitioners; they represent the growing demand that practitioners be as 
trustworthy and reliable as possible, on an epistemic as well as an ethical level. They are the 
reason why more and more people, including many medics, have started to ask themselves 
why, about which things and to what extent doctors are to be trusted – not only with regards 
to clinical and moral judgment, but also as thinkers and theorists. But how to answer these 
questions? 
 
2. 7. Historical-philosophical analysis as a weapon against ‘intellectual infirmity’. 
                                                          
102This paragraph does not commit me to any positions regarding the public's trust in representatives of scientific 
medicine, it concerns mainly my own observations on public attitudes towards clinicians. In fact, further in the 
thesis I mention my personal impression that there are apparent discrepancies between the credibility levels 
attributed by the public to representatives of scientific medicine on one hand and to clinical practitioners on the 
other. The former generally tend to be regarded as more reliable truth-givers of a higher order, while the latter 
seem to be given a comparatively lower degree of epistemic credibility. 
103 Giddens, A., Beyond Left and Right, Polity, Cambridge, 1994 
104 Youngston, R. and Schott, I., Bad Medicine: True stories of weird medicine and dangerous doctors, Robinson, 
London, 2012, p. 254 
105 Ibid, p. 321 
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The critical thinking cultivated by disciplines like philosophy could help us escape the influence 
of the particular brands of prejudice pertaining to science and science-permeated disciplines 
such as clinical practice. Those of us looking for the answers to questions like ‘What is 
disease?’ struggle with a lot of conceptual difficulties, although philosophical debates have 
been successful in shedding some light on them. Negative definitions of disease such as ‘an 
absence of health and well-being’ raise further questions, like ‘What are health and well-
being?’, and functional definitions which explain health and disease through the (in)ability to 
cope with life and to perform everyday tasks fail to capture the distinction between healthy 
people and ill people who are independent and well adapted to their conditions. Defining 
health through well-being is also problematic as it implies that well-being could be present 
only in healthy individuals, while authors such as Carel106 and Lindsey107 have argued that well-
being is possible and quite common even among the sick. Definitions of health/disease should 
avoid reinforcing negative stereotypes and misunderstandings. One way to achieve this is 
through abandoning the deficit perspective. Disease does not necessarily equal disability, 
discomfort and lack of health or well-being in all cases: one could test positive for HIV and still 
be healthy in the sense that one is free of other infections; one could be affected by a slight 
case of myopia and still have healthy eyes in the sense that she does not need contact lenses 
and her optic nerves have not been damaged by conditions like severe glaucoma. In addition, 
the sense of comfort and well-being could be absent in healthy individuals due to trauma, 
injury, stress, or even perfectly ‘normal’ but unpleasant states and processes like teething, 
menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth, or ageing.108 
                                                          
106 Carel, H., ‘Can I Be Ill and Happy?’, Philosophia, 2007, Vol. 35, pp. 95-110 
107 Lindsey is responsible for an innovative study of health experiences in illness and disability, which was 
conducted among eight chronically ill participants. The results revealed that these subjects felt they were capable 
of ‘celebrating life’, establishing social connections and pursuing life opportunities, transcending their own selves 
and the illness, et cetera. Based on the study, Lindsey concludes that the so-called ‘deficit perspective’, which 
construes chronically ill and disabled people as somehow deficient or defective, does not produce an accurate 
portrayal of their experiences. See   Lindsey, E., ‘Health within illness: Experiences of chronically ill/disabled 
people’, Journal of Advanced Nursing, Vol. 24, pp. 465–472 
108 I am aware that a recent paper by Christopher Boorse argues that ageing is pathological (see Boorse, C., ‘A 
Second Rebuttal on Health’, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, December 2014, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 683-
724). The main reason I do not accept this argument is that it relies on making ‘young adults the standard for all 
adults’ and ‘[counting] age as irrelevant after adulthood’ – a strategy which is not likely to deliver reliable results, 
since the threshold of adulthood is itself an arbitrary category, and since human beings tend to develop and age 
at very different rates. 
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An additional benefit of philosophical approaches to health/disease definitions is their 
openness to exploring different models of body perception in health and disease. A powerful 
example is Barbara Duden’s paper ‘History of the Body’, which begins with an outline of 
Foucault’s idea about the epistemological break in the history of the Western body between 
the 18th and 19th centuries. Duden shows that, in accordance with that period’s new and 
different ‘cognitive style’, the body turned into an object of scrutiny and professional, 
scientific definitions. It came to be viewed in new ways as a new, solid, ‘organ-specific’ body 
model replaced the older, humoral, fluid one. This process was accompanied by changes in 
language. Until then, with the exception of highly educated patients (who often shared similar 
educational backgrounds with that of the medic, for instance good knowledge of Latin), 
medics usually had to deal with complaints made in the patient’s own language109, often 
influenced by her daily work and surroundings.110 Little by little the language used to describe 
the body and its parts or conditions underwent an evolution of its own as ‘the experiences are 
shaped and expressed according to medical diagnostic terminology, “humoral” body is 
replaced by a body with “dismembered, isolated, fixed” organs; symptoms have to be 
“organically localized.”’111 However, centuries ago, the body was both experienced (by 
laypeople) and thought of (by medics) as an arena of hidden, unseen processes and activities. 
An explanation of these processes was available only to the relatively low number of educated 
practitioners who were learning through Vesalius’s anatomical illustrations. In the present 
age, this is no longer the case, and the body is often viewed as an object available to the 
scrutinizing eye of the professional; disease is perceived as an objective condition, and 
symptoms are localized with much greater precision than the one shown in Albrecht Dürer’s 
prototype of a pain map, for example.112  
                                                          
109 Which was, as pointed out by Duden in her introduction to The woman beneath the skin, often ‘fantastic’and 
abundant of ‘improbable details’. 
110 Duden, B., ‘Medicine and the History of the Body’ in (Eds.) Lachmund, J. and Stollberg, G., The Social 
Construction of Illness, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1992, p. 46 
111 Ibid 
112 I am referring to Albrecht Dürer’s (1471-1528) small self portrait known today as The Sick Dürer on which he 
wrote, ‘Do wo der gelb fleck is und mit dem finger drawff dewt do is mir we’ (‘There, where the yellow spot is 
located, and where I point my finger, there it hurts’) before sending it to his physician for consultation. Because 
of its resemblance to the pain charts produced by Palmer, the inventor of modern pain mapping, this work of art 
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What the work of authors like Barbara Duden shows is that for every key epoch in history, 
accounts of health and disease are closely related to a predominant model of body perception 
of that epoch. That is why I place such high importance on the cultural and historical 
exploration of medical thinking’s stages of development, as the awareness of older notions 
and definitions could provide us with deeper insight, and help us build a basis for comparison 
between the thinking models of different historical periods. This comparison, in turn, can help 
us distinguish between the important persisting elements (which I sometimes refer to as 
‘constants’) and the more irrelevant variables – such as the influences of social-political and 
moral factors, or even aesthetic ideals. 
 
For instance in 19th century tuberculosis, which we now know as a deadly bacterial infection 
of the lungs, was believed to be a hereditary constitutional trait. Despite the fact that it 
affected people from all walks of life and killed an estimated one quarter of the adult 
population in 19th century Europe, it somehow became known as the disease of artists and 
poets113, and was associated with spiritual purity, creativity and fragility. Instead of potential 
threats to the health of the public, the sufferers were seen as noble, delicate, sensitive and 
brilliant, which is why their condition was glorified. The physical characteristics associated 
with it – like pale skin, restless shining eyes, thinness, and gaunt faces with hollow cheeks (as 
observed in all portraits depicting the Polish composer and pianist Chopin, a famous phthitic 
symbol of attractiveness during Romantism) – came to be romanticized and considered 
beautiful.114 This was all guided by the tastes of an era ruled by melancholy and ideals about 
tragic beauty, during which ‘consumption’ was often ‘used’ by its sufferers as a fashionable 
accessory because of everything it had come to symbolize.  
                                                          
has been called by physicians ‘the Renaissance prototype of pain maps’. For more information see the article by 
Schott, G. D., ‘The Sick Dürer – a Renaissance prototype pain map’ at:  
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC535996/, last accessed on 15 April 2013 at 17:36 h 
113 Anne Bronte, Emily Bronte, Walter Scott, Frederic Chopin and many other prominent figures in the field of 
music, art and literature are known to have died from what was then known as ‘consumption’.  
114 Of course, with the exception of George Sand who was fascinated by the ‘infinite grace’ with which her lover 
Chopin coughed (see Howe, M. J., George Sand: The Search for Love, Kessinger Publishing LLC, Whitefish, 2005 
for exact quotations of letters between Sand and Madame d’Agoult), most people simply disregarded some of 
the more unpleasant traits of the disease, such as hemorrhaging, sweating, hacking and so on, and focused on 
the beauty of flushed cheeks and shining eyes. 
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A similar case of ideals shaping the understanding about health and disease can be observed 
in the 17th century. The example I have chosen is Rubens's painting ‘The Three Graces’ which 
presents the viewer with an image of three beautiful full-figured young women surrounded 
by flowers and trees.  
 
At the time it was painted, the three women were considered a depiction not only of the 
predominant beauty ideals, but also of youth, vitality, fertility and good health. However, in a 
relatively recent paper Bonafini and Pozzilli argue that, when analyzed medically, these young 
women show signs of disease ‘that inevitably affect our reading of the image’ including, but 
not limited to, a ‘presence of overweight close to obesity with a calculated BMI between 26 
and 29, associated with an increased risk of cardiovascular disease.’115Whereas a 17th century 
physician would have seen nothing but robust, strong bodies when inspecting the painting, 
his contemporary colleague would inevitably detect the alarming signs of obesity, as well as 
the threat of numerous conditions like diabetes, high blood pressure, osteoarthritis, cancer 
and many others which are now associated with being overweight. We are taught about the 
benefits of maintaining a low body mass index and weight, but centuries ago fuller body types 
meant health and wealth, because they were associated with good nutrition, and thin bodies 
symbolized hardships, poverty, deprivation, and disease. Two things that have remained 
unchanged over the past few centuries are: a) that, with the obvious exception of romantic 
ideals about the tragic beauty of consumption, we usually link attractiveness and good health, 
and b) that today we still believe in the importance of proper nutrition as a way of preventing 
or treating disease. Studies confirm that nutritional alterations affect all aspects of the 
endocrine glands’ functioning,116 and that they can be used to control a variety of conditions, 
including sex hormone disorders. 
 
The two examples presented above show convincingly that research – including cultural 
                                                          
115 Bonafini B, Pozzilli P., ‘The Three Graces: Canons of Beauty or Disease Repulsion’, International Journal of 
Cardiology, 2013 Feb 22,  pp. 234-239  
116 Hari Kumar K., Baruah M. M., ‘Nutritional Endocrine Disorders’, Journal of Medical Nutrition and 
Nutraceuticals, 2012, 1, pp. 5-8 
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studies – on the history of causal explanations of disease could be of great use, as a historical-
philosophical interpretation of the major paradigm shifts in disease theory could reveal 
fundamental conceptual misunderstandings in health/disease definition debates, as well as in 
the philosophy of medicine more broadly construed. Since we live ‘in an environment which 
has been increasingly transformed by science and … in a society which has itself been wholly 
shaped by the scientific culture of modernity’117, we have this idealized picture of medicine as 
a result of unhindered scientific progress which marked history with numerous great 
discoveries that saved lives, improved the quality of life and educated us on the mysteries of 
the human body. But is that all there is to it? Philosophy, along with the ‘relatively neglected 
area of medical history’118 has much in store for us that could, if examined in detail, bring 
about significant changes in the way we think of medicine, health and disease.  
 
2. 8. On the supposed infallibility of science.
As noted in the previous section, science is not infallible. Its history is filled with examples of 
mistakes, misunderstandings, failed experiments and rejected theories which it has to correct 
in order to move forward. And just like the development of science is maintained by its own 
continual self-correction,119 our knowledge of this development could be improved by 
historical examination and interpretation of this continual self-correction and its 
circumstances. This, in turn, could help us build a better understanding of health and disease 
as objects of philosophical investigation. An example of this is the shift from the theory that 
diseases have multiple constitutional causes to ‘germ theory’ as described by K. Codell 
Carter.120 Carter attributes this shift to the rapid development of bacteriology, but it has also 
been shown by historical research to stem from certain processes dating as far back as the 
middle ages or the early modern age. The imbalance of temperaments (also known as 
humours) and other causes typically used for explaining diseases at that time were largely 
abandoned after the appearance of untreatable at the time epidemic ‘diseases as syphilis and 
plague, which were new, devastating, and often appeared contagious, and for which cures did 
                                                          
117 Gadamer, Op. cit., p. 104 
118 Thomas McKeown, The Origins of Human Disease, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, 1988, p. IV 
119 Gadamer, Op. cit., p. 3 
120 Carter, K. C., The Rise of Causal Concepts of Disease: Case Histories, Routledge, New York, 2003 
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not easily come to hand, stimulated a search for causes other than the imbalance of 
temperament.’121 For instance, physicians Da Monte and Fracastoro were convinced that 
syphilis was spread through contact; the former believed that this happened by the emanation 
of poison, and the latter – that there were ‘seeds’ which caused the disease within a receptive 
environment.122 This dramatic change from the previous (Galenic) line of thought which 
considered all diseases to be the result of imbalance in elements or humours, is a clear 
demonstration of the fact that ideas and concepts in science could also be subject to change 
and interpretation. In fact, historical interpretation of the relation between health and 
conditions of life can help us do away with misunderstandings about the nature of disease:  it 
could present us with a clearer picture of the behavioural or environmental origins of disease 
while at the same time removing any attempts to explain disease through, or attribute disease 
to, factors like ‘intrinsic inferiority’ or ‘weakness’ of the affected organism. Some scientists 
hold that we are not genetically well equipped for the contemporary way of life. Human 
genetic constitution has remained basically the same over the past 100 000 years. The 
contemporary businessman sitting in his office chair for hours on end has the same 
constitution as his hunter gatherer ancestors, though he is exposed to completely different 
life conditions and, at least according to some, faces much greater, man-made dangers to 
health (such as environmental pollution, smoking, alcohol, junk food and isolated, sedentary 
lifestyles far removed from the active life that our genes have prepared us for).123 It has been 
argued that health is a condition based, among other things, on the quality of the relationship 
between the body’s genetic constitution and its environment. That might sound plausible, but 
according to some theories disease cannot be eradicated just by correcting the socioeconomic 
or environmental context of its origin, because ‘we simply substitute one form of disease for 
another’ and ‘other forms of illness seem to fill any vacuum produced by corrections in 
harmful environments’.124 Aetiology, then, should not feature in accounts of disease, if we are 
                                                          
121 Wear, A., ‘Medicine in Early Modern Europe 1500-1700’ in Lawrence I. C. et al, The Western Medical Tradition 
800 BC to AD 1800, CUP, 1995, p. 261 
122 Ibid, p. 263 
123 Of course, despite all these hazards, birth rate has increased, mortality has declined, and health has improved. 
All this can be attributed to our increased knowledge of disease mechanisms. 
124 Bean, William B., ‘Changing Patterns of Ideas about Disease’ in Rotschild, Henry R. (Ed.), Biocultural Aspects 
of Disease,Academic Press, Orlando, 1981, p. 46 
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to avoid dangerous distractions and further complications to an already ambitious 
philosophical task. 
 
Clearly attempts to ‘outsmart’ and subordinate the powerful dynamic of health and disease 
to the needs of mankind ought to take priority over conceptual disagreements about the 
meaning of a term. This observation has been used to justify eliminativist positions regarding 
health/disease definitions – i.e. positions according to which these definitions are irrelevant 
or even harmful distractions from more important discussions. Canguilhem asserts that it is 
‘understandable … that physicians are not interested in a concept which seems to them to be 
too vulgar or too metaphysical’, since that which truly interests them is diagnosis and cure 
understood as ‘restoring a function or an organism to the norm from which they have 
deviated. ’125  The next three chapters will deal with the following problematic implications of 
this notion:   
1) …that conditions which cannot be cured are not diseases (more on this objection in Chapter 
5); 
2) … that debates about the exact meaning of health and disease are pointless and, most 
importantly, useless (a position also known as eliminativism in the philosophy of medicine, 
which I shall critique in Chapter 4); 
3) …that health should be regarded as a measurable characteristic. 
 
The latter position’s historical and theoretical roots shall be explored in the next chapter 
(Chapter 3), but a proper critique of it will be developed in greater philosophical detail in 
Chapter 5, after we have dealt successfully with the arguments for eliminativism in the 
health/disease definitions debate (Chapter 4). Among many other questions, Chapter 5 will 
ask:  
 
                                                          
125 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 122 
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a) If disease is a measurable property, as some physicians and scientists seem to believe, then 
does that not mean that health is too? 
b) If health is the same thing as normality and normality is a standard based on the average of 
a measurable characteristic, then health would be measurable too, but how are we supposed 
to account for the fact that health is not something which has an upper limit (as pointed out 
by Boorse)? 
 
Chapter 3, however, will not raise these questions just yet. Instead, it shall introduce us to the 
historical and sociocultural influences which produced the very discourse of naturalist views 
on biology, physiology, medicine and the corporeal aspects of human life. The purpose is to 
demonstrate that naturalism, rather than being a paragon of scientific objectivity, is itself a 
historically situated intellectual movement, and thus no less prone to various forms of 
socioculturally conditioned bias. 
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3. Quantifying abnormality then and now: 19th century scientific 
theories and their ongoing influence on contemporary philosophical 
discussions of disease 
 
‘The age of science in medicine – the radical transformation of medicine that began in mid-nineteenth 
century and continues today – coincided with the age of medical monopoly. While scientific thinking in 
medicine existed at least as early as the seventeenth century, the decisive change in the mid-nineteenth 
century was the startling rapidity of medical advances which changed the profession. … The magical 
promise of science to wipe out disease contributed to the public’s willingness to turn away from other 
healers and allow allopaths… to take charge.’ ~ Jay Katz126 
 
‘The journey deep into human flesh initiated by dissection is what has made Western medicine unique. 
It has sustained the fruitful conviction that in ever-more-minute investigation of the flesh lies the key 
to health and disease, even if that has also encouraged a tendency to myopic reductionism, to miss the 
whole by concentrating exclusively upon the parts.’ ~ Roy Porter127 
 
 
The above quote from Roy Porter refers to the role played by 16th and 17th century anatomical 
discoveries in the subsequent development of scientific biomedicine’s and clinical practice’s 
theoretical apparatus. Indeed, the history of anatomy presents fruitful ground for research for 
anyone interested in the connection between reductionism and the rise of the ‘medical gaze’ 
(which coincided with the elevated status of observation in post-Vesalian anatomy). In his 
book Blood and Guts: A Short History of Medicine, Porter identifies advances in anatomy  as 
the main factors behind the shift from humoral to organic theories of disease: ‘… in due course 
the familiarity which followed from dissection drove investigators to rethink the body and its 
disorders – indeed, the very nature of disease. Traditional humoral theories had viewed health 
and disease in terms of systemic fluid balance. This model was gradually supplanted by a new 
                                                          
126 Katz, J., The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 40 
127 Porter, R., Blood and Guts: A Short History of Medicine, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2004, p. 54-55 
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concern with local anatomical structures and mechanisms – the “solids”. The “black box” of 
the body was being exposed to the medical gaze.’128 In that sense, anatomy in the 16th and 
17th centuries precedes 19th century physiology and biochemistry as the driving force behind 
disease objectification and reductionism. However, it lacks their pronounced influence on the 
general public’s medical culture. For the social and economic reasons outlined by Jay Katz, 
namely the intimate ties between medical monopoly and scientific advances in the nineteenth 
century, scientific medicine and physiology have been able to gain influence over the 
postmodern masses with a large, sweeping motion, and to keep this influence, thus reshaping 
the way everyone – laypersons included – thought about medicine, health and disease. Here 
I will argue that many of the features and opinions attributed to contemporary science and, 
by association, to clinical practice and medical thinking, are in fact value-laden and culture-
specific, rather than representative of undisputed objective truths.  
 
3. 1. Science, values, and fetishization. 
The new ideal of science is one which depicts a humane and human-oriented science, which 
does not abandon societal values during its relentless search for truth, but rather manages to 
incorporate them in its pursuits – usually in the form of focusing on current socially significant 
issues and their potential solutions. This is not the early twentieth century ideal from which 
we have inherited our predominantly naturalist approaches to medical and biological 
phenomena – the ideal about the distant, unconcerned, solitary endeavour,129 focusing on 
issues far removed from the lifeworld and more engaged with objectivity than with 
practicality. In the biomedical field, preoccupation with objectivity is linked with a fetishization 
of acontextual, universally valid, quantifiable evidence as a sign of accuracy and reliability – a 
trend originating in nineteenth century Western physiology and biochemistry in opposition to 
intellectual movements like vitalism, as will be shown in this chapter. While it may have served 
the purpose of eradicating these movements with a remarkable success, its contributions to 
patient-practitioner relationships remain dubious. Far from facilitating a fully functional 
interpersonal dynamic between these groups, the obsession with objectivity may even have 
                                                          
128 Ibid, p. 59 
129 Jewson, N. D., ‘The disappearance of the sick-man from medical cosmology’, International Journal of 
Epidemiology, 11 May 2009, Vol. 38, pp. 622-633  
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turned into an obstacle to the practice of a more humane and personalized medicine. Here I 
will briefly outline the particular historical and cultural context where it formed in order to 
explain its original role. I will then use the results of this comparative historical-philosophical 
analysis to argue that such extreme fetishization of science can no longer serve the current 
purposes of medical thinking and medical ethos, nor the challenges faced by practitioners in 
the present. 
 
Some have felt that through scientific medicine, physiology and biochemistry, clinical practice 
has been permeated by a scientific spirit resulting in a glorification of quantifiable, ‘precisely 
expressed evidence’130, as well as an excessive faith in science and technology’s abilities to 
deliver certainty via strict, reliable methods. The roots of naturalist approaches to health and 
disease definitions (and to medical thinking in general) can be discovered there as early as the 
nineteenth century. I will trace them back to just one particular source not only for the 
purpose of brevity, but also because of its high degree of saliency, which makes it an excellent 
illustration of the intellectual trends I have set out to explain. Indeed, the cult status acquired 
by the French scientist and philosopher Claude Bernard in the history of physiology has 
allowed Bernardian anti-vitalism to continue spreading its enormous influence onto medical 
thinking up until the middle of the twentieth century.  
 
3. 2. Bernardian anti-vitalism and the origins of the ‘value-free science’ myth. 
The biostatistical theory developed by contemporary philosopher of medicine Christopher 
Boorse suggests that disease could be understood as an individual organism’s deviation from 
a biological species’ statistically typical organ functioning. This objectified view of abnormality 
as a quantifiable biological parameter was anticipated over a hundred years beforehand by 
Bernard. The 19th century physiologist – equally famous for his medical discoveries and his 
prolific work on scientific methodology – came up with a theory which heavily implied that 
physiology and pathology were merely quantitative variations of the same state, and viewed 
abnormality as a measurable property rather than a value-laden term for an undesirable 
                                                          
130 Reiser, Op. cit., p. 162 
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physical trait.  This section will present brief outlines of the two theories and draw parallels 
between them.  After that the results of this comparison will be combined with an analysis of 
19th century science’s constructions of the abnormal in order to demonstrate how the latter 
have influenced the way we think about health, disease and disability today. The goal will be 
to show that the ongoing influence of 19th century science’s construction of abnormality has 
not only paved the way for naturalistic accounts of disease in contemporary philosophy of 
medicine, but also may have contributed to the medical breakthroughs associated with this 
historical period through significant changes in the patterns of medical thinking. 
 
As already mentioned in an example from the previous chapter, during the early the 19th 
century tuberculosis was construed as an inherited constitutional trait rather than an acute 
illness. The overall position was that sickness was caused by a hereditary weak constitution, 
and that both physiological normality and pathology were largely predetermined by 
hereditary factors. Thanks to the celebrated bacteriologist Robert Koch, we already know that 
tuberculosis is an infectious disease caused by bacteria, but that is not the only change 
humanity has witnessed since then. Historians of medicine and philosophy have argued that 
both our scientific and our everyday notions of disease and abnormality have undergone a 
massive epistemic shift, leading to a standardized practice of medicine where what Foucault 
would have called the ‘gaze’ objectifies and monitors the subject in order to measure any 
potential deviations.131 
 
Once again, I would like to call the reader‘s attention to Gadamer‘s characterization of the 
scientific approach as an approach ‘concerned with quantifiability, with weighing and 
measuring. What we esteem in science is that capacity for objectification which is 
fundamental to the acquisition of knowledge.’132 Hormonal levels, bone density or intraocular 
pressure and other biomedical parameters measured during examinations seem to point that 
there is an objectively measured side of normality. I intend to show how this idea originated, 
among other sources, in the writings of 19th century French scientist Claude Bernard, and that 
                                                          
131 Foucault, M., The Birth of the Clinic: An archaeology of medical perception, Routledge, London, 2003, 
especially p. 137-139 
132 Gadamer, H. G., The Enigma of Health, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 105 
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there is a palpable connection between his works on theoretical physiology and the 
abovementioned intellectual tendencies. I also suggest that naturalist accounts of health and 
disease in contemporary philosophy of medicine (in this case the account proposed by Boorse) 
draw on Bernard’s concept of milieu intérieur (internal environment). 
 
Without doubt, in this age the predominant approach in medical thinking is one which relies 
heavily on objectification, teleological explanations and dehumanized objective parameters. 
This tendency has predictably influenced the philosophy of medicine, where it informs one of 
the sides in the debate about the definitions of health and disease – naturalism. In an article 
from 1977 that was widely regarded as the prime example of this philosophy, Christopher 
Boorse attempted to provide a value-free account of disease based on the notion of biological 
function as a contribution to an organism’s goals. 
 
 Today the paper ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’ continues to be recognized as the most 
sophisticated one of its kind. There also appears to be general agreement that Boorse has 
been successful at creating a definition of (ab)normal functioning as a phenomenon that can 
be determined by empirical facts alone – which was clearly his goal, judging by the conclusion 
of the paper: ‘in any vocabulary, we must avoid confusing empirical questions with deep 
normative issues about the goals of human life.’133 
 
On Boorse’s account, health equals statistical normality, or statistically typical functions with 
at least statistically typical efficiency in contributing to the organism’s survival and 
reproduction. By ‘typical’ here we mean typical for the corresponding reference class to which 
the organism belongs – i.e. an age group of a sex of a species. Correspondingly, a disease 
would be any condition which departs from this typical performance, in other words, any 
dysfunction of an organ or (sub)system: ‘Health in a member of the reference class is normal 
functional ability: the readiness of each internal part to perform all its normal functions on 
typical occasions with at least typical efficiency. A disease is a type of internal state which 
                                                          
133 Boorse, C., ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 4, December 1977, p. 572 
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impairs health, i.e. reduces one or more functional abilities below typical efficiency.’134 That is 
why the biostatistical theory (BST) developed by Boorse is characterized by its heavy reliance 
on biomarkers for diagnosis and classification: an approach which is typically associated with 
20th century thinkers, but which reaches as far back as the 19th century, where it originated as 
a quasi-ideology. Over the next few paragraphs I will show that the seminal works of 
physiologist and philosopher of science Claude Bernard anticipated this objectification and 
quantification of physiological (ab)normality which appear to have become characteristic for 
both contemporary science and philosophy of medicine. 
 
In the year 1836 Claude Bernard135 (b. 12 July 1813 in the French village of Saint-Julien), who 
had been exposed to the pharmaceutical sciences while working as an apprentice at a 
chemist’s shop during his college years, decided to pursue internship in one of the oldest 
hospitals in Paris [Hôtel-Dieu de Paris]. While there, he met the physician François Magendie, 
who also happened to be a famous professor in physiology at the Collège de France. Just a 
few years later, Bernard became a lab assistant at the same university in 1841, and six years 
after that he was assigned the duties of deputy-professor for his patron and friend. Eventually 
he would become a full professor, as well as a member of the Académie française and the 
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Although his contemporaries tended to underestimate 
the importance of his area of research, Bernard quickly became famous for multiple scientific 
discoveries: for instance the digestive function of the pancreas, the glycogenic role of the liver, 
the processes taking place behind body temperature regulation, etc. He was able to make 
these discoveries through animal vivisection – a practice which was being met with serious 
disapproval at the time (and even led to the scientist’s divorce with wife Marie Françoise, who 
later went on to set up an anti-vivisection society). In addition to his scientific contributions, 
Bernard left behind a philosophical legacy, which turned out to be overabundant with 
influential ideas. 
                                                          
134 Ibid, p. 555 
135 Many thanks to Dr Peter Wise, as the biographical elements contained in the present chapter are based almost 
exclusively on information from his webpage about Bernard‘s life and work. [Please see http://www.claude-
bernard.co.uk/, last accessed on 14 December 2016, 12:16 h.] 
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As a college student, young Claude had been exposed to philosophy, for which he developed 
a deep passion that never quite left him. He was profoundly influenced, for example, by the 
writings of the French mathematician and philosopher René Descartes, and drew on these 
ideas throughout his entire life and career. Cartesian doubt provided the basis of Bernard’s 
approach to science, and inspired his own theoretical works on scientific methodology. ‘True 
science teaches us to doubt, and in ignoring, to refrain’, he noted in his magnum opus An 
Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine, before proceeding to explain that ‘our 
feelings lead us at first to believe that absolute truth must lie within our realm; but study takes 
from us, little by little, these chimerical conceits.’136 
 
Apart from this famous book, he also left other works such as Le Cahier Rouge [The Red 
Notebook], Pensées: Notes Detachées [Thoughts: Various Notes], and a series of manuscripts 
kept at Collège de France, all of which contain philosophical reflections based on 
methodological skepticism. Bernard provided the initial boost for contemporary experimental 
medicine’s theoretical framework by forging his own brand of determinism: asserting that 
there needed to be established principles in experimentation, and opposing his colleagues’ 
reliance on chance, repetition, and coincidence. This was the kind of reasoning behind the 
introduction of standardization for experimental procedures, as well as the introduction of 
parameters for medical monitoring. 
 
Bernard was also firmly opposed to vitalism – the then-predominant doctrine which 
postulated a core difference between the principles governing living and non-living entities: 
‘vitalists have always insisted on the impossibility to explain the phenomena of life in physical 
or mechanical terms; their adversaries have always responded by reducing the manifestations 
of life to well demonstrated physical-chemical explanations.’137 
                                                          
136 Bernard, C., An introduction to the study of experimental medicine, translated by H. C. Greene, digitized by the 
Internet Archive in 2014, available online at https://archive.org/stream/b21270557/b21270557_djvu.txt, last 
accessed on 12 December 2016, 04:39 h. 
137 My translation, original paragraph reads: ‘les vitalistes se sont toujours retranchés dans l’impossibilité 
d’expliquer physiquement ou méchaniquement tous les phénomènes de la vie; leurs adversaires ont toujours 
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In his book La Science Expérimentale, Bernard famously expressed his frustration with authors 
who still clung to metaphysical explanations of will and intellect: ‘people find it conceivable 
that one can derive digestion, respiration, locomotion etc from mechanical phenomena; yet 
they do not admit that thought, intelligence, and will all submit to similar explanations.’138 The 
scientist even compared living organisms to wonderful machines – complex and delicate, yet 
amenable to scientific analysis and modification: ‘the living organism is nothing more than a 
wonderful machine gifted with the most marvelous properties, driven to action by the most 
complex and delicate mechanisms.’139 To illustrate his claims about the thin line between life 
and non-life, and about all natural entities obeying the same set of physical-chemical laws, he 
used the rather gruesome yet convincing example of a decapitated dog whose body would 
continue to perform its typical physiological functions whenever injected with oxygenated 
blood.140 Here we can observe the roots of physico-chemical and psychophysical reductionism 
in medical thinking, which has been fueling the contemporary desire for quantification of 
biological phenomena. 
 
Last but not least, in the late 1860’s Bernard’s idea about blood as an ‘organic environment, 
an intermediary between the external environment and the (internal) living molecules’141 
finally crystallized into the concept of milieu intérieur, for which he is so widely known today, 
and which revolutionized medicine in its own way. Back then, Bernard described this concept’s 
role in his theoretical works as a facilitating one, and suggested that it could be a useful 
intellectual tool for scientists who strive for precision in their studies of physiological 
                                                          
répondu en réduisant un plus grand nombre de manifestations vitales à des explications physico-chimiques bien 
démontrées’, see p. 204 of Bernard’s La Science Expérimentale 
138 My translation, original paragraph reads: ‘on conçoit que l’on puisse ramener la digestion, la respiration, la 
locomotion, etc., à des phénomènes de mécanique, de physique et de chimie; mais on n’admet pas que la 
pensée, l’intelligence, la volonté se soumettent à de semblables explications’, ibid, p. 370 
139 My translation, original paragraph reads: ‘[…] l’organisme vivant n’est qu’une machine admirable douée des 
propriétés les plus merveilleuses, mise en action à l’aide des mécanismes les plus complexes et les plus délicats. 
C’est une machine dont [le physiologiste et le médecin] doivent analyser et déterminer le mécanisme, afin de 
pouvoir le modifier […],’ ibid, p. 54 
140 Ibid, p. 123-124 
141 Translated by Dr Peter Wise for his personal project on the life and works of Claude Bernard. The original 
version of the paragraph can be found in Bernard, C., Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale, 
Baillière, Paris, 1865, p. 398. The translated quote can be found at http://www.claude-
bernard.co.uk/page10.htm, last accessed on 14 December 2016, 12:16 h. 
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functions: ‘experimental or scientific medicine should be based mostly on knowledge of the 
properties of the intra-organic environment… When we are under the influence of medication, 
it is not exactly our stomach that it affects, but only our intra-organic environment, after it has 
gained access to our bloodstream and entered into contact with our organized particles. This 
idea of the internal environment which directs my studies in physiology has served me to 
determine in a more precise manner  the effect of toxic substances on the various elements 
of our body.’142  
 
However, the concept of milieu intérieur ended up serving more than just an auxiliary purpose 
– to the contrary, it became the foundation of the homeostatic explanatory model of disease, 
which continues to dominate orthodox medical thinking to this day. Bernard postulated 
homeostasis, or the stability of the organism’s internal environment (milieu intérieur), as a 
necessary condition for life – a notion which left a deep trail in 20th century medicine and 
philosophy. He described the homeostasis of the body’s milieu intérieur as a state maintained 
by complex processes of compensation and equilibration of ‘external variations’, a process in 
which all of the organism’s systems are involved, i.e. the body regulates itself, ensuring its own 
life and normal functioning.143 Within this theoretical framework, any change was regarded 
as a possible source of disturbance: ‘[To him,] disease is an alteration in the normal functioning 
of the anatomical element, an alteration which is due either to [the element] itself, or to the 
composition of the blood or internal environment, or to the mode of distribution of the 
internal environment.’144 In other words, abnormality was a deviation from the organism’s 
self-sustained state of internal balance. 
                                                          
142 My translation, original paragraph reads: ‘La médecine expérimentale ou scientifique sera surtout fondée sur 
la connaissance des propriétés du milieu intra-organique. … Quand un médicament exerce sur nous son action, 
ce n’est point dans notre estomac qu’il agit, mais seulement dans notre milieu intra-organique, après avoir 
pénétré dans notre sang et s’être mis en contact avec nos particules organisées. Cette idée du milieu intérieur, 
dirigeant mes études en physiologie, m’a servi à déterminer d’une manière plus précise l’action des substances 
toxiques sur les divers éléments de notre corps […],’ ibid, p. 51-52 
143 Renan, E., Bert, P., Moreau, A.,  L’oeuvre de Claude Bernard,  J. B. Baillière et fils, Paris, 1881,  p. 68, p. 71-73 
144 My translation. For the original text see Renan, E. et al, Op. cit., p. 74: ‘Pour lui, la maladie n’est qu’une 
altération dans le fonctionnement régulier de l’elément anatomique, altération due soit à lui-même, soit à la 
composition du sang, du milieu intérieur, soit au mode de distribution de ce milieu.’ 
63 
 
 
 
3. 3. From homeostasis to functionalism, and how the intellectual legacy of 19th century 
reductionism led to attempts at quantifying pathology. 
Of course, the 19th and 20th century worked with slightly different theoretical formulations of 
balance, with 20th century science defining it not so much in terms of physical stability, but 
rather as a type of relationship or interaction between internal and external forces; between 
what was inside the organism and what was out there, in the environment. It is clear, however, 
that 20th century ideas about adaptation are deeply rooted in 19th century physiology’s 
advancements, and draw heavily on their homeostatic implications. As a demonstration, let 
us consider the following developments. 
 
At first, towards the end of the 19th century life for Bernard meant survival by means of 
regulation and compensation of external influences – a theory which was further developed 
by biology professor Lawrence Henderson in his book The Fitness of the Environment 
(published in 1913), which earned him a place among the world’s leading biologists during 
those days.145 Around the same time, a similar notion of stability or equilibrium was also 
picked up and ‘mobilized’ by Freud and analysts, as well as social theorists and economists as 
a key feature in numerous theories during the first decade of the 20th century.146  In 1923 the 
English surgeon and microbiologist Crookshank used virtually the same notion of life to base 
his theory about health as ‘the functional unity of the organism that continues when, following 
repeated response to stimulus, there is successful adaptation … to environment.’147 Disease 
was understood, correspondingly, as ‘no objective entity but a dissociation of functional unity, 
or, mal-adjustment due to failure or incompleteness of adaptive response.’148 The world 
famous endocrinologist Hans Selye also appeared committed to the concept of self-regulation, 
with all of his works published between 1951 and 1971 maintaining the claim that every case 
                                                          
145 Henderson, however, introduced a slight variation by making the point that biological stability was not to be 
understood as ‘absolute constancy’, but rather as something ‘cyclical’ and ‘adaptive’. See Jackson, M., The Age 
of Stress: Science and The Search for Stability, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 67 
146 Ibid 
147 ‘Science and health’ in Marvin, F. S. (Ed.), Science and Civilization, Oxford University Press, London, 1923, pp. 
247-278, at p. 247 
148 Ibid 
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of disease is essentially a failure to adapt to environmental stresses: 149 ‘there is an element 
of adaptation in every disease’150; ‘many of the most common maladies of man are “diseases 
of adaptation”, that is to say, the by-products of abnormal adaptive reactions to [external 
stressors].’151  
 
This growing tendency signified a major epistemic shift within medicine’s foundations, similar 
in its magnitude to the one which had occurred during bacteriology’s first years. It also meant 
that a new stage had begun in our understanding of (ab)normal physiological functioning, the 
terms in which it was to be described and examined, and the conditions under which it was to 
be regarded as needing rectification. These changes needed to be reflected by medicine’s 
scientific method; therefore, quite predictably, the very concept of self-regulation quickly led 
to attempts at quantification and standardization of the human body’s physiological functions 
and anatomical characteristics. Medical metrology flourished in response to the increased 
needs for reliable testing and measurement, which eventually led to the appearance of the 
so-called ‘biomarker’ indicators used today. 
 
Of course, there have been objections to some of the main principles in Bernard’s theory. For 
instance, Canguilhem has argued that the pathological state cannot be understood simply as 
a quantitative variation of a normal mechanism or process. There is something more to it, a 
quality which is acquired during the process of contextualization – namely, quantity acquires 
quality within the context of clinical practice where norms and standards are created: ‘For 
example, the hydration of tissues is a fact which can be expressed in terms of more and less; 
so is the percentage of calcium in blood. These quantitatively different results would have no 
quality, no value in a laboratory, if the laboratory had no relationship with a hospital or clinic 
where the results take on the value or not of uremia, the value or not of tetanus.’ 152 A ‘more’ 
                                                          
149 This expression is not a mistake on my behalf; in fact, Selye’s earlier work receives warranted criticism from 
Jackson for his inconsistent and indiscriminate use of the terms ‘stresses’ and ‘stressors’, often using them 
interchangeably in his earlier writings – i.e. taking ‘stress’ to mean both the reaction of the organism and the 
triggering factor from the environment. 
150 Selye, H., The Stress of Life, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1956, p. 127 
151 Selye, H., ‘Stress and The General Adaptation Syndrome’, British Medical Journal, 17 June 1950, Vol. 1 (4667), 
pp. 1383–1392 
152 Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, p. 111 
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or ‘less’, as we are reminded by Canguilhem, could only exist with relation to a specified 
standard. It is in relation to a fixed norm that a certain quantity can be translated as ‘too much’ 
or ‘too little’, become a value, acquire the quality of a ‘deviation from a norm’. Values, 
however, had no place in the discussions of scientific communities in post-Enlightenment 
France, who were too caught up in their struggle to discredit vitalism and popularize the
 knowledge of natural laws.
  
To go back and summarize, Bernard believed that not only the difference between living and 
non-living entities, but also the one between normally and abnormally functioning 
physiological mechanisms of living entities, could be summed up by quantitative variations 
which obeyed the same kinds of physical and chemical laws. The ‘pathological’ phenomenon 
was therefore a quantitative variation of the ‘normal’ phenomenon, and the difference 
between a diseased and a healthy state could be best described in units for objectively 
measurable parameters. For instance, a healthy organism would produce total bilirubin levels 
between 5 and 17 micromoles per litre, and anything above that would raise suspicions for 
Gilbert’s syndrome (relatively common genetic metabolism disorder), hepatitis or other 
conditions.  
 
In other words, just as Boorse, Bernard appears committed to eradicating values, as well as all 
other ethical and metaphysical concepts, from scientific accounts of life, health, disease and 
(ab)normality in physiological functioning. Of course, there also exist a number of obvious 
distinctions between their two conceptions of normality, though none of them appear 
significant enough to cause a fundamental contradiction. 
 
Boorse, for instance, has openly expressed the view that many life functions – such as 
perception, growth and pregnancy - are not homeostatic and even tend to upset the 
organism’s balance rather than maintain it; hence his opinion that there is no point in ‘trying 
to view corresponding diseases such as deafness…, dwarfism…, or sterility as homeostatic 
failures’. However, rejection of the homeostatic model of normal health per se does not 
necessarily entail a rejection of the milieu intérieur doctrine, of which it is but an element. In 
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fact, Boorse acknowledges that ‘certainly many aspects of normal and abnormal physiology 
fit this model,’153 and even that ‘various equilibria are crucial to life’154; his skepticism was 
reserved merely for the idea about internal equilibrium as the ultimate goal of all physiological 
functions. It should be indicative of something important that the most sophisticated currently 
available account of disease is underpinned by the same theoretical assumptions that underlie 
one of the most influential disease theories in 19th century Western Europe. In this chapter I 
have shown that this is not coincidental, but the result of complex historically situated 
sociocultural factors, such as the dynamic opposition between the competing theories of 
vitalism and mechanism – a clash, the echoes of which resemble those of Cartesian dualism in 
terms of composition, audibility, and endurance. 
 
The idealized notion about value-free science conjured by the 19th century supporters of 
physico-chemical reductionism is one of the most powerful influences still permeating 
postmodern Western and industrialized societies, but it is rarely recognized as a culture-
specific phenomenon, since its historical roots rarely receive sufficient critical attention. 
Instead, it masquerades as an accurate representation of science and a necessary condition 
for the production of reliable, empirically useful knowledge.  
 
That, in itself, does not make reductionist and naturalist accounts of health/disease 
problematic. A more important issue results from the associated attempts to objectify, 
quantify and measure qualities or features that reside on an abstract level (‘normality’, ‘well-
being’), or to define non-scientific categories (‘health’, ‘disease’) in scientific terms. Such 
attempts are made to look somewhat misguided by the knowledge that science could never 
be a value-free enterprise which disobeys the dictate of sociocultural forces. That, however, 
in no way means that defining health and disease is itself a pointless task – it simply means 
that certain approaches are better equipped for the task than others, as I intend to show in 
my critique of eliminativism in Chapter 4.  In Chapter 5 I will outline some further 
resemblances between Bernardian anti-vitalism and Boorsian naturalism, analyze competing 
                                                          
153 Boorse, C., ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 44, No. 4, December 1977, p. 549 
154 Ibid. 
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theories, and investigate which among them could be augmented, combined, and put to use 
in the manner outlined in Chapter 1: 
 
1) …to provide a functional and relatable account of health/disease which will be well-adapted 
to the purposes of law and policy making without generating misunderstandings or instances 
of political incorrectness (e.g. by contributing to negative stereotypes, stigmatization, social 
exclusion and disempowerment of specific groups); 
2) …to account for our bodies’ ability to actively respond to influential factors from their 
environment whilst also regulating their own internal milieu; 
3) ...to depict disease as a biologically, psychologically and socially complex, multi-layered 
phenomenon; 
4) … to combine philosophical astuteness with a relatable ‘language of pain and reactivity’ 
(with which patients will readily associate); 
5) …to ‘unify’ the two distinctive languages of physician and patient, and to make their 
separate practical realities overlap for the sake of effective communication. 
 
Before that, though, I shall engage in a critique of eliminativist claims that a disease account 
is not currently needed by either practitioners or health care policy makers. The next chapter 
(Chapter 4) will present two such positions and falsify their arguments, thereby showing that 
there is indeed a need for health/disease accounts, and allocating their place both within the 
cosmology of clinical practice and outside it. For now I will conclude that, in addition to bearing 
serious internal contradictions and unrealistic pretensions about the kind of knowledge they 
can offer, approaches which rely on objectification and quantification to define dynamic and 
existentially meaningful phenomena such as health and disease only serve to constrain the 
debate further. They also limit its potential to make positive socially significant changes to the 
way health and disease are conceptualized and perceived. 
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4. Why are accounts of health and disease even necessary? A 
refutation of eliminativist positions on the debate about 
health/disease definitions. 
 
‘People do not merely have health beliefs, as they might have eggs carried in a shopping basket. They also 
construct their state of health as part of their ongoing identity in relation to others, as something vital to the 
conduct of everyday life. This means that the accounts that are given of health and illness are more than a 
disclosing of a supposed internal attitude. In offering views, people are also making claims about themselves as 
worthy individuals, as more or less “fit” participants in the activities of the social world.’155  ~Radley and Billig 
 
4. 1. Eliminativism in the context of the health/disease definitions debate. 
As previously mentioned, the debate about disease definitions has more than two sides. While 
normativists and naturalists argue whether disease is a label reserved for any disvalued 
physical states or there are objective criteria that need to be met, hybridists attempt to 
combine the two approaches in order to eliminate their weaknesses and play up their 
strengths. However, there are also philosophers who have expressed profound skepticism 
regarding the very need for such discussions. Ereshefsky, Hesslow, and John have supported 
eliminativist positions on health/disease definitions, arguing that such definitions are required 
neither for the purposes of clinical practice nor for those of health care policy making. 
Ereshefsky has theorized that state descriptions might suffice with regards to clinical 
decisions, and Hesslow has expressed concerns that the debate on health definitions is a 
needless distraction from more important matters – such as whether or not the patient feels 
that she needs a medical intervention. John, on the other hand, has argued that health care 
policies should rely on the concept of ‘personal safety’ rather than that of health.156 However, 
for the purpose of brevity, I will leave John’s discussion of ‘personal safety’ out of my analysis, 
and only focus on Ereshefsky and Hesslow’s positions, which exemplify eliminativist critique 
of health/disease definitions’ more general status in medical thinking. I will outline and 
                                                          
155 Radley, A., and Billig, M., ‘Accounts of health and illness: Dilemmas and representations’, Sociology of Health 
and Illness, March 1996, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 221 
156 John, S., ‘Why “Health” is not a Central Category for Public Health Policy’, Journal of Applied Philosophy, April 
2009, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 129-143 
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address each one of their positions separately in order to show that, although they are without 
doubt a valuable contribution to the philosophy of medicine, they cannot be taken as a 
compelling proof that the health/disease definition debate is pointless. Ereshefsky’s and 
Hesslow’s critique targets the importance of health/disease definitions in the context of 
clinical practice and health care policy making, leaving out the possibility that those definitions 
may serve other, less obvious practical purposes – such as helping ill people reclaim disease 
labels and re-conceptualize them in a way that would validate their experiences and identities, 
or enabling physicians to gain better understanding of said experiences and integrate them in 
clinical practice. Ereshefsky and Hesslow also disregard the inherently normative character of 
medicine and of the relationship between health and moral well-being, which has been 
pointed out by philosophers like Hamilton.157 Finally, Ereshefsky’s and Hesslow’s positions do 
not reflect the larger cultural and societal issues at hand – for instance that shutting down the 
health/disease definitions debate could signal problematic messages about the importance of 
disease’s existential aspects in human life, or that different interpretations of health and 
disease could shape lifestyle choices, compliance with public health measures, social 
expectations as to how ill or disabled people are meant to act, and ethical norms for 
interaction with those who are ill. However, before I address all of these issues in the present 
chapter, I will attempt to invalidate the positions which dismiss them so lightly. 
 
4. 2. Eliminativism and the question about ‘centrality’: Ereshefsky’s critique of the 
health/disease definitions debate. 
In a famous article from 2009, Ereshefsky states that normativism, naturalism and hybrid 
theories – the three most popular approaches to defining ‘health’ and ‘disease’, are all 
problematic and unsuccessful.158 He proposes an alternative approach which consists in a 
focus on distinguishing between the considerations currently considered to be ‘central in 
medical discussions’: state descriptions and normative claims. The former refer to descriptions 
                                                          
157 ‘[T]he question of the relationship between physical health and moral well-being is an ancient one. The Greeks 
noticed that morality and medicine seemed inextricably entwined…’, see p. 323 in Hamilton, R. P., ‘The concept 
of health: beyond normativism and naturalism’, Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 2010, Vol. 16., No. 2, 
pp. 323-329 
158 Ereshefsky, M., ‘Defining “health” and “disease”’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, September 2009, Vol. 40, No. 3, pp. 221-227 
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of physiological and psychological states, while the latter refer to claims about what we value 
or do not value. State descriptions should be free of normative elements (such as the use of 
expressions like ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ which Ereshefsky sees as burdened by ‘implicit normative 
assumptions’159). Normative claims are explicit value judgments – for instance, that HPV 
infections should be avoided and/or treated if possible. Ereshefsky attributes the usefulness 
of the distinction between state descriptions and normative claims to its capacity of 
highlighting the points of disagreement between disputants, instead of just lumping together 
the two aspects of the debate under the heading ‘disease’. For example, both sides of the 
dispute might agree that there is a condition/state which involves having a cervical ulcer, a 
pap-test result categorized as ‘group III’, and an infection with the HPV virus, but they might 
disagree on whether it should be treated and avoided. This way medical discussions could 
supposedly be carried out more effectively and without the needless distraction of arguments 
about the correct definitions of ‘health’ and ‘disease’. After framing the discussion in terms of 
state descriptions and normative claims we get to what is really important and then, claims 
Ereshefsky, ‘the terms of “health” and “disease” become superfluous’.160 He admits that many 
state descriptions rely on implicit normative components, and that they could never be 
completely value-neutral. However, he appears confident that as long as all talk of value is 
highlighted as a normative claim, normative concepts would not ‘get disguised as descriptive 
ones’.161 Bias in science cannot be eradicated completely, but according to Ereshefsky the 
threat it poses could be eliminated if its presence is highlighted and made more explicit. This 
is achieved by virtue of switching to talk of state descriptions versus normative claims, which 
deliberately overemphasizes the distinction between the two, and separates their goals and 
outcomes.  
 
4. 3. ‘Centrality’ reframed: disarming Ereshefsky’s arguments. 
By thematizing normative thinking in medicine as a potential trap in ‘disguise’, Ereshefsky 
misrepresents clinical practice – which is essentially a social enterprise on every level, from 
individual encounters between patient and practitioner to the way clinics are administrated – 
                                                          
159 Ibid, p. 225 
160 Ibid, p. 226 
161 Ibid, p. 227 
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and paints it as a neutral, disinterested goal-oriented trade which reduces patients to their 
health conditions, and health conditions to problems that need quick, morally uninvolved 
solutions. In the introduction, Ereshefsky’s paper promises to deliver a method that would 
facilitate explicit talk about ‘the considerations that are central in medical discussions’, and 
capture ‘what matters in medical discussions’, but issues such as patient well-being, care, 
comfort, autonomy, adaptability and self-determination are never mentioned. However, 
others have argued that patients’ needs as such far surpass the simple necessity to receive 
diagnosis and treatment. Toombs emphasizes the centrality of care by noting that ‘the patient 
needs support in his efforts to establish the integrity of a newly defined self’162 brought about 
by illness. The idea about the importance of patients’ psychological integrity is also supported 
by physician-writer Cassell, who points out that patients construe medicine as ‘suffering-
oriented’, but that patient suffering is rarely ‘confined to physical symptoms,’ instead 
including additional experiences such as loss of autonomy, or an overwhelming sense of 
‘impending destruction’ of the Self.163 Svenaeus supplements this multi-layered portrayal of 
suffering by remarking upon the feelings of meaninglessness, helplessness, alienation and 
shame which are sometimes present in some of the more severe cases,164although his 
proposed strategy for dealing with these obstacles relies entirely on patients’ own 
transformative potential and desire for a change in ‘core life values’, whereas Cassell assigns 
a major part of the responsibility for patient mental well-being to the practitioner. Both 
approaches, however, recognize that values play a crucial role in the treatment process, and 
acknowledge that medicine – just as its targets disease and suffering – is without doubt 
complex and multidimensional. Furthermore, they both stress the importance of thematizing 
patient complaints as more than secondary sources of information, and physical signs of 
disease – as separate aspects of a specific case which have yet to be situated within its full 
context, rather than exhaustive accounts of said case. 
 
4. 4. Breaking down Hesslow’s advice against needless ‘distractions’. 
                                                          
162 Toombs, S. K., Op. cit., p. 230 
163 Cassell, E., Op. cit., p. 30, p. 31 
164 Svenaeus, F., ‘The phenomenology of suffering in medicine and bioethics’, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 
December 2014, Vol. 35, pp. 407-420 
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A similar line of critical reasoning may be extended over to earlier works, for instance the ones 
written by Germund Hesslow165, who compared health/disease definition debates to an 
argument whether or not a car is defective just because it does not accelerate just as quickly 
as another car from the ‘same make and model’. According to Hesslow, the discussion in this 
example is both unnecessary and distracting, when what actually matters is whether the 
owner of the car wants to have the car’s acceleration increased or not. An analogical attitude 
applies just as well to diseases, in Hesslow’s opinion. Indeed, the idea might seem very 
appealing at first – what could possibly go wrong if we choose to regard the state of requiring 
treatment as a concept with negotiable, arbitrary boundaries which depend on the personal 
preferences of individual patients? Since the standards for well-being vary between persons 
and across cultures, that would seem like a reasonable and even necessary measure – one 
that has already been reflected by European law under the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), which draws on moral principles like autonomy and self-determination.166 But 
Hesslow’s claims concern the practical realities of decision-making within clinical medicine, 
and not the legal aspects of patienthood; his argument about the aimlessness of the 
health/disease definition debate is developed via a set of entirely different premises that have 
very little to do with moral considerations. These premises are, as follows: 
 
1) … that somehow philosophers have been ‘misled’ into believing that ‘health’ and ‘disease’ 
are important in clinical thinking and decision making,  
 
 
2) … that the health/disease distinction is actually completely irrelevant in the aforementioned 
contexts as it does not produce any important consequences, and 
3) … that ‘we never really need to know whether someone has a disease or not’.167 
                                                          
165 Hesslow, G., ‘Do we need a concept of disease?’, Theoretical Medicine, 1993, Vol. 14, pp. 1–14 
166 Wicks, E., ‘The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment under the European Convention on Human Rights’, Medical 
Law Review, Spring 2001, Vol. 9, pp. 17-40 
167 Hesslow, Op. cit., p. 2 
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The latter claim clashes with Hesslow’s position that medical discussions ought to be centered 
around treatment, due to treatment’s obvious dependence on diagnosis and prognosis. It is 
incredibly difficult to conceive of a physician who would proceed to treatment without first 
establishing a condition’s nature, aetiology, and likely course. 
 
4. 5. Invalidating Hesslow’s position on the role of health/disease definitions. 
Based on these claims, Hesslow suggests that what little role our definitions of disease do play 
in clinical practice should be reduced even further. But here I will argue that his conclusion is 
rendered invalid by his own analysis of the functions served by disease concepts, which I find 
to be somehow impoverished in several ways. Firstly, he makes the claim that clinicians’ 
supposed lack of interest in discussing concepts of health and disease indicates the irrelevance 
of said concepts – a claim which he does not defend, and which rests on an unwarranted 
assumption about clinicians.168 Secondly, he appears to be convinced that clear-cut definitions 
are needed only for those terms in science which facilitate the understanding of scientific 
theories: ‘certain concepts have such a central role in scientific theories, that they are 
indispensable for the derivation of those empirical and applied statements (lower-level laws, 
individual statements, etc.) which the theory is supposed to cover.’169 While there can be little 
doubt that every science requires a fundamental set of clearly defined terms in order to 
develop and operate successfully, Hesslow has not succeeded in providing solid evidence to 
support his unconvincing claim that the absence of terms like ‘health’ and ‘disease’ from the 
academic jargon of the biomedical sciences is a sign that they are equally superfluous in 
clinical settings; in other words, he has committed a non-sequitur. Thirdly – and this is related 
to my previous objection – he fails to pick up and acknowledge the fact that medicine (as it is 
practiced in clinical settings) integrates, rather than draws solely and entirely upon, scientific 
medicine. In his everyday work of treating living persons with complaints, the medical 
professional is at once a scientist, a healer, a skilled ‘tradesman’, a patron and an advisor. His 
‘trade’ unifies scientifically derived knowledge (which he has been taught during his years of 
                                                          
168 In Chapter 2 I have discussed in more detail the works of physician-philosophers who engage with the topic. 
These authors present a clear example of the importance attached to concepts of health and disease by some 
mindful physicians, and thus a refutation of the somewhat careless assumption made by Hesslow. 
169 Hesslow, Op. cit., p. 4 
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training) with empirical observations (which he has acquired in his professional experience) 
and culturally situated knowledge about human behaviour (which he has inferred from the 
community which relies on his services). Last, but not least, he relies on his delicate intuition 
as a social creature – a human being, like any other. The physician Robert Lefever has 
summarized these influences in the following manner: ‘My examples [are] from real patients 
and I have a clear picture of the individuals involved: they are not identical to any other 
patients, nor are their situations identical to others. They are unique. Equally, I am unique. 
The patients and problems that I encounter are similar to those of other doctors, but my 
perception of any situation may be different from theirs. Each of us interprets what we see 
according to our own clinical and social perspectives. My decisions reflect me and my practice 
(and the geographical area in which I work) even more than they do any clinical medical 
absolutes.’170 In this mixed environment, different types of concepts co-exist in a 
predominantly productive, albeit sometimes confusing way: scientific terms are applied 
alongside colloquialisms, folk concepts and everyday language with the intention of bridging 
the ‘gap’ between patient and physician.  
 
4. 6. Language, intuitions, and the role of labels. 
Everyday language, which operates on tacit general agreement about shared meanings and 
values, provides the majority of concepts which remain without clear-cut definitions – like 
‘health’, ‘disease’, ‘illness’, ‘suffering’, and others derived from human experience. Among 
these, a good deal are seldom, if ever, problematized; their meaning appears to spread over 
language users inexplicitly, as if driven by a collective social intuition. What does it mean to 
suffer, or to be diseased? Neither patient nor doctor can respond with a well-formulated 
definition when put on the spot, but both can tell that, as far as physical symptoms are 
concerned, the woman in labour who has just been admitted to the maternity ward is 
suffering far more than the one who is visiting her dermatologist for a toenail fungal infection; 
both doctor and patient have an intuitive understanding that the states of being down with a 
                                                          
170 Lefever, R.,  ‘“Decision Making” in Medical Care: Is It a Consumer Good?’, IEA Health Unit Paper No. 8, London, 
The IEA Health Unit, 1990, p. 68 
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flu or having cancer are diseases, while the states of having oily skin, a broken arm, or a bad 
burn after a cooking accident, are not, despite being treatable by physicians. 
 
All of the abovementioned notions are excellent examples of intuitions that have been 
elevated to the status of ‘common sense’ – a status which allows them to spread intra-
collectively and take hold of innumerable minds. Once there, they usually remain undisputed 
until either a major epistemic shift (such as a scientific discovery or an eye-opening life 
experience) forces them out, or the host herself begins to question them. The same is true for 
social labels, whose potential to produce and modify public discourse is often underestimated.  
 
A label is like a court sentence in the sense that, even if it is baseless or unfairly attributed, it 
still has the power to shape the defendant’s destiny, or the public’s opinions of her. Very often 
the ways in which we categorize a person or refer to her can impact others’ perceptions of 
her, the way that the person herself thinks about her standing in the community, and even 
the way the person performs academically, professionally, or socially. This phenomenon, 
which psychologists have dubbed ‘the self-fulfilling prophecy’171, reflects a simple truth about 
humankind: we tend to internalize most things we hear about ourselves or others, as long as 
the message is reinforced often enough. This is especially obvious in cases where the label 
attached carries strong negative connotations, or entails a disadvantaged social role – such as 
that of an ‘incapacitated’ person. 
 
A quick glance at the language traditionally used to describe those with different bodily 
capabilities should be sufficient to confirm my claim about negative stereotyping: ‘dis-ease’, 
‘poor health’, ‘health problems’, ‘health concerns’, ‘health troubles’, ‘health worries’, ‘dis-
ability’, and ‘morbidity’, just to name a few examples. The seriously chronically ‘ill’ or ‘disabled’ 
person is not believed to be in an enviable position. She is generally thought to have poor 
prospects for success, happiness and self-realization, as well as a diminished capacity to 
participate fully in society. This same society, by operating on the aforementioned pessimistic 
                                                          
171 Watzlawick, P., ‘Self-fulfilling Prophecies’ in O’Brien, J. (Ed.), The Production of Reality: Essays and Readings 
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assumptions, fails to take all measures necessary to integrate the differently abled successfully 
and to provide a more welcoming environment for them, thereby diminishing the affected 
persons’ quality of life and chance to succeed (an observation which has served as the 
foundation for the so-called ‘social model of disability’172). Because of this, at first glance an 
eliminativist position arguing that disease definitions could aggravate this situation further by 
reinforcing negative stereotypes about ill people might actually appear quite reasonable to 
many. Indeed, what would happen if, say, instead of generously applying labels to people, we 
applied them solely to environments and situations? There are palpable consequences of 
saying that somebody is caught up in a ‘non-inclusive work situation’ or a ‘disabling milieu’ 
instead of saying that they are a ‘disabled person’. The responsibility, instead of being relayed 
to the person herself, is immediately shifted onto those who, unlike her, participate fully in 
society and thereby share the joint obligation to modify those aspects of it which can challenge 
or threaten equal access to opportunity. Clearly rhetoric and labels hold more than just 
symbolic power where social roles and interactions are concerned, and their impact could thus 
be exploited to further social goals173 (or, if left in the wrong hands – to hamper them). The 
rest of this chapter will show how this principle applies in the context of health/disease 
definitions, explore their transformative potential, and argue that it needs to be put to ‘good 
use’ – contrary to eliminativist claims about its uselessness and disadvantages. 
 
As already stated, a definition of disease which is centered around the concept of deficit, 
incapacitation, deffectiveness or dysfunction could have strong repercussions on a number of 
aspects of ill people‘s lives. Firstly and most importantly, it can lead to dismissive attitudes 
                                                          
172 Oliver, M., ‘The social model of disability: thirty years on’, Disability and Society, 2013, Vol. 28, No. 7, pp. 1024-
1026 
173 One might argue that furthering social goals does not fit within the job descriptions of physicians. However, I 
will raise two objections to this: firstly, as I intend to show, health/disease definitions and labels in general are 
issues which expand beyond the scope of clinical medicine and are thus everyone’s concern; secondly, physicians 
have been known to support and contribute to social goals for as long as medicine has existed. It is not a 
coincidence that Pseudo-Albertus Magnus’s medical treatise De Secretis Mulierum (The Secrets of Women) from 
the late thirteenth century, for example, contains advice on treatments which could help women lead modest 
lives. For a more thorough analysis of that matter, please refer to Cadden, J., Meaning of Sex Difference in the 
Middle Ages: Medicine, Science and Culture, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 263: ‘By providing 
the means to support social norms, physicians demonstrated their willingness to participate in and advance social 
goals. In addition to testing for virginity, they offered other means of guaranteeing legitimacy as well, such as 
recipes for preventing a woman from committing adultery.’ 
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towards ill people‘s rights to autonomy and self-determination; it can serve as a justification 
of medical paternalism, increased surveillance and unacceptable interference with their lives. 
Secondly, and perhaps less obviously, framing disease definitions in terms of deficiency and 
dysfunction can carry subconscious associations with weakness and/or moral infirmity. The 
former issue is somewhat self-explanatory, but the latter one requires careful unpacking, 
which I will attempt to provide in the following section of this chapter in order to cement my 
conclusion that health/disease definitions, rather than serving a very limited or even 
redundant role in health care policy making or clinical practice (as claimed by eliminativists), 
actually underpin the moral, social and political dimensions of living as an ill person. In the 
next section of this chapter I will examine these dimensions through the lens of Kent 
Maynard’s discussion of the fluid, dynamic categories of selfhood, personhood and medical 
identity, as well as Jackie Stacey’s analysis of social expectations of people living with serious 
disease, and Ian Williams’s theory about the ‘iconography of illness’. I intend to show that, 
just like experiences of self and personhood,174 identities in what N. D. Jewson once referred 
to as ‘medical cosmology’175 can also vary cross-culturally; furthermore, they can also undergo 
structural shifts, and these structural shifts usually depend on social factors such as public 
opinions, stereotypes, visual cues, and rhetoric. This demonstration is going to serve three 
purposes: a) to illustrate the powerful impact of definitions and labels; b) to offer practical 
examples which indicate just how far-reaching the effects of people’s differing notions of 
disease can be; c) to establish the need of a functional and relatable account of disease, and 
thus refute eliminativism. I will begin my demonstration with an analysis of the impact 
produced by social metaphors of disease. 
 
4. 7. From letter to life: rhetoric, social metaphors of disease and their role in shaping 
laypersons’ experiences. 
a) Talking about disease. Stacey on negative stereotyping. 
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Other than contributing to their feelings of isolation, inadequacy or worthlessness, the labels 
we attach to others could also impact our own attitudes. The same holds true for certain 
common social metaphors of disease which regularly appear throughout the media, literature, 
and everyday language. One such example is the metaphor which represents illness as an 
enemy who needs to be fought, disarmed, and defeated: 
1) ‘Person V is fighting a deadly infection.’  
2) ‘Person W was able to defeat malaria.’ 
3) ‘Person X succumbed to cancer after a long and brave battle.’  
4) ‘Person Y is a victim of polio.’  
5) ‘Person Z is a stroke survivor.’  
One might argue that expressions such as those shown above have resulted naturally by way 
of association after the existence and function of the immune system became common 
knowledge among laypersons. However, my concern has little to do with the associations 
themselves or their origin – it is all about how they translate into normative implications about 
how the ill person should or should not act. In other words, I am going to address social 
expectations of ill people – a topic which has received insufficient philosophical attention, 
especially from eliminativists who tend to focus on the more obvious applications of disease 
definitions (such as health care policies or clinical decision-making). Social expectations are a 
powerful force that can ‘make or break’ one’s experience within her community. The more 
pronounced the physical aspect of the experience, the stricter the rules and prescribed ways 
of acting – hence the taboos surrounding topics such as sexual intimacy, childbirth, venereal 
infections, pregnancy termination, illness, and death. Poor health comes with an additional 
burden – its associated narrative about the ‘fight’ for survival. Disease is not just any enemy – 
within most of Western culture, it is usually construed as the ultimate reminder of our own 
mortality; as an unpredictable nemesis who can find, outrun, outlast and defeat nearly every 
one of us, unless bravely confronted with the help of modern medicine. While physicians’ and 
scientists’ socially assigned roles as gatekeepers of health and all knowledge relating to it are 
seldom questioned, there exists another cultural trope which introduces an additional 
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requirement for defeating disease: the patient’s own will power and desire to live. Thus moral 
qualities such as courage, will power, and a positive outlook on life are postulated as essential 
weapons when confronting the harsh realities of dangerous illnesses, e.g. cancer. However, 
this product of crowd wisdom is also characterized by a serious downside: its power to foster 
negative explanatory tropes about the aetiology of disease and its relation to moral character 
(‘Person X probably became ill because she was overly focused on her career’; ‘Person Y 
probably became ill because she was not eating properly and getting enough exercise’; ‘ 
Person Z probably became ill because she was not a very positive person’, etc). This tendency 
has been described by Sharma as ‘…the modern moralistic concern with the perfectibility of 
the body, and the individual’s responsibility for its imperfections.’176 Contrary to what logic 
might have dictated, instead of finding support and encouragement during a difficult time, ill 
people are sometimes met with hostility and judgment, or held accountable for their 
conditions, whatever their true causes. The so-called ‘blame the victim’ mentality177 is not just 
a myth for those among us who are living with disease. 
 
In a relatively recent cultural study on cancer, ovarian cancer survivor and cultural studies 
professor Jackie Stacey addresses some of the existing negative behaviours towards, or 
stereotypes about, ill people. Her book Teratologies reveals how disease often gains a much 
deeper significance in the process of interpretation where it is seen as a manifestation of its 
own aetiology, or as a ‘metaphor’ of the choices which presumably led to it: ‘cancer is… 
constructed as a monstrous physical manifestation of other problems: these may be problems 
of modernity (pollution, workaholism, chemicals and so on); or they may be problems of a 
repressive and repressed culture which cannot deal with emotional life and prefers instead to 
be governed by rationality and intellect.’178 
 
Indeed, one of the major problems Western and industrialized societies have with sickness, 
                                                          
176Sharma, U., ‘Using complementary therapies: a challenge to orthodox medicine?’ in Williams, S. J. and Calnan, 
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178 Stacey, J., Teratologies: A Cultural Study of Cancer, Routledge, London, 1997, p. 12 
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especially cancer, is the way it puts all plans on hold for an indefinite amount of time; the way 
it disrupts careers, academic progress, and family life. By making us face our own ‘temporal 
expectations’, it forces us to confront the threat of imminent death, and thus leads us to 
question the very ideals we have been brought up to believe in – for instance that we will all 
get our own chances to achieve important life milestones and build our lives as ‘coherent 
stories of success, progress and movement.’179 Interruption of one’s progress in life is 
construed as a crisis – as crisis is any interruption of a preferred line of movement, a stop, an 
abrupt and unexpected end. Due to this unexpectedness, it demands a moment for re-
evaluation of the sick person’s priorities and plans for the future (or ‘what is left of it’); it 
demands rethinking the physical and economic strain placed on the sick person and her family 
by the long and expensive yet risky treatments, by the fear of death, the helplessness. 
 
Suffering and helplessness are already disvalued states in Western culture, because they 
translate as weakness, loss of control, and failure – all qualities which the West does not 
tolerate; eliminativists’ insistence upon separating clinical decisions and state descriptions 
from their moral and existential aspects only reinforces the taboo placed upon them. It also 
reveals an insensitivity to the issues of stigmatization surrounding diseases like cancer, the 
mechanisms of which are so poorly understood by the general public. However, the widely 
distributed false beliefs about cancer testify to the presence and seriousness of these issues: 
many are convinced that cancer is always related to self-destructive behaviour or ‘negative 
thinking’. This observation is also shared by another author – the Canadian sociology professor 
Arthur W. Frank, whose reflections on his own experience with cancer have led him to 
describe the social metaphor of the so-called ‘cancer personality’. According to Frank, this 
type of stigmatization operates in the following manner: ‘ [people] want to believe that they 
control their health and that they have earned it. Those who have cancer must have done 
something wrong, which the healthy can then avoid. The sick person must have participated 
in sickness by choosing to have a cancer personality, otherwise illness is an intolerable 
reminder of how risky life is.’180 
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Due in part to these beliefs, and in part to cancer’s capacity to provoke extreme reactions such 
as uneasiness, anxiety, disgust, or horror, it has become a cultural taboo in its own right.181 
Because of this taboo, few speak up and try to break free from the labels and negative 
stereotypes – from the new identities that have been forced upon them along with their 
diseases. An additional silencing factor, such as eliminativists’ conviction that state 
descriptions need to remain bland and neutral, may guarantee that this silence will not be 
broken often. It may be the case that most eliminativism supporters’ commitments extend 
only over a particular strain or locus of the health/disease definitions debate, i.e. that they 
believe that only the philosophical strain of the debate is pointless, or that the debate has no 
place within the context of clinical encounters, which should be striving to provide a neutral 
intellectual space and foster value-free clinical judgements.  
 
 
However, this debate cannot and should not have to operate under such constraints, seeing 
as it forms part of the broader and very important discourse on the sociocultural dimensions 
of life as a diseased person. A human profound desire to ponder the existential meaning of 
disease has naturally led to philosophical attempts to define it; the debate was not simply 
forced into existence by bored intellectuals who felt that the topics of love, life and happiness 
were becoming too tiresome. Philosophical discussions of health and disease concepts cannot 
be artificially separated from the discourse which produced them, and should instead be used 
to provide insight into it, raise awareness of its implications for the lives of diseased people, 
and give a voice to those who feel discouraged to speak.182 That is why I believe that appeals 
to shut down the debate on health/disease definitions, or to expel it from the locus of the 
clinic, can send out the wrong message – a negative message – about the way disease ought 
to be perceived by society.  
                                                          
181 Stacey, Op. cit., p. 25 
182 A parallel can be drawn between the present topic and the fields of gender, race and social studies. It is not 
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Philosophical work on health/disease definitions is very central to how a culture regards 
disease in general – it both reflects and shapes the predominant trends in the relevant 
discourse. The way we express ourselves, the debates we choose to fuel or discourage, the 
terms we speak with, they have everything to do with how we treat each other – indeed, they 
already constitute a way of treating one another. Eliminating all talk about the meaning of 
disease from spheres where it really matters a lot, like medicine and philosophy, is akin to 
silencing those among us who would benefit the most from such discussions, and who have 
an interest in listening and participating – the sick. Additionally, it would deprive us of 
important phenomenologically-padded insights into disease symptomatics, which could serve 
as a useful boost to bedside medicine and the clinical practice perspective in general.  
 
Stacey’s articulation of the importance of perspective is by no means an isolated theory. In a 
paper dedicated to patient perspectives on pain relief, G. A. Bendelow engages in an analysis 
of ‘interpretive sociological perspectives’183, such as Bury’s ‘biographical disruption’184, 
Williams’s ‘narrative reconstruction’185, and Herzlich’s186 and Radley’s187 ‘styles of 
adjustment’. Albeit focused on the experiences of people living with chronic pain, Bendelow’s 
conclusions also apply to those living with disease: ‘…lack of social support, especially for those 
living alone, appeared to be [a] contributory [factor] to the desperation and hopelessness of 
[these people].’188 Isolation and negativity can cause profound damage to the individual 
diseased person’s capacity to adjust, reconstruct her disrupted biographical narrative, or 
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make sense of her experiences. On a larger scale, this could lead to a serious problem with the 
successful integration of diseased or disabled people in society and the work force, where they 
feel unwelcome and restrained – especially if their situations have already been complicated 
by factors such as poverty or lack of adequate support networks. Reconstruction of one’s lost 
or disrupted narrative is a good place to start re-building one’s sense of direction in life, but is 
unlikely to happen in the conditions of a public discourse on disease which refuses to 
acknowledge its tremendous existential importance, and even attempts to shut down all 
philosophical debates of its meaning, or at least to prevent professionals from contributing – 
and thus lending legitimacy – to said debates. 
 
It is not a coincidence that wealthier patients talk about ‘managing’ their conditions, while 
patients of a lower socioeconomic status are ‘coping with disease’189; that people with 
different lifestyles, social standing and educational backgrounds may have a different sense 
of agency in illness, or different needs when confronted with illness. Indeed, some have even 
been able to detect gender differences in beliefs about which factors were the most helpful 
when struggling with illness: ‘When asked what helped the most, aside from medical 
treatment …, there also appeared to be gender differences. For men, occupational status and 
material advantages, particularly the ability to maintain their income level, were seen as the 
most important factors, with the subsequent implications of “failure” when these were lost. 
In contrast, whereas these aspects were also important for women …, social support was 
perceived to be of equal importance.’190 It is not a mere coincidence that many patients place 
such high importance on support – in all its forms, from loving personal relationships and 
accepting social networks at one’s job or neighbourhood, to institutionalized social support 
services. Since illness can have a debilitating and even incapacitating effect on one’s emotional 
and physical well-being, it is not uncommon for health care systems to operate in conjunction 
with other spheres of services, such as counselling. It is also not at all unusual for physicians 
to take professional occupations, lifestyles or social status into account when weighing 
treatment options during the clinical decision-making process. For example: diabetic patients 
with more physically demanding jobs and exercise routines get less intense treatment plans; 
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athletes with severe Crohn’s disease are less likely to be recommended getting an ostomy that 
may interfere with their professional lives; poorer patients in countries without universal 
health care can be prescribed the more affordable drug, etc. 
 
Considerations about the social and normative implications of diagnosis, prognosis and 
treatment are clearly important elements of clinical practice. Simply put, it would be neither 
necessary nor productive to eradicate them, as they are needed in order to contextualize and 
guide the decision-making process. After all, humans are not cars. The question whether we 
want our car to accelerate as quickly as other cars is a simple matter of preference. The 
question whether I want the growth in my right breast operated upon is not – it would very 
much depend on whether or not I am ill, what the potential consequences of failing to take 
any action are, the amount of funds available to me at that precise moment, whether I feel 
that my femininity would be threatened by the scarring and asymmetric appearance of my 
breasts, etc. An interesting conflict arises upon realizing that, while these important 
considerations guiding myself and my physicians may be dismissed by eliminativism as forms 
of ‘needless distraction’, to me they represent crucial dimensions of my existence. The reason 
behind this phenomenon is that, as a social actor, the patient creates a specific narrative about 
her own life and how she functions in her community, but this narrative does not form in a 
state of existential vacuum – it is influenced and restrained by external, usually social, 
influences on her perception of self. These influences can include, although they are by no 
means limited to, linguistic and visual cues about others’ expectations. Here I have dealt with 
linguistic cues such as labels, while sub-section b) will deal with visual cues. 
 
b) Williams on metaphors and ‘iconography of illness’. 
Ian Williams may not be the first philosophically inclined practitioner who has dared to 
question why in Western culture the most common reactions to disease and those living with 
it are ones of pity and disgust. However, his analysis of this taboo topic provides both a 
refreshingly unique perspective and an uncommonly insightful explanation. By combining his 
professional medical experience, his academic background in art, and his deep knowledge of 
web comic culture, he sheds light on one of the most under-researched issues in the field of 
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medical humanities – that of the mechanisms behind the social construction of categories like 
‘disease’. Williams unpacks the roles of labels, codification, and visual representation or visual 
cues, which he refers to as the ‘iconography’ of illness.191  
 
The reactions of pity and disgust, he says, are our respective reactions to impotence and 
ugliness192;  referring to Sontag’s Illness as Metaphor, he speculates that the reason most of 
us fear cancer, leprosy and syphilis, for example, resides within our fears of losing control and 
witnessing our bodies transform ‘into something alienating’.193 This thought is, of course, 
anticipated in Erving Goffman’s work on stigma – the book Stigma: Notes on the Management 
of Spoiled Identity,194 which Williams credits as a main source of the notion that disease-
related stigma functions on a visual level by tying together the concepts of ‘expressing disease’ 
and ‘embodying disease’. Or, as formulated by Williams, the diseased individual becomes a ‘… 
a vessel holding disease and, therefore, an extension of the disease.’195 Disabling the debate 
on disease definitions would not neutralize this reality – it would cement it. That is why 
eliminativism poses a hidden threat to our collective efforts to comprehend and 
accommodate those among us who live with illness. 
 
While the diseased persons may perceive themselves as ‘diseased-but-normal’ selves trying 
to have a ‘viable way of living in the world’ (which Williams argues can also be done 
symbolically, e.g. by finding meaning or a meaningful narrative, since many people experience 
disease as a chaotic interruption of their life-story), the rest of us can test or altogether abolish 
their determination with our negative stereotypes – as also explained by Stacey. In order to 
confront our prejudice, deal with stigma or counteract negative stereotypes, we need to 
acknowledge that they are present – that they have permeated both folk psychology and 
medical thinking. While the pathway to challenging our own assumptions is open, it is made 
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unusually difficult by the distracting influence of institutionalized ‘knowledge’, which we 
regard as undisputed fact. Physicians are the first link in this chain of interactions:  
 
‘Images help structure the schemata of illness within the mind of the clinician who builds a 
mental catalogue of clinical signs and presentations against which the presenting appearances 
can be judged. Atlases of clinical signs serve as diagnostic aids, and modern imaging 
techniques offer the chance to visualize the interior of the body as well as the surface, further 
objectifying the body and enhancing the idea that the “truth” about the body can be obtained 
through technology and digital representation.’196 
 
This reiterates some of the issues I have already discussed in chapters 1 and 3, where I 
highlighted the problematic aspects of medicine and medical thinking’s preoccupation with 
objectification and measurability. However, it approaches them from an altogether different 
angle – one that exposes the ways in which ‘iconography of illness’ borrows images, 
stereotypes and tropes from ‘the bank of available images that inform our collective 
conceptions of illness and health care’197, all the while maintaining the pretense that it draws 
on objective knowledge rather than highly culture-specific tropes – a pretense that lends it 
apparent legitimacy. Rather than solving this problem, eliminativism can only aggravate it 
through denial. The very serious issue here is that of stereotyping diseased people and their 
experiences by forcibly locking them inside a sui generis ‘lexicon of visual cues’ embraced by 
both science and media:  
 
‘There is a tradition within figurative art of showing various stages of psychological distress, 
and over the centuries a lexicon of visual cues has been developed and remains powerful 
today. We know the classic pose of melancholia when we see it, because we recognize it from 
images we have internalized or observations of depressed people: slumped shoulders, the 
chin resting on the hand, the other in the lap, the expressionless face. Is this pose some sort 
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of “natural” posture to adopt when one is feeling melancholic, or is our behaviour informed 
by the media we consume?’198 
 
The same line of questioning can be applied to all states which are depicted in stereotypical 
manners by the media: do all sociopaths have violent tempers which eventually turn them 
into axe-swinging murderers? Are all drug addicts impulsive and prone to criminal activity? 
Did all lung cancer patients cause their own condition through poor lifestyle choices? Do all 
cases of the same disease look the same? The obvious answer is that, while individual cases 
may differ vastly in their manifestations, ‘iconography of illness’, much like nosography itself, 
relies on de-individualized or even de-humanized generalizations, and does so in order to 
constitute and reinforce the official languages and postulates of clinical practice. But these 
questions will still need to be asked, even if eliminativists were to successfully impose the 
notion that definitions of disease are ultimately pointless, because practice needs to be guided 
by rules and postulates; by convention and shared language – by instruction (as discussed in 
Chapter 1). In the absence of discussion and debate, instruction is often delivered via textbook 
wisdom and iconography. That is why ‘iconography of illness’ has a special place in medical 
education, where it makes up a significant part of textbooks: 
  
‘Textbooks, guidelines, and verbal discussion among healthcare professionals could be seen 
as constituting the “official” language of healthcare: sanctioned by authority, peer reviewed, 
and packed with “objective” and “evidence based” propositions. It is through these avenues 
of approved knowledge that the discourse exerts its power. The visual aspects of the discourse 
are mediated through an analogous official iconography that shows how sick people should 
look and helps distinguish the “normal” from the “abnormal”. The marks of disease on the 
body are appropriated by medical photographers or illustrators; positioned in “neutral” 
anatomically “correct” positions and in the “correct” light; and captured in photographs or 
drawings. Any sense of the individual is removed by cropping off the head, isolating the body 
part, or blacking out the eyes.’199 
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In the above-described act of appropriation, not only the individual is deprived of a name and 
a face – taxonomizing disease in visual terms downplays individual differences and eradicates 
the importance of what lies ‘underneath’ or ‘within’ physical signs. In that sense, ‘typical’ 
representations of disease are produced in an intellectual environment which erodes not only 
the specificity of disease manifestations, but also the ‘deep-seated culturally accrued attitudes 
within the observer that may also be unacknowledged or unconscious.’200 
Thus these attitudes remain obscured, but active, and their activity is all the more powerful 
because they operate silently. Eliminativists like Ereshefsky maintain that such attitudes need 
to be ‘highlighted’ in order to be prevented from masquerading as neutral, but does not 
prescribe any specific strategies for acting neutrally – that is, to prevent normative thinking 
from influencing our decisions; Hesslow does not present a solution either, other than 
transferring all responsibility onto the patient. That, in itself, is enough to raise suspicions 
about the productivity of their proposal that we ignore all value-laden aspects of clinical 
encounters and shut down all philosophical discussions about the concept of disease. 
Furthermore, physicians who insist that they are disconnected from sociocultural influences 
often do not realize that they end up imposing the very norms and standards they claim not 
to acknowledge; that they reinforce the very stereotypes to which their professional 
objectivity has supposedly left them ‘culturally blind’. They achieve this effect by practicing 
the art of diagnosis, which relies, among other things, on visual cues and superficial sensory 
information, which is often filtered indiscriminately. Similarly, diagnostic labels are attached 
without much consideration of the potential psychological or social effects to be experienced 
by the patient, but can have powerful transformative effects on the patient’s identity. Thus 
the combined influences of ‘iconography of illness’, public discourse, and medical authority 
can translate diagnostic labels and ordinary folk language of illness into social roles. In the next 
section I argue that this power, rather than feared or dismissed (as suggested by 
eliminativists), ought to be embraced, turned around, and used productively. Ignoring this 
knowledge instead of incorporating it in clinical practice would mean that optimal efforts are 
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not being made to guarantee the best possible outcome for patients as persons (as opposed 
to patients as asocial, purely biological, bodies).  
 
The message of Williams’s research paper is clear: rather than simply reflecting what is already 
out there, images have the power to generate, shape, or destroy our social world.  
If not used wisely, they can oversimplify and trivialize important issues, create false 
generalizations, or, in the case of medicine, decrease the range of ‘real life’ appearances and 
variations of normality. The same applies to words, which, when wed with images, create the 
labels and stereotypes underpinning social identities. 
 
c) Maynard and medical identities. 
Kent Maynard defines identity as ‘one of those concepts that simultaneously face in two 
directions – towards the individual and towards the group – at once opening on to an exterior 
world of sociality (and even the cosmos), yet equally personal.’201 He begins the introduction 
to Medical Identities202 with a curious nod to Marxist theory – namely by locating the identity 
and consciousness of Self within the individual’s bodily existence, work and sphere of 
activity.203 As members, it turns out, we both ‘constitute’ and ‘embody’ our social groups, by 
means of participating in their specific ‘emotional, social and cognitive lives’ in the manner 
intended by the group. Thus, by definition, social identities are cultural identities and 
therefore performative, i. e. related to performing in accordance with certain cultural norms 
(such as specific practices or bodily manifestations, etc). As there is no person who has not 
received ‘a cultural upbringing’, all existing identities have culturally shaped symbolic 
parameters, argues Maynard. However, scientific biomedicine and clinical practice both aspire 
to be objective and thereby culturally blind to the reality that, ‘if both our “human nature” 
and our social identities are entwined with daily activities, then semi-specialities or 
occupations involved in medicine have a way of defining their practitioners.’204 While this does 
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not necessarily mean that sufferers and chronically ill people differ fundamentally from the 
rest of us, it still raises questions about the cultural dispositions of doctors, e.g. are they 
disposed to reflect upon the cultural realities they reject or not. However, there can be little 
doubt that, like most professions, medicine is culturally nuanced work, regardless of one’s 
dispositions. Similarly, medical thinking is necessarily culture-specific, and always subject to 
the influence of the thinker’s cultural upbringing.  
If even relatively basic and trivial human phenomena, such as satisfying our need of food, 
clothing and shelter, obey such different rules of performance across different cultures, it 
would not be unreasonable to conclude that the same applies to health care and medical 
thinking, which far surpass them in complexity (because of the additional dimensions of ‘care’ 
and ‘thinking’, which elevate health care and medical thinking beyond the status of basic 
material needs). Therefore, to reiterate one of my main arguments from Chapter 2 but 
borrowing Maynard’s elegant prose, ‘… there is nothing natural, nothing inevitable about how 
physicians think about themselves, or what we assume about them. [Their]  identity is both 
an historical construction and cross-culturally variable.’205 Because, as noted by Maynard, 
‘…[all medical identities] are shaped fundamentally by larger structural and institutional 
factors, both internal and external to medicine.’206 It is therefore impossible to approach 
medical issues from a completely neutral standpoint (as I have also shown in Chapter 3). If 
anything, the results of such attempts are bound to be counter-productive because of the very 
nature of contemporary health care as a dynamic social enterprise involving multiple agents 
with different beliefs and purposes. In the next section I will lend further support to this claim 
through a selection of examples, which demonstrate that the effectiveness of health care and 
public health depends on facilitating discussion rather than shutting it down; on becoming 
more aware of the existence of a multitude of notions about health, disease and health care, 
which are often crucial parts of patients’ personalities and lifestyles and thus inextricably 
linked to the process of medical decision-making. 
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4. 8. How notions about health and disease translate in real life: the case of public health 
and patient compliance. 
In Chapter 2 I have already managed to show that the blatant disregard that medical and 
public health professionals sometimes express towards alternative notions about health 
stems from an inability to appreciate the important part played by values and sociocultural 
powers in the development of medicine and public health. This inability appears to be shared 
by eliminativists, whose claims about the uselessness of health/disease definition debates 
show a lack of appreciation for sociocultural reality and historical truth. From the introduction 
of quarantines during 14th century Black Death epidemics to contemporary vaccination 
schedules, humankind has a long history of organized attempts to promote physical well-being 
by preventing disease or reducing infection transmission rates among populations, and 
virtually every one of these attempts have been accompanied by underlying concerns of a 
moral nature. The initiatives now referred to as ‘public health programmes’ are designed in 
accordance with relevant science-based, peer-reviewed evidence, but their intellectual 
foundations ultimately draw on philosophical ideas. Due to their intricate connections to 
issues such as justice, fair resource distribution, (dis)advantage and poverty, public health 
programmes present a social and ethical challenge in the sense that they require active 
commitment to maximizing general welfare. However, because of the involvement of 
epistemically authoritative figures (scientists, medical professionals, public health officers, 
and politicians, among others), any occasions in which the interventions fail to achieve their 
proclaimed end are often critically regarded as the result of inefficient policy-making, careless 
planning, or unsuccessful campaigns. This narrow view downplays the impact that factors like 
values, epistemic virtues (or the lack thereof), rational self-interest, lifestyle and personal 
views on health could have on the general health of the population. In reality, all these factors 
have the potential to produce, fuel and disseminate health trends – alternative, user-driven 
forms of health-related group knowledge. Natural living movement supporters, vaccination 
opponents, and therapeutic nihilists are all examples of alternative perspectives on healthy 
living, which can have a profound influence on the effectiveness of government-imposed 
public health interventions and campaigns, or even shape the disease profiles of entire 
populations. Contrary to what eliminativists might believe about the superfluousness of terms 
like ‘health’ and ‘disease’, the clash between different interpretations of these concepts can 
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affect public health practices. A closer inspection of the social dynamic involved in producing 
medical knowledge and communicating it to the public reveals that without a trace of doubt. 
 
Medicine and its social environment do not develop in isolation from each other – in fact, 
historians of medicine generally agree that there has always been an intimate two-way 
connection of dependence between medicine and sociocultural forces, economic 
circumstances, or ideological influences. History shows that the major epistemic shifts in 
medicine can be accompanied by social re-structuring and political changes. For example, 
during the early nineteenth century humoural and miasmatic theories – the explanatory 
models of disease that had been used since Antiquity – gave way to Germ theory, leading to 
an increased focus on hygiene, and producing the idea that the state had an obligation to 
protect its citizens from the spread of infectious diseases. The notion that diseases were 
communicable also meant a growing public desire to learn more about pathogens and the 
ways to keep them at bay. This ambition reflects a re-discovered sense of responsibility for 
one‘s own health – a sense which was already present in Western European societies, but 
which continued to flourish in spite of the rapid development of reliable health services. Sales 
of personal and domestic hygiene products spiked, while the so-called ‘sanitation science’ 
manuals or pamphlets became a must-have for all responsible citizens, clearly indicating that 
medical knowledge is bound to have repercussions on our shared social world, our lifestyles 
and our value systems – and vice versa.207   
 
However, it was also during this historical period that a significant social and epistemic gap 
began to form between those who consumed health services or health information, and those 
who provided them. The professionalization of medicine and public health was a major 
contributing factor, assigning physicians and public health officers to an inherently superior 
position, whilst their clients were expected to play an obedient, silent and passive role that 
had very little in common with their pro-active attitudes or their vivid interest in health-
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related matters (hence the use of the term ‘patients’). N. D. Jewson has famously referred to 
these social developments as an ‘eradication of the sick-man from medical cosmology’208 and 
suggested that they have had an ongoing effect on the relationship between medical 
investigators and those whose interests they are meant to serve. The exclusion of patients 
from the production of medical knowledge coincided with a shift from a person-oriented to 
an object-oriented medical cosmology, where the patient presenting herself in front of the 
medical gaze gradually came to be viewed as a ‘collection of synchronized organs’ with no 
voice of her own, a ‘material thing to be analyzed’209 and subordinated to a paternalistically 
inclined professional expert.  This process has occurred as a result of two major tendencies in 
medical thinking: the tendency towards objectification and quantification (which I have 
discussed in Chapter 3), and the tendency to refrain from reflections on the existential and 
normative dimensions of medicine and disease (which I have addressed in Chapter 2). 
Eliminativism may be seen as a product of these developments, and interacts with 
paternalistic attitudes towards patients in the most curious way: obscuring those aspects of 
the physician-patient dialogue which most resemble a philosophical exchange of outlooks and 
ideas is tantamount to silencing, and silencing is tantamount to disempowerment. 
 
Despite the recent focus on ethical issues such as patient autonomy and informed consent, 
there continues to be insufficient regard for the patient’s role as an epistemic agent in the 
context of clinical practice or public health. This has led to palpable tension between public 
health authorities and certain groups which resist their efforts or hold different opinions on 
health-related matters. After briefly outlining the historical reasons behind these social 
developments, I will discuss these views’ underexplored potential to shape the disease profiles 
of entire populations, as well as their proponents’ capacity to  produce or disseminate group 
knowledge in ways that make it attractive to the public (for instance in the form of ‘health 
trends’). I would like to suggest that, due to certain historical and cultural influences particular 
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to Western Europe, these alternative forms of knowledge production are systematically 
underestimated. 
 
Currently, not all of the segments of society that are engaged in active contribution to the 
production of medical knowledge receive recognition for their efforts. As the involvement of 
laypersons has undergone a gradual devaluation over the course of the past two centuries, 
public participation in the development of all science and technology has been severely 
limited,210 and medicine makes no exception. While there may have been a time when 
medicine vaguely resembled a jointly created and maintained enterprise, this ceased to be the 
case after the institutionalization and professionalization of medicine – a process which began 
during the early 19th century.211 A series of legislative measures were taken, such as the 
Medical Act of 1858, which were designed to create serious disincentives for laypersons who 
wanted to practice the profession in England.212  
 
However, historians tend to agree that during the centuries leading up to that moment, 
medicine resembled a ‘marketplace’ full of diverse services, trades and professional 
opinions.213 It has also been noted that even after medicine began to flourish as an academic 
discipline, the majority of important discoveries continued taking place outside the context of 
universities and academia for quite a while – usually on the battlefield or in the hands of 
barber-surgeons like Ambroise Paré.214 Of course, medicine as we know it today in the 
Western world and the majority of industrialized countries – I will refer to it as ‘orthodox 
biomedicine’ – seems to make a point to distinguish and distance itself from other forms of 
medical knowledge and practice.  The very fact that such forms of knowledge or practice are 
even referred to as ‘alternative’ testifies to its success in that regard. However, one of the 
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uncomfortable results is that a large number of the health professionals influenced by this 
doctrine may be working with somewhat culturally impoverished notions215 of health, disease, 
healthy living and the optimal strategies for educating the public on these crucial matters. 
Orthodox biomedicine, which has been a stepping stone for public health since the latter’s 
beginnings in the late 17th century, has been criticized by some socially conscious authors for 
its elitism and exclusivity, as well as its implicit racism, which is precisely why the appropriate 
reaction to eliminativist ideals about objective state descriptions ought to be one of 
skepticism. Medicine’s long history of prejudice and bias can hardly make it a likely candidate 
for producing value-free, detached descriptions – a position that has also been shared by 
insiders. 
 
In the early 1990’s the Sri Lankan born British psychiatrist Suman Fernando, a former member 
of the Mental Health Act Commission and chair of its National Standing Committee on Race 
and Culture, published Mental Health, Race and Culture – an influential work analyzing what 
Fernando refers to as the ‘cultural blindness’ of orthodox medicine, and noting how its belief 
systems have been informed entirely by ‘concepts based on Western culture’, which means 
that certain people have always been, and will likely continue to be, disadvantaged by its 
biases.216 According to Fernando, this negative effect is especially obvious in the case of 
psychiatry, which he finds to be ‘inherently prejudiced’, but some of his conclusions could 
easily be extended over other fields, for example public health. Certain groups of people, who 
subscribe to certain unconventional beliefs about medicine and health, are routinely critiqued, 
dismissed, or regarded as less epistemically reliable than people of comparable educational 
backgrounds or social positions who hold beliefs that comply with the orthodox medical 
paradigm. One might argue that these people are facing a type of epistemic oppression: their 
knowledge is dismissed as irrelevant, inaccurate, useless, or somehow inferior to that 
produced by orthodox biomedicine. This practice is made all the more problematic when we 
follow the eliminativist prescription to prioritize objectivity over values. But what even is 
objectivity, when our epistemic output is so contingent upon the input of values and cultural 
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influences?217 Opinions are anything but insignificant; evidence clearly suggests that even very 
small groups of like-minded individuals still have the potential to re-shape an entire country’s 
disease profile – all just by acting on their values and beliefs. 
 
Simple medical decisions which are often regarded as a personal choice – such as whether or 
not to vaccinate oneself or one’s children – can have massive repercussions for an entire 
community, as shown by the large, multi-state measles outbreak faced by the US in 2014-
2015218, which affected a total of nearly 860 people across 27 states. In the United Kingdom, 
measles was declared endemic to the population in the year 2008, having reached this status 
again within the decade following the MMR vaccine controversy created by Andrew Wakefield 
in 1998, which led to a sharp drop in vaccination rates and a decrease in herd immunity.219 
However, the recent outbreaks in some other Western European countries appear to be linked 
to particular philosophies about health and medicine, rather than produced by vaccine scares. 
The 1999-2000 outbreak in the Netherlands220 and the 2015 outbreak in Germany221, for 
example, have some things in common: the affected were mostly children (nearly 80%), and 
mostly from families that held anthroposophist, homeopathic, naturopathic or other 
alternative views on medicine. This information is just as medically relevant as anything an 
‘objective description’ of the patient’s state could tell us, but would be left out if it were up to 
the eliminativist because of unconvincing claims about its uselessness.    
 
While the philosophies of alternative medicine movements may differ significantly, their 
supporters typically share a cluster of common notions about healthy living and healing, as 
well as a common skepticism regarding evidence-based medicine’s methods and 
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achievements. Self-diagnosis and self-healing can be common, as can be the opposition to 
many artificially produced means of treatment, such as synthetic medication or surgical 
treatment. These could be replaced by lifestyle and dietary changes (for naturopaths), and 
sometimes by art therapy, rhythmic massages or counselling (for anthroposophists). Health is 
usually understood as an innate order or balance best preserved when adhering to what is 
‘natural’, while diseases are perceived as products of the stress or demands associated with 
unnatural lifestyles.222  
 
In contrast, orthodox medicine, which draws on the scientific methods of biomedicine, tends 
to construe the healthy and the diseased state as processes,223 and is more preoccupied with 
pragmatic assessments such as the effectiveness of interventions than it is with the largely 
ethical question whether or not to intervene,224 i.e. to interrupt a process. The treatment itself 
is seen as little more than a means to an end, an instrument of extrinsic value, whereas in 
alternative medicine the treatment itself appears to be assigned significant value225 or reflect 
the value system of patient and healer. Moreover, it often plays the additional role of 
signifying the patient or healer’s social engagements, her political views, and the epistemic 
position from which she confronts the phenomena of health, disease, and health care.  
 
Today, in addition to the extensive range of treatment options for the ill body, there is also a 
multitude of resources available to the inquisitive mind, which increase the exposure – and 
thereby the popularity and scope of influence – of alternative medicine.226  This ongoing 
process has occurred along the same timeline as three other important changes – an 
introduction of compulsory education, a change in the goals and purposes of public health 
care, and a move towards globalization. 
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Compulsory education has produced populations that are better equipped to seek out and 
understand information about the treatment options available to them. It has also helped 
cultivate more socially engaged, pro-active, independent, and outspoken attitudes, some of 
which are essential aspects of critical thinking. 
 
It has been noted that people today are more likely to exhibit independence in terms of their 
health choices, to question physician decisions or even challenge them legally,227  and to 
mistrust scientific authority – especially in the context of research-supported evidence or 
scientific theories which go against their beliefs. However, this independence has produced 
certain radical forms of skepticism, a few of which have been of questionable benefit to the 
public. The rejection of commonly applied public health measures such as vaccination, or the 
emergence of controversial conspiracy theories (for instance that there is no reliable evidence 
suggesting a causal connection between HIV and AIDS, or that the existence of the HIV virus 
itself is a myth) both stem from a profound skepticism regarding scientific medicine and health 
care institutions. 
 
Despite vicious smear campaigns in the media which portray anti-vaccinators as backwards or 
scientifically illiterate, sociologists of medicine have pointed out that the main issues which 
prevent successful dialogue with them go deeper than their supposed ‘ignorance’.228 When 
discussing these issues, it is worth keeping in mind that a significant number of vaccine 
opponents demonstrate decent levels of health literacy; perhaps even more interestingly, 
there are more than a few medical professionals among them. As shown by the research of 
authors such as Anna Kata, stubborn resistance to certain public health measures, or 
skepticism regarding the very need for such measures, are phenomena which can be observed 
across all levels of education, in all occupations or segments of society, which should be 
sufficient evidence that these behaviours do not always result from ignorance, but rather from 
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alternative understandings of health or – in the case of child vaccination, for example – from 
differing interpretations of parental responsibilities.229 In a more recent paper, Goldenberg 
also contests the notion that public resistance is produced by a misunderstanding of science, 
and points out that vaccine hesitancy is more likely to stem from a ‘mistrust of scientific 
experts and institutions’.230  
 
One might argue very successfully that the overall negative and condescending attitude 
towards vaccination opponents is representative of how the experts and institutions in 
question are accustomed to dealing with public controversies. Instead of increasing their 
efforts to maintain a productive dialogue with their dissenters, scientists and public health 
authorities attempt to invalidate their rights to question the benefits of certain policies or 
practices. Gross accusations of ill-intentioned conspiracy are not rare, and neither are ridicule, 
bullying and epistemic oppression. But health care and public health interventions are not just 
about technical knowledge – they are also about knowing what is ‘good’ and how to secure 
public ‘goods’ for a specific society in a fair and just manner.  
 
To sum up, the same principle holds true for all societies: in order to protect the health of a 
specific population, one needs to acknowledge that its members’ beliefs about health and 
disease are bound to affect any and all measures taken against disease. The success of one 
and the same educational campaign against a sexually transmitted infection, for example, will 
vary largely across different communities, based on a combination of epistemic and ethical 
factors, the most obviously relevant among which are: level of education, previously held 
beliefs about the disease in question (i. e. beliefs about whom it affects, or how likely it is that 
one will acquire it based on one’s current lifestyle), level of epistemic trust in the organization 
providing the educational campaign, and personal values (for instance how high the individual 
ranks the category of health among her priorities, or how she feels about the possibility of 
                                                          
229 Kata, Op. cit. Also see Kata, A., ‘Anti-vaccine activists, Web 2.0, and the postmodern paradigm – An overview 
of tactics and tropes used online by the anti-vaccination movement’, Vaccine, 30, 2012, pp. 3778-3789 
230 Goldenberg, M. J., ‘Public Misunderstanding of Science? Reframing the Problem of Vaccine Hesitancy’, 
Perspectives on Science, 2016, Vol. 24, No. 5, pp. 552-581 
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contracting the disease). A less obviously relevant cluster of factors, which is nonetheless just 
as important, contains notions about health and how one can maintain the state of health 
whilst avoiding disease, as well as the openness to participate in discussions of the 
abovementioned topics. All of these factors ought to be taken into account during attempts 
to come up with successful public health interventions.  
 
4. 9. Summarizing the arguments in favour of maintaining the debate. 
Chapter 4 introduced the subject of eliminativism – the position that the debate on 
health/disease definitions is pointless, as such definitions are not necessary for the purposes 
of medicine, clinical reasoning and health care policies (Section 4. 1.). I have presented 
convincing objections to this position, which I have derived from my research across a 
multitude of disciplines and theories that challenge such assumptions about the practical 
implications (or lack thereof) of definitions, labels and identities. 
 
First I have examined Ereshefsky’s idea that neutral state descriptions ought to be kept 
separate from normative claims (Section 4. 2.), before showing that this step needlessly 
overemphasizes the distinction between the two types of considerations, and artificially 
separates their goals and outcomes (Section 4. 3.). Then, I have addressed Hesslow’s opinion 
that evaluative judgements and normative reasoning are a type of needless ‘distraction’ 
(Section 4. 4.) – a claim which I invalidated based on medicine’s integrative, multidimensional 
character, which combines scientifically derived knowledge and methodology with 
soioculturally derived knowledge of the world and human behaviour (Section 4. 5.). The 
importance of the latter kind of knowledge does not receive sufficient recognition due to 
idealized notions about medicine as a value-neutral, objective, and ‘culturally blind’ enterprise 
(a myth which I have exposed and rejected with the help of Chapters 2 and 3). 
 
However, inspired by label theory, in Section 4. 6. I spell out my observation that language 
and rhetoric are among the main driving forces behind the production of social expectations; 
behind the production of the social instructions, which I have discussed in Chapter 1, and on 
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which we rely when performing the social roles that we have been assigned – medical 
identities included.  
 
I have developed this idea further in Section 4. 7., where I have described in detail how rhetoric 
and social metaphors can be expected to influence the ways in which laypersons perceive 
disease phenomena, or experience life with disease. Drawing on Jackie Stacey’s analysis of the 
negative stereotyping associated with cancer, in the first sub-section of Section 4. 7. I have 
shown that evaluative judgements form a crucial part of how laypersons and physicians alike 
tend to contextualize disease; they also provide the basis for patients’ narratives of their own 
disease, as well as the basis of their interpretation of the medical identity or social role 
assigned to them. 
 
Then, in the following sub-section, I have relied on Ian Williams's theory about the 
‘iconography of illness’ to help me demonstrate how highly dependent we are on visual and 
linguistic cues (e. g. labels) from others to guide us in this process of instruction: rather than 
merely reflecting attitudes and notions that are already present in our sociocultural 
environment, these cues can create or re-shape them, thereby exercising a powerful influence 
on our social dynamic (which includes science, medicine, public institutions, and more). 
 
As indicated in the final sub-section of Section 4. 7., medical identities obey the same 
principles – K. Maynard’s work on the influence of sociocultural context on medical thinking 
testifies that issues relating to medicine and disease could never be approached from a neutral 
standpoint, but instead depend on one’s cultural upbringing. This idea has prepared the 
ground for my last argument, which has been delivered in the form of evidence that, in order 
to protect the health of a specific population, one needs to take into account its members’ 
notions of health and disease, which determine the inclination (or lack thereof) towards 
compliance with state-regulated public health measures (Section 4. 8.). I have shown that, in 
order to be successful, campaigns need to be informed by an accurate understanding of the 
values and beliefs that the target population maintains about health, disease, and medicine – 
an understanding which would be impossible to acquire unless the right social and epistemic 
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climate is maintained, e. g. by creating a public space where philosophical debates such as the 
one on health/disease definitions are encouraged, instead of shut down as unnecessary and 
redundant. This illustration of the practical importance of maintaining dialogue has added the 
final and most compelling detail of my argumentative structure.  
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5. How do we define disease? 
‘…do diseases really exist as entities, like demons or frogs or leaves or rocks? If so, what are their characteristics 
and how do they differ from their opposites – healths?’ ~ C. R. Burns231 
 
‘Cancer is not some entity separate from yourself.’ ~ A. W. Frank232 
 
5. 1. The chicken or the egg? Introduction. 
What is the difference between Munchausen syndrome and malingering? Are eccentric 
personalities synonymous with psychiatric illness? Are paedophiles ill-intentioned deviants or 
unfortunate, sick people? Does the state of people with drug addictions deserve critique or 
pity? There are no easy answers here. Separating facts from values is impossible in the social 
domain that is the shared lifeworld of human beings. A definition of disease would likely have 
facilitated our reflections on the above questions. But how do we define a term that has 
always been so value-laden, and therefore so difficult to pin down? The most intuitive solution 
would be to research its roots. But which came first? The chicken or the egg? Medicine or the 
notion that human beings could suffer from ‘disease’? 
 
Post-structuralists would have us believe that illness (especially mental illness) is a social 
construct regulated by whatever values are currently held by a society; that there is no such 
thing as disease in nature, because a disease is an artificially created category attributed to 
disvalued states; that medicine greedily reaches out to capture innocent victims whom to 
pathologize without good cause. Coincidentally, the Western world may indeed be 
experiencing the occasional wave of over-eagerness to ‘medicalize’ conditions and processes 
which are ordinary parts of life (overdiagnosing naughty, energetic children with ADHD comes 
to mind, and so does overdiagnosing exhausted, stressed out adults with anxiety or 
depression). But any claims that our intuitions about what constitutes a disease are shaped by 
                                                          
231 Burns, C. R., ‘Diseases vs. Healths: some legacies in the philosophies of Modern Medical Science’ in Engelhardt, 
H. Tr., and Spicker, S. F. (Eds.), Evaluation and Explanation in the Biomedical Sciences, D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, Dordrecht, 1975, p. 29 
232 Frank, A. W., At the Will of the Body: Reflections on Illness, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1991, p. 84 
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societal values need to be supported by a convincing explanation about the social and 
institutionalized powers which drive the process of devaluation. The simplest answer here is 
that the label is justified via the practice of diagnosis, which in turn is underpinned by the 
institution of scientific medicine – an authoritative source which apparently not only construes 
deviant states (by means of creating arbitrary standards of ‘normality’), but also confirms the 
need of their rectification. But while claims that medicine pushes for the creation of new 
diagnostic labels may not be entirely unfounded, they are unlikely to serve as proof that the 
concept of ‘disease’ itself did not, in fact, precede the industry based around its existence by 
a long time rather than arise alongside it. It is not the case that disease is ‘coined’, ‘made up’, 
or ‘construed’; it is not the carefully crafted fantasy of a writer or the marketing trick of a 
salesperson. The concept of ‘disease’ provides the basis for medicine, rather than the other 
way around. Medicine developed – first as a trade, then as a science – because of the strong 
presence of disease, and the desire to combat that presence by any means possible. 
 
While the ever-increasing body of professional knowledge about disease aetilogy today is 
more advanced than anything our ancestors could have conceived of, lay intuitions as to what 
does or does not constitute disease have remained remarkably stable over time. The language 
of symptoms has evolved, explanatory models of illness experiences or body perception have 
changed, ideals about health and beauty have shifted, but to this day people generally tend 
to agree that a sore throat, a congested nose or obstructed, coughing lungs are ‘diseased’. It 
makes no difference whether or not the condition is milder or more serious, non-contagious 
or highly infective, acute or chronic: a disease is a disease, and even when we cannot put our 
finger on the exact quality which makes it such, it still is what it is. This chapter is meant to 
introduce the reader to some of the most influential attempts to understand this 
phenomenon, as well as the context in which I am examining them – recent philosophical 
discussions of health, disease and the various approaches used to define them.  
 
5. 2. On the importance of asking the right questions. 
In Chapter 1 I argued that the facts-values opposition in terms of which we are accustomed to 
perceiving the debate on disease definitions, is not a legitimate portrayal of this debate, 
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because it ignores their conceptual similarities and shared historical-cultural origins, which 
were exposed in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 showed medicine’s susceptibility to bias, 
whereas Chapter 3 revealed reductionist and naturalist theories’ ideological roots. Based on 
these demonstrations, I have reached the conclusion that perceiving or framing the 
health/disease definitions debate in terms of a competition between two fundamentally 
different camps is intellectually misleading, and not the most productive way of systematizing 
the established approaches to defining disease. A more useful strategy in that regard, 
especially considering the need to evaluate and compare different solutions, would be to 
group them based on what they deem to be the most central features of disease in real life 
experiences, rather than based on the author’s subscription to a particular school of thought. 
Although in this case philosophical commitments are certain to influence an author’s 
perception of what are – or what are not – central features of disease phenomena, we need 
to ensure that these commitments do not receive more attention than the notions they have 
produced. Having established that the two intellectual traditions share common grounds, we 
are now less likely to overemphasize the imaginary chasm between them, and more likely to 
resist the pressure to pledge allegiance to either. Rather than pitting different brands of 
philosophy against each other and making broad generalizations about them, this chapter is 
going to engage in an analysis of the different strategies they have produced, exploring how 
the specific focal points vary between definitions, and comparing them. I will attempt this by 
recreating the structure of Boorse’s paper ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, which grouped 
different approaches to health/disease definitions in terms of focal points rather than 
philosophical commitments. However, my critique will be informed by different 
considerations, and my conclusions will not match Boorse’s. 
 
Firstly let us start out by giving credit where credit is due: ‘Health as a theoretical concept’ has 
turned out to be remarkably insightful in terms of identifying certain persistent intellectual 
biases, misconceptions and trends plaguing the debate on disease definitions. It is not a 
coincidence that this ground-breaking paper begins by presenting common approaches which 
Boorse deemed problematic based on the features they regarded as paradigmatic to disease 
phenomena: a) diseases as disvalued states; b) diseases as the states treated by physicians; c) 
disease as statistical abnormality; d) health as adaptivity and disease as maladaptivity. This 
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classification will be more convenient due to the following reasons: 1) it would allow us to see 
where and how different methods can overlap conceptually (for instance, both eliminativism 
and specific brands of normativism could conceive of diseases as ‘those things that are treated 
by physicians’, and both phenomenologists and naturalists may agree that disease is a 
disruption of homeostasis, even though they might construe homeostasis in different terms); 
2) it would allow us to focus on exploring, comparing, defining or rejecting particular strategies 
rather than the broader ideological and philosophical contexts within which they are proposed 
(which we have already seen share more similarities than differences). The goal is to examine 
the most widely used means for defining disease and see where they go wrong – knowing 
what to avoid is a good place to start.  
 
Throughout this chapter, a certain name will be appearing nearly as much as Boorse’s. Georges 
Canguilhem – a prominent figure in the area of medical humanities and author of The Normal 
and the Pathological – has anticipated, and helped shed light on, some of the toughest 
problems faced by philosophy of medicine when it comes to defining health and disease. His 
successful explanation of the difference between anomaly and pathology, coupled with his 
convincing theory about biological normativity, presents an insightful criticism of the works of 
authors like Leriche, the 19th century physiologist Claude Bernard, and multiple others. 
According to Canguilhem’s intuition, while far from an empty concept, health is a concept of 
the normative kind, in the sense that in the world there is no object which corresponds to the 
label ‘health’, but rather a characteristic called ‘health’ which we attribute to objects (in this 
case, to organisms) possessing certain qualities: we are the ones who determine which those 
qualities are; we create and edit the criteria list according to our own understanding and the 
various factors which influence it. Let us now turn to Boorse for a brief overview of what these 
criteria tend to look like, versus what they ought to look like. 
 
 
5. 3. Boorse’s idea: an overview. 
Boorse’s view on health bears little resemblance to views in the classical medical tradition 
where accounts of health are based on the idea of a natural state allowing human beings to 
107 
 
 
lead a good life and to preserve the human kind by reproducing. There is superficial similarity 
in the sense that Boorse, too, views the body’s cells, tissues, organs and (sub)systems 
teleologically, i.e. as organized in a complex hierarchy which exhibits goal-oriented activity on 
every level233, just like in Aristotelian biology body parts and systems were believed to be 
subjugated to the goals of ‘flourishing’. Aristotle insisted that species have their own ‘nature’:   
a functional design that empirical data show to be typical for said species. Similarly, Boorse 
refers in his writings to a ‘nature’ or functional design, which he calls a ‘species design’. The 
notion of a uniform, standard functional ‘species design’ serves as a starting point in ‘Health 
as a Theoretical Concept’, where Boorse aims to provide a value-free account of disease based 
on the notion of biological function as a contribution to an organism’s goals. He takes 
biological function statements to be completely value-free statements of biological facts 
which serve to describe species or population characteristics. Polymorphic functional traits 
(like eye colour, blood type and other variables) can be included disjunctively in it – for 
instance, we can say that human irises are blue or green or brown, and human blood can be 
of the type A, or B, or AB, or O in order to avoid classifying less common genetic traits such as 
red hair or a rare blood type as diseased states. Since functional design also happens to show 
variations with sex and age, Boorse embraces the use of reference classes smaller than 
species. A reference class would be an age group of a sex of a species, for example ‘12 year 
old human girls’ or ‘newborn human males’. Thus functions which are statistically typical with 
respect to one’s corresponding reference class, and which exhibit statistically typical efficiency 
in contributing to the organism’s individual survival and reproduction, make for a healthy 
organism on Boorse’s account; there is a disease when there is a noticeable inability to 
perform certain function(s) on the typical occasions with at least typical efficiency - an inability 
which, according to Boorse, remains a disease even if the occasion to perform it never arises 
(as in the case of hemophiliacs who are still diseased even when they are reliably protected 
from all kinds of injury). The central role of functions in Boorse’s account reflects what he 
deems to be the key biological feature of the structure of living organisms, i.e. their ‘means-
to-end hierarchy with goal-directedness on every level’ – for example, by manufacturing 
certain compounds cells contribute higher-level goals like muscle contractions, which in turn 
make behaviour like nest-building or prey-catching possible, which in turn contributes to the 
                                                          
233 Boorse, C., ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, Philosophy of Science, December 1977, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 556 
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goals of survival and reproduction, taken by Boorse to be the ultimate goals of every organism. 
Boorse distinguishes between accidental contributions and causal contributions (giving the 
famous example of the squirrel which catches its tail in a crack en route to being hit by a car – 
just because in this case the tail made an accidental contribution to the squirrel’s survival, it 
does not follow that the function of the tail is to protect the squirrel from cars234). Having 
summed up this incredibly detailed account, let us turn our attention to the explanatory 
models it was meant to replace, and the criteria they rely on. 
 
a) Health and values. 
Unsurprisingly, the first method Boorse addresses is the reliance on normative judgments, and 
he starts by noting how while it is undesirable to be below any valuable physical quality, we 
do not consider conditions like a short stature, unattractiveness or less than perfect 
coordination to be diseases. Next comes the revelation that certain circumstances might make 
diseases desirable – a point Boorse illustrates with the example of myopia, which could 
arguably be of advantage to someone who is trying to avoid infantry. That relying on value 
judgments alone would not provide sufficient ground for developing a plausible account of 
disease becomes even more apparent when one considers how often normativist definitions 
seem to avoid the question, rather than try to answer it. Peter Sedgwick, for instance, has 
claimed that in the natural world the harmful condition of an organism has ‘no more 
significance than the snapping of an autumn leaf from its twig’, and that ‘the invasion of a 
human organism by cholera germs carries with it no more the stamp of “illness” than does the 
souring of the milk by other forms of bacteria’235. In his view we can talk about a disease if a 
body (or a part of it) has been disvalued in some way, in other words, if there is a condition 
which is undesirable and we have an interest in getting rid of it. A similar line of reasoning can 
be encountered in Georges Canguilhem’s The Normal and The Pathological, where 
Canguilhem observes that it is not the case that concepts of health and disease (or harm and 
benefit) have resulted directly from the rise of medicine, but that medicine itself exists 
because we consider some states to be pathological and in need of rectification. In much the 
                                                          
234 Ibid, p. 557 
235 Sedgwick, P., Psycho Politics, Pluto Press, London, 1982, p. 32 
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same way, values exist because we exhibit preferences for certain goods, states, traits, 
behaviours, and environments; values are ways of exhibiting or ascribing our preferences to 
external objects or their characteristics in systematic, clearly delineated ways, i.e. with a 
constant and easily identifiable (albeit subject to cultural interpretations) pattern. Life itself – 
even more so in the case of social species like humans and other higher order primates – can 
be seen as a normative activity, because it establishes norms:  ‘life is not indifferent to the 
conditions in which it is possible… life is polarity and thereby even an unconscious position of 
value; in short, life is in fact a normative activity.’236    This firm conviction has led Canguilhem 
to proclaim that ‘the sick man is not abnormal because of the absence of a norm but because 
of his incapacity to be normative.’237 But does the normal state designate the habitual state 
of a specific organ, system or organism, or the ideal, or both?238 Canguilhem discusses two 
senses of normality: statistical (descriptive) normality – how others are functioning, and 
therapeutic (normative) normality239 – how a particular person should be functioning with 
regards to her own personal habitual condition.240 Paradoxically – given Canguilhem’s own 
solid scientific background and his extensive experience as a physician – he does not see law 
as playing a central role in these phenomena. Canguilhem explains the difference between 
law and biological normativity, stating that pathological events occur in compliance with 
physicochemical laws whilst simultaneously going against biological norms: ‘When the wastes 
of digestion are no longer excreted by the organism and congest or poison the internal 
environment, this is all indeed according to law (physical, chemical, etc.) but none of this 
follows the norm, which is the activity of the organism itself.’241 Laws are not that which makes 
up existence as they do not have any tangible presence, unlike the creatures, events and 
environments which exhibit them in various flexible ways: ‘what the fox eats is the hen’s egg 
and not the chemistry of albuminoids or the laws of embryology.’242  Laws are theoretical 
                                                          
236 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 126 
237 Ibid, p. 186 
238 Ibid, p. 126 
239 Ibid, p. 123-124 
240 For instance, let us say that both my healthy, fit sister and I – a person in frail health, have the flu, and we 
both go to the same doctor. The goal of the treatment provided for me should be to restore my health to what 
it normally is, rather than attempt to push even further and make me as fit and healthy as my sister, i.e. healthier 
and fitter than I normally am. 
 
241 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 129 
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abstractions, and if used to define health or disease, the resulting definition would be just 
another law, just another theoretical abstraction: ‘it is life itself and not medical judgment 
which makes the biological normal a concept of value and not a concept of statistical reality. 
For the physician, life is not an object but rather a polarized activity, whose spontaneous effort 
of defense and struggle against all that is of negative value is extended by medicine by bringing 
to bear the relative but indispensable light of human science.’ 243 
 
Therefore it is not surprising that in concepts like health and disease, there is always 
necessarily a fusion of fact and value, which creates an unsurmountable obstacle in the way 
of naturalist approaches. As pointed out by Elselijn Kingma, Boorse definitely does not succeed 
in providing a value-free account of disease.244 In his BST (Biostatistical Theory) health is 
defined as statistically typical contribution of all organism’s parts and processes to the 
organisms overall goals of survival and reproduction. To reiterate, typical here means typical 
with respect to a reference class – an age group of a sex of a species, for instance 28 year old 
male humans. Reference classes have a central role in BST because of the wide variety of 
functioning across our species – what has been established as ‘normal’ for one group may not 
be viewed as ‘normal’ for another group. For example, low hemoglobin counts may be 
‘normal’ in adult women who tend to lose blood during menstruation, but may indicate 
anemia, leukemia or other problems in newborns whose bodies usually produce high levels of 
adult hemoglobin in order to replace the production of fetal hemoglobin which is switched off 
after birth. However, it is Boorse’s requirement that reference classes must be ‘appropriate’ 
– in other words, a reference class must be a ‘natural class of organisms of uniform functional 
design’.245 This means that reference classes will be based on normative claims about what is 
‘natural’ or ‘uniform’, since it is not clear exactly what these terms mean, or at least what 
Boorse takes them to mean. Thus it appears that the process through which reference classes 
are selected and formed relies on normative judgments, on values. Since the role played by 
reference classes in BST is a very important and central one, one might argue that Boorse’s 
whole theory is implicitly normative: BST cannot be value-free when its basis (the reference 
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244 Kingma, E., ‘What is it to be healthy?’, Analysis, 2007, Vol. 67, No. 294, pp. 128-133 
245 Boorse, ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, p. 555 
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classes) depends on values. The formation of reference classes is what determines the 
distinction between health and disease. But the distinction between health and disease must 
(at least according to Boorse) be determined solely by empirical facts. It should be empirical 
facts, and not values, which determine that ‘28 year old male humans’ is an appropriate 
reference class and the class ‘people with schizophrenia’ is not an appropriate class. In other 
words, Kingma has shown that Boorse does not offer a value-free and purely empirical account 
of health, because his procedure for the selection of reference classes is not based on 
objective criteria. Still, while the influence of values cannot be escaped, there can be little 
doubt that normative judgments alone are not sufficient criteria for defining disease.  
 
Some have attempted to solve this difficulty and boost the explanatory and descriptive power 
of value judgements by merging them with factual statements. The resulting so-called ‘hybrid’ 
theories present an interesting option to try and combine the advantages of normativist and 
naturalist accounts of disease while at the same time eliminating their weaknesses. Chris 
Megone, for instance, believes that there is no separation, that fact and value are fused in the 
natural world.246 According to his Aristotelian notion of natural kinds, the supposedly 
evaluative judgment as to what constitutes a healthy human being is the same as the 
supposedly factual judgment as to what constitutes a human being.247 Megone’s explanation 
of this is that the cycle of changes that constitutes the function of the human being also 
determines what a human being is, since the potentialities that are realized when a member 
of a natural kind fulfils its (the member’s) function also constitute the essential potentialities 
of all members of that natural kind. That is why he believes that elaborating a satisfying 
account of (mental) disease would require both functional analysis and evaluative 
elements.248 However, further in this chapter I shall demonstrate that functional analysis relies 
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on accounts of function which are in themselves problematic. I will also show that, while 
values and facts may indeed be fused in the natural world, they are still not the same entities.  
 
b) Are diseases the things that physicians treat? 
It goes without saying that some diseases – like HIV, for example, are treatable but have no 
known available cure in today’s medicine. It is also common knowledge that physicians also 
treat a lot of conditions which clearly are not diseases: they cure broken limbs, prescribe 
contraceptive pills, perform abortions, cosmetic surgery and circumcision, or assist in 
childbirth and procedures involving technologies for assisted reproduction. While these 
procedures can arguably enhance one’s well-being and quality of life, most people would 
consider it counterintuitive to interpret them as cures, or the respective conditions they 
address – as diseases. This type of miscategorization may result from overinclusive definitions 
which describe disease as a biological failure – for instance Megone’s definition of disease as 
‘incapacitating failure’.249 Framed in Aristotelian – that is, teleological – terms, Megone’s 
definition equates health to being a good specimen of a certain kind, i.e. possessing qualities 
that enable one to lead a good life and to reproduce, all in the ways typical for the kind.250 On 
these terms, disease acts as an incapacitating condition which prevents the specimen from 
achieving the above-described goals. This has led Rachel Cooper to express a concern that 
Aristotelian approaches cannot define disease properly since they end up lumping together 
different kinds of harm instead.251 Cooper rightfully points out that biological ‘bads’ like short 
stature, or even moral vices and social ‘bads’ like a lack of education, are all examples of 
incapacitating ‘bads’ which are not diseases.252 This argument has also provided the basis for 
her criticism of Megone, whose account of disease she sees as overinclusive and poorly 
equipped to distinguish between true diseases and moral vices (like laziness, for example).253 
According to Cooper, this level of conceptual discrimination could be achieved if more 
conditions are added to the criteria list, such as that the state to be labeled disease be a ‘bad 
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thing to have’, that the afflicted persons be considered ‘unlucky’, and that the state could be 
treated.  However, while Cooper’s otherwise adequate and successful normative account of 
disease does exactly what it promises, it may turn out to be problematic on several levels. The 
first criterion risks slipping into the territory of politically incorrect language, not only by 
reinforcing negative stereotypes about diseased and disabled people’s lives as somehow less 
worthwhile or valuable, but also by depriving their respective communities of the possibility 
to define their afflictions in their own terms. The second criterion, in addition to contributing 
to this negative image, commits the fault of sounding vague and unspecific – precisely what a 
definition ought not to be – and only serves to further illustrate Boorse’s point about values 
as unreliable tools for determining which states are disease. However, the issue with the third 
criterion, which is meant to serve as an aid in distinguishing between diseases and 
socioeconomic ‘bads’, goes beyond politically problematic wording or fuzzy terminology; it 
risks slipping into a categorical mistake. The term ‘treatment’, often taken to be synonymous 
with ‘curing’, has a separate meaning covering a variety of clinical behaviours, including 
‘managing’, ‘caring’ for, and ‘tending’ to. The different use of these terms is philosophically 
grounded on the practical distinction between controlling a chronic condition (as in diabetes 
‘management’), reducing the frequency and intensity of its outbreaks (as in cystic acne 
‘treatment’), tending to unpleasant symptoms (as in ‘caring’ for wounds, or taking ‘care’ of an 
ill person), and a complete eradication of disease (also known as ‘curing’ – applicable to the 
context of a mild case of influenza, but not to the context of an HPV or herpes infection). While 
Cooper clearly distinguishes between cure and other kinds of medical attention (hence her 
opting for the more general term ‘treatable’, which is applicable to a wider range of 
conditions, including all ‘curable’ ones), her account does not seem to filter out treatable 
conditions which are not diseases, meaning that she may end up repeating that same mistake 
which she identifies in Megone’s work – ‘lumping together’ different kinds of ‘harmful’ states 
(in this case, states like undesired pregnancy254 or drug addiction). As Boorse noted more than 
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become pregnant’. Although I agree with position a) in principle, I do not think that it applies to this particular 
case, or even to the medical discourse on fertility in general. If we were to turn the example around and discuss 
the inability to become pregnant instead, we would see that the lay populace’s intuitions are, in fact, rather 
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four decades ago, clinical practice addresses (or tends to, or indeed ‘treats’) multiple bodily 
concerns, not all of which can be considered to be proper diseases, and this critical remark 
about the applicability of the ‘treatability’ criterion continues to be just as relevant today. 
Nevertheless, Cooper’s account represents an inspirational change from the dismissive and 
superficial approach to the social dimensions of disease, which has long dominated medical 
thinking and the philosophy of medicine. 
 
Even in the past, some of the most profound analyses on the matter rely on the implicit 
intuition that disease is something more than an accidental temporary inconvenience, and 
attempt to further this intuition by accentuating the physiological and conceptual links 
between disease and mortality. An interesting example can be found in The Normal and the 
Pathological, where Canguilhem quotes the legendary French physiologist Jean Pierre 
Flourens, noting how ‘most men die from disease; very few die, strictly speaking, of old age’255, 
and then draws on that observation in order to expand French sociologist Maurice 
Halbwachs’s idea that every society has ‘the mortality that suits it’.256 Halbwachs, who firmly 
supported the view that workplace conditions and hygiene affected mortality rates, in so 
doing laid the foundations of 20th century European sociology of medicine and sparked 
research interest in the combined effects of geography, historical influences, and lifestyle on 
health and mortality rates. Once the social sciences turned their attention to the mortality 
rates and disease profiles of different populations, variations in functional rhythms for people 
of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, races, and lifestyles began to emerge as a fruitful 
ground for aetiological and epidemiological analyses.257 Porak, for instance, saw diseases as 
                                                          
quick to acknowledge a condition’s newly acquired ‘disorder-status’. Infertility, in all of its shapes and forms, 
has been medicalized for as long as assisted reproduction and fertility therapy have been around, and not just 
due to sexist views about women’s supposed duty to become mothers (male subfertility is also pathologized 
and medicalized), or due to misguided thoughts about our biological design (most people are at least vaguely 
aware of the high maternal and newborn mortality rates before the arrival of modern medicine, which testified 
that, indeed, not all of us are fit to carry a pregnancy to term and deliver a healthy infant). Therefore I disagree 
with Cooper about both the status she assigns to unwanted pregnancy and the reasons she suggests will lead 
most people to reject said status.  
255 Canguilhem, The Normal and the Pathological, p. 160 
256 Halbwachs, M., Les causes du suicide, Puf, Paris, 2002, p. 4, p. 63-67, p. 287-288 
257 Trostle, J., ‘Anthropology and Epidemiology in the Twentieth Century: A Selective History of Collaborative 
Projects and Theoretical Affinities, 1920 to 1970’, in Anthropology and Epidemiology: Interdisciplinary 
Approaches to the Study of Health and Disease (Ed. C. R. Janes), D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, 1986, 
p. 59 
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disturbances of rhythms that resulted from ‘fatigue or overwork, that is, from any exercise 
exceeding the proper adjustments of the individual’s needs to the environment,’ while Vallois 
observed that there have been typical diseases for every historical period depending on the 
prevalent lifestyles associated with it.258 That is how the newly increased focus on mortality in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries prompted a thorough investigation of the 
social forces at play behind heightened cancer, diabetes and heart disease rates in the 
industrialized world, which in turn resulted in a decisive rejection of single-cause explanatory 
models of disease. It was revealed that potentially any serious disturbance – however far 
removed from physicians’ primary field of observation or scope of corrective influence – could 
cause disease, and thus acquire medical significance. Therefore it is not entirely unreasonable 
that the concept of multifactorial aetiology should produce a broader picture of medicine as 
an aggregate area of expertise which deals with a variety of human concerns; however, the 
logical step from accepting disease heterogeneity (and the supposed aggregateness of 
medicine) to construing the category of disease itself as an aggregate of ‘all conditions which 
are treated by physicians’, is an intellectual fallacy, a non sequitur. Nevertheless, scrutiny on 
the harmful working and living conditions associated with increased mortality led to 
unprecedented awareness of the human dimensions of disease – feelings of illness, 
incapacitation, debility, and most of all, suffering. Unsurprisingly, those also needed to be 
quantified in order to be rendered more comprehensible, so along with anthropology and 
social epidemiology, another couple of disciplines that flourished in the 20th century was that 
of medical metrology and statistics. Coincidentally, it is statistical normality that we shall 
address next. 
 
c) Are health and statistical normality the same thing? 
The third criterion opposed by Boorse is statistical normality. When taken as the ultimate 
indicator of health, it would lead to people with unusual characteristics (such as red hair or a 
rare blood type) being considered as diseased even when they clearly are not, while failing to 
register people with common conditions (like myopia) or nearly universal diseases (like dental 
                                                          
258 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 168 and 173, respectively. 
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caries).259 Another problem with the criterion of statistical ‘normality’ has been articulated 
decades ago by Georges Canguilhem, who reflected on the descriptive concept of anomaly 
and the appropriate ranges within which individuals demonstrating deviations from the 
average would still be considered normal. Biological or medical standards do allow some 
oscillations or variety, he notes, and it is difficult to say when the line between normal and 
abnormal has been crossed, as statistical methods alone do not provide the necessary means 
to distinguish firmly between the two, so instead we find ourselves relying on conventions and 
guidelines when making those judgments.260 Clearly not all anomalies are pathological; rather, 
most of them can be explained as acceptable statistical variations in structure, i.e. as 
comparatively unusual and peculiar ‘in terms of one’s organization’.261 Therefore the 
pathological is always abnormal, but since diversity or simply being different are not 
pathologies per se, there has to be an additional assessment factor: an intuitive understanding 
or an evaluative judgment of something going ‘wrong’,262 meaning that even statistics-based 
explanatory models of health and disease still have to operate in conjunction with non-
epistemic criteria like values and ideals. But the latter two do not exist independently, they 
are derived from, and collectively shaped and maintained by, human communities in order to 
serve normative purposes. In fact, Canguilhem explicitly points out that he regards the 
‘normal’ human as a normative human, or a human who is capable of establishing norms,263 
and life itself – as a kind of ‘polarity’ which determines the organism’s preference for some 
conditions and avoidance of others.  Behavioural norms for all living beings, he argues, are 
defined by the organism’s natural constitution: ‘even for an amoeba, living means preference 
and exclusion. A digestive tract, sexual organs, constitute an organism’s behavioral norms’264. 
Indeed, even the very existence of medicine itself can be explained through this dynamic 
‘polarity’: ‘…no living being would have ever developed medical technique if the life within 
him – as within every living thing – were indifferent to the conditions it met with, if life were 
                                                          
259 Boorse, C., ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, Philosophy of Science, December 1977, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 566 
260 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 154 reads: ‘In order to represent a species we have chosen norms which are in fact 
constants determined by averages. The normal living being is the one who conforms to these norms. But must 
we consider every divergence abnormal? … Guiding hypotheses and practical conventions are needed, allowing 
one to decide what value… constitutes the transition from normal to abnormal.’ 
261 Ibid, p. 133 
262 Ibid, p. 137 
263 A sentence on p. 139 reads that “normal man is the normative man, the being capable of establishing new, 
even organic norms.” 
264 Ibid, p. 136 
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not a form of reactivity polarized to the variations of the environment in which it develops.’265 
The norm, then, appears to be ‘the persistence of life’266 , or living organisms’ self-preserving 
behaviours, self-healing properties and struggle against infections. While pain may be ‘not in 
nature’s plan’, as Leriche assures us267, disease most certainly appears to be part of the grand 
scheme of things; the presence of immune systems and their associated formation of 
antibodies in reaction to pathogenic microorganisms give eloquent testimony to this 
interpretation of our physiology, meaning that ‘in a sense one could say that continual perfect 
health is abnormal.’268 The pathological can be considered normal in instances where 
normality is defined in terms of statistics and statistical frequency. According to Canguilhem, 
the reason behind this is that ‘health’ has two meanings, depending on whether health is 
taken absolutely or as ‘qualified’, 269 i. e. as a normative concept defining an ideal type, or as 
a descriptive concept outlining a specific organism’s dispositions and behaviour. But disease 
is something which could appear at either one or both of these levels, i.e. a person can be 
considered diseased both in relation to others and in relation to her usual, ‘normal’ self, as 
noted by Canguilhem. For obvious reasons, large-scale statistics (or even small-scale statistics) 
are not appropriate tools if one’s goal is to account for diseases which are characterized not 
by divergences from the overall average, but by deviations from an individual average.270 
 
However, the statistical component has dominated the philosophical discourse on health and 
disease for a very long time, which is especially obvious in some of the debate‘s seminal works 
created in the 1970’s, such as the ones written by Kendell (who ties the category of disease to 
evidence of increased mortality and reduced fertility)271 or Taylor (who discusses ‘patient 
classes’).272 It was also widely believed to have been successfully employed in Boorse’s 
writings via the sophisticated Biostatistical Theory (BST) he had developed in support of his 
                                                          
265 Ibid, p. 130 
266 Ibid, p. 138 
267 Leriche, R., Chirurgie de la douleur, Masson, Paris, 1940, p. 483 
268 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 137 
269 Ibid 
270 Ibid, p. 153 
271 Kendell, R., ‘The concept of disease and its implications for psychiatry’, British Journal of Psychiatry, 1975, Vol. 
127, pp. 305-315 
272 Taylor, F. K., ‘The medical model of the disease concept’, British Journal of Psychiatry, 1976, Vol. 128, pp. 588-
594 
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account. It was not until Cooper and Kingma exposed the inherently flawed logic behind 
reference classes that many other readers became aware that any information yielded by the 
BST would be neither sufficiently informative nor particularly objective. As pointed out by 
Cooper, statistical normality also depends on additional factors like environment, 
geographical location, lifestyle and culture just as much as it does on age, sex and species – 
the three crucial characteristics that Boorse’s far too broadly construed reference classes rely 
on.273 At the same time, if reference classes are allowed to become too narrow, they become 
uninformative with regards to any general principles or tendencies that one might try to draw 
from them. In addition, with especially narrow reference classes the distinction between 
accidental and non-accidental contribution to functions would become eroded: for instance, 
let us suppose a recent study has confirmed that 25 year old white female vegetarian non-
smokers who live in a US megapolis are less prone to HPV-related uterine cancers than their 
meat-consuming, smoker peers from East European towns with smaller populations. If that 
were the case, could this tendency be attributed to subtle physiological differences between 
the two classes of women, or to the differences in their diets, smoking habits or 
environments? Or would it be yet more plausible to hypothesize that cultural factors like 
higher levels of exposure (or sensitivity) to public health campaigns facilitate preventive 
behaviours and thus lead to marginally lower disease rates among the citizens of the US 
megapolis? These questions are not impossible to answer, but would require further 
investigation, which would take us far beyond the relatively straightforward act of compiling 
statistical results. As pointed out by Leonelli, data and models serve different epistemic 
functions, and exhibit different levels of abstraction when representing a given target 
system.274 This view supports my position that, without interpretation, statistically derived 
data becomes a purely descriptive formal representation of the functioning across a group of 
superficially similar organisms. Only when coupled with background knowledge or theoretical 
reflections on the acquired results can it lead to legitimate conclusions. However, the larger 
the amount and the scope of additional background knowledge required for completing this 
process, the more subject to error it is; moreover, an increased reliance on multiple sources 
of background knowledge opens the door to evaluative judgments by introducing an extra 
                                                          
273 Cooper, R., ‘Disease’, p. 266 
274 Leonelli, S., Data-Centric Biology: A Philosophical Study, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2016 
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step in the procedure – the selection of sources based on their relevance and reliability. That, 
in itself, can guarantee different conclusions each time the procedure is attempted by a 
different agent, even in the presence of an identical sample. 
 
d) Disease as pain or disability. 
The fourth and the fifth criterion attacked by Boorse are, respectively, pain, suffering or 
discomfort, and disability, reflecting the rather common tendency (intellectual fetish, even) 
to falsely assume causal links between diseases and discomfort and/or debilitating conditions. 
Diseases like HIV and syphilis can remain asymptomatic; the people affected by them may not 
experience any discomfort, pain or suffering for many years post infection. On the other hand, 
healthy women may feel intense pain during childbirth, or even during menstruation, but 
neither of those is a pathological state per se. Similarly, diseases like eczema and dental caries 
are not (and do not lead to) disabilities, while a lot of ‘normal’ natural occurrences or phases 
in the lives of organisms are: the infant’s inability to walk and consume solid foods, the 
diminished mobility observed in advanced age, the absence of ovulation during the initial 
months of breastfeeding, the instances of female incontinence during the first weeks 
following vaginal delivery, the experience of mittelschmerz (also known as painful ovulation), 
et cetera. 
 
While disease can and often does overlap with pain and debilitating states, it does not 
completely coincide with them. It is wise to avoid conflating those three distinct categories, 
as long as that does not lead to a complete disregard for the human dimension of disease – 
the experience of living with disease. Hybrid accounts of disease are an attempt to overcome 
this conceptual difficulty by merging together elements of naturalism and normativism in 
order to combine the two approaches’ strengths whilst simultaneously eliminating their 
weaknesses. Robert Spitzer275 and Jerome Wakefield276 have tried to achieve this effect by 
                                                          
275 Spitzer, R. L., ‘Harmful dysfunction and the DSM definition of mental disorder’, Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, August 1999, Vol. 108, No. 3, pp. 430-432 
276 Wakefield, J. C., ‘The concept of mental disorder: On the boundary between biological facts and social values’, 
American Psychologist, 1992, Vol. 47, No. 3, pp. 373-388, also see Wakefield, J. C., ‘The concept of mental 
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describing ‘mental disorder’ as a ‘harmful dysfunction’. ‘Dysfunction’ is a term meant to 
describe measureable properties of objects found in the material world, natural systems 
available to the observing eye, while the term ‘harm’ means nothing outside the framework 
of human moral vision, it is similar to a label that we attach to things to mark them with our 
disapproval, fear or disgust. The naturalist element of the account – ‘dysfunction’ – is 
admittedly there to introduce a sense of objectivity that would not be present if we were to 
be guided exclusively by the concept of ‘harm’. On the other hand, as many dysfunctions are 
minor or compatible with the demands of ordinary everyday life, the naturalist element alone 
would be an insufficient foundation on which to base any judgements regarding the 
pathologization or medicalization of a particular condition.  
 
Wakefield has stressed that judgements about ‘harm’ differ across societies. He appears to 
embrace, rather than question or problematize, this reliance on sociocultural frames of 
reference, while paying little attention to individual norms, subjective experiences and their 
role in establishing the presence of ‘harm’ for the affected persons. However, a truly 
debilitating condition will not become any less ‘harmful’ to the individual simply because a 
certain community or culture lacks the conceptual resources to imagine it as such and perceive 
its potential to cause ‘harm’ in another context, or because the occasion to experience this 
‘harm’ never arises for the affected individual. The opposite is also true: a person who does 
not present with complaints that can be traced back to identifiable structural and functional 
changes is not automatically considered ‘diseased’ just because she does not function exactly 
like everyone else around her. While based on a correct intuition about the arbitrariness of 
concepts like ‘harm’, Wakefield’s assumptions tend to overestimate just how widely the 
criteria for harmfulness can vary between different cultures. A severe case of dyspraxia, for 
example, would be considered problematic in virtually all cultures, regardless of their value 
systems, whilst an equally serious case of dyslexia may never even be detected in an illiterate 
community that does not rely on written language.  
                                                          
disorder: diagnostic implications of the harmful dysfunction analysis’, World Psychiatry, October 2007, Vol. 6, 
No. 3, pp. 149-156 
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However, that is not the main issue with Wakefield’s account – the bigger problem is that the 
account says too little about how we ought to think about disease. It more or less accurately 
sums up the social and psychological mechanisms operating behind the attribution of the label 
‘disease’, but does not ask if there is a more productive and socially progressive way of 
construing it. To put this in the terms developed by Haslanger, such an account constitutes a 
‘descriptive project’ when it should strive to be an ‘ameliorative’ one277 and seek to question 
or improve the status quo. 
  
It also invites a list of questions with no easy answers: how harmful is too harmful, and what 
levels of ‘harmfulness’ would be considered as a criterion that medical attention is required? 
How are we expected to measure objectively the presence of a normative element that the 
author allegedly agrees is predominantly contextual and therefore arbitrary? Would that task 
also be assigned to physicians, or would it be the patient’s responsibility to evaluate the 
‘harmfulness’ of her own condition? If ‘harmfulness’ is construed as causing distress and 
suffering, then it would be inapplicable to a wide range of asymptomatic diseases and 
disorders which attack their hosts ‘silently’, without affecting their lives in an especially 
dramatic or pervasive manner – as is the case with the majority of sexually transmitted 
infections. Another example is toxoplasmosis, which is particularly interesting because of the 
contrast between its negligible risks to the host versus the high risks to the host’s pregnancy. 
The latter type of risks raise an important question about the subject experiencing harm – in 
this case the unborn foetus, who is likely to suffer from hydrocephalus or other types of brain 
damage as a result of the infection. If a condition is harmless to the host, but harmful to others 
around her, is it considered a disease? Human males almost never develop complications 
following HPV infections with the strains 16 and 18, but can transfer those to female partners 
who, unless vaccinated or regularly screened, could then go on to face the dangers of cervical 
cancer. However, since the host has not experienced a dysfunction himself – much less a 
harmful one – his state as a passive carrier would not be considered as a disease on 
Wakefield’s account. Relaxing the definition, for instance by specifying that the dysfunction 
may be ‘potentially harmful’, ‘harmful to others’, or only ‘occasionally harmful’, could resolve 
                                                          
277 I have already defended my position regarding the social-political implications of disease definitions, 
diagnostic labels and medical identities in Chapter 4, where I refer to Haslanger’s work in footnote 186. 
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the tension on a superficial conceptual level, but not without adding more confusion on a 
practical level. The question how to distinguish between ‘harmful’ and ‘harmless’ states would 
remain, sparking further enquiries and replacing the original focal point of the health/disease 
definitions philosophical debate. Thus the ‘harmfulness’ of a dysfunction – be it a somatic or 
a ‘mental’ dysfunction – ought not to rank high among the reliable criteria for whether or not 
a certain condition is a disease (or a disorder). That being said, the notion that certain disease 
states can be harmful to oneself or others is still sufficiently philosophically and existentially 
significant to feature in discussions of health care and patient experiences. As shown in 
Chapter 4, shutting down such topics can impoverish medical thinking, and silence an already 
vulnerable group. The goal, then, should be to strike an intellectual balance between staying 
true to the original task (answering the question ‘What is disease?’) and allowing our judgment 
to be enlightened by these additional perspectives. This makes phenomenology a useful ally, 
as it can bring us important philosophical insights into ‘harmful’ disease experiences without 
committing us to structure disease definitions around the vague concept of ‘harm’. 
 
Phenomenology of medicine is an intellectual movement characterized by its focus on 
embodied experiences of health, suffering and illness, and their meaning for clinical practice 
and philosophy of medicine. Authors such as Fredrik Svenaeus278, Anna Luise Kirkengen279, 
Eric Cassell, S. Kay Toombs280, and Havi Carel have expressed opinions that the ways in which 
people respond to their own disease, their experiences of living with disease and the often 
negative ways in which it affects their well-being, have not received enough philosophical 
attention. Carel proposes a phenomenological approach which draws on a sharp distinction 
between illness (as subjective experience) and disease (as an objectively identifiable state). 
On this approach illness is not just the impairment of an organ or body function but something 
which affects the entire person, as well as her relationship to the physical and the social world 
                                                          
278Svenaeus, F., ‘The phenomenology of suffering in medicine and bioethics’, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 
December 2014, Vol. 35, pp. 407-420; for a more recent example see Svenaeus, F., ‘Anorexia Nervosa and the 
Body Uncanny: A Phenomenological Approach’, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, March 2013, Vol. 20, No. 
1, pp. 81-91 
279 Eriksen, T. E., Kirkengen, A. L. et al, ‘The medically unexplained revisited’, Medicine, Health Care and 
Philosophy, August 2013, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 587-600 
280 Toombs, S. K., ‘The Meaning of Illness: A Phenomenological Approach to the Patient-Physician Relationship’, 
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 1987, Vol. 12, pp. 219-240 
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that she inhabits. In contrast, the naturalistic approach is characterized by a fixation on 
measuring diseases and the people affected by them in objective parameters and seeing how 
far they deviate from the norm, which Carel sees as an incomplete, one-dimensional view. By 
focusing on ‘disease’ (a dysfunction of a body part or system) and leaving out ‘illness’ (the 
social, existential, and emotional effect disease has on the diseased person and their life, in 
other words – the experience of living with disease), naturalists implicitly posit disease as the 
primary concept and illness as a secondary concept derived from it. This perspective is at odds 
with the practical realities of the clinical context, where medical professionals are met with 
patients and their complaints (rather than just their patients’ detached organs or some 
abstract ‘biological processes’), and deal with illness’s very real and profound impact on 
human life, attempting to mitigate ‘harm’ wherever possible. 
 
While Carel does not reject the naturalist view and even admits that it ‘sits well with the 
training many practitioners have received and with their workplace culture’281, she expresses 
an opinion that clinical practice could benefit from an improved version of it, augmented by a 
solid phenomenological approach which leaves space for health care specialists to take into 
account their patients’ descriptions of their own experiences of suffering or adaptation to 
illness, since these could be just as informative and useful as screening procedures. Strongly 
influenced by Merleau-Ponty’s writings, Carel’s view distinguishes between the (objective) 
‘biological body’ and the (subjective) ‘lived body’. The biological body is the material body, the 
body as an object, the body ‘as it is’. The lived body is the ‘first-person experience of the 
biological body’, the body as lived by the person. Carel notes that in the normal everyday life 
of the healthy person the two bodies are aligned and in harmony, in other words – the 
objective state of the biological body and the subjective experience of it are overlapping.  The 
healthy body is usually taken for granted and remains inconspicuous until changes related to 
illness or disability begin to take place.  That is when we start to experience the body’s 
processes consciously by focusing our attention to the malfunctioning body part that causes 
us problems. In illness we experience the difference, the disrupted harmony between the 
biological and the lived body, which the first chapter of Carel’s book Illness illustrates with the 
                                                          
281 Carel, H., ‘Phenomenology and its application in medicine’, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2011, Vol. 32, 
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example of anorexia nervosa.282 Looking at the biological body (the body as it is) of someone 
affected by this condition, we will notice signs of severe and prolonged malnourishment, with 
the scale showing a very low weight and the body mass index of the person indicating that she 
is underweight. However, the person will still insist that she is obese, and by her own 
descriptions it will be obvious that her lived body (her subjective body) is a heavy one.  Carel 
claims that her account would help us distinguish between someone who has a real disease 
like anorexia nervosa and someone who is otherwise healthy but is very underweight simply 
because of unfortunate circumstances, such as being unable to afford food. The second 
person’s experience might not be characterized by a rift between her biological body and her 
lived body like the anorexic person, but a naturalist account would still view her condition as 
a disease because of its departure from the norm. However, there is a clear (and vast) 
difference between the person who avoids food due to a distorted body image, and the person 
who is too poor to afford sustenance. The second person would go back to her normal weight 
if her socioeconomic circumstances were to change, allowing her to have regular meals. The 
anorexic, however, would likely continue to be ill even if hospitalized and made to gain weight 
against her will, as her body dysmorphic disorder would ensure that a gap remains between 
her biological and her lived body.  
  
This strong focus on subjective experiences is simultaneously the strongest and the weakest 
component of the phenomenological account. Its supposed effectiveness in capturing genuine 
cases of illness would depend entirely on the reliability of the testifying patient’s assessment 
and interpretation of her own symptoms, which creates an unexpected difficulty with regards 
to persons with hypochondriasis,283 who may be incorrectly diagnosed with one or more of 
the conditions they claim to suffer with.  As hypochondriacs often exhibit detailed knowledge 
of the conditions’ associated symptoms and their overactive imagination translates into a 
genuine belief that they are experiencing all of them, there is a chance that a rift between 
biological and lived body may be present even in the absence of an underlying disease 
experience. This could lead to problems with overdiagnosis, biased testing and needless 
medicalization, as the patient’s compelling testimony may be taken as a sufficient source of 
                                                          
282 Carel, H., Illness, p. 29 
283 Illness anxiety disorder. 
125 
 
 
conviction for a practitioner who is forced to operate under strict time and resource 
constraints. This is just one example of how the phenomenological account and its implicit 
assumptions that patient reports will always be accurate or reliable would become acutely 
philosophically problematic upon application to certain practical contexts. As noted by Eric 
Cassell, the patient’s knowledge ‘endows bodily occurrences with meaning’284 which is subject 
to interpretation: the patient can choose to attribute her condition to illness, but also to 
factors like overwork and fatigue, for example.285 Thus one might argue that certain patients 
who are in denial about their state (like the person with anorexia nervosa from Carel’s 
example) could continue to reject a diagnosis, while anxious but otherwise healthy patients 
can continue maintaining their irrational beliefs that they are seriously ill, sometimes even 
managing to convince their own physicians. In both cases the practitioner will have few 
options other than to accept their stance and proceed accordingly, if the phenomenological 
account of illness were to be applied as a judgment tool for establishing the presence (or 
absence) of pathological states.286 But since medicine also habitually deals with numerous 
conditions which are not considered to be diseases, including cases of what Carel refers to as 
‘illness without disease’, practitioners often have an intuitive grasp of nearly all notions 
implied by Carel’s phenomenological account, as well as a profound understanding of the 
difference between diseased and non-diseased states; according to many philosophers of 
medicine, including Cooper, it is arguably policy makers who need an account of disease in 
order to be better equipped to distribute justice and resources where afflicted persons are 
concerned.287 Therefore another problem with the phenomenological account would be the 
impossibility to step beyond the idiosyncratic beliefs of the sufferer and to come up with firm, 
objectively established criteria as to what constitutes illness. Just as the case with disease, this 
                                                          
284 Cassell, E., The Nature of Suffering, p. 95 
285 Ibid, p. 93 
286 The view that ‘many of the prototypical phenomenological insights regarding the lived experience of illness 
bring with them new problems that undermine their apparent utility’ has been defended in a recent paper by 
Sholl, where he argues that, while phenomenology may be a useful method for describing lived experiences, it 
lacks the theoretical resources to explain them. According to Sholl, the focus on personal experiences ‘results in 
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Sholl, J., ‘Putting phenomenology in its place: some limits of a phenomenology of medicine’, Theoretical Medicine 
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known as being unaware of one’s own medical condition, and which I, too, have addressed on this page), sleep 
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development or prior to the possibility of memory formation and conscious experience. 
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debate can be expected to go on indefinitely, and the phenomenological account of illness, 
however insightful, raises even more questions than it answers. Some of them, however, are 
valid and urgent with respect to the intellectual task of defining disease.  The 
phenomenological approach can help enrich philosophy of medicine with an important 
perspective on the role of signs and symptoms in disease, if the two concerns about the 
naturalist approach outlined below are addressed. 
 
1) It does not give the complete ‘picture’: an account which focuses on the process which 
takes place in the body of a diseased person, but does not include the effects suffered by the 
person, does not represent this process fully. This is why an account of disease must include 
illness (the effects of the disease on the diseased) as well.288 
 
2) It is not an accurate representation: it is certainly a misrepresentation of a disease to give 
an account of it that does not include something so crucial as the ways in which disease may 
a) change a person’s relationship with her own body (by means of affecting the relation 
between the biological and the lived body); b) influence the person’s relationship with her 
environment ; and c) trigger a reaction of adaptation to the limits imposed  by illness on the 
body, during which complex compensatory processes begin to take place in the organism (a 
phenomenon to which I have referred as ‘biological normativity’ following Canguilhem’s 
example).   
 
To sum up, disease is not simply a dysfunction in an organ or body system. It can, and often 
does, manifest as a situation with enormous and complex social, economic and emotional 
consequences for the affected and the people around them. Even more importantly, 
                                                          
288 An early paper by Boorse acknowledges this incompleteness, but defends it with the following statement: ‘It 
is disease, the theoretical concept, that applies indifferently to organisms of all species. That is because, as we 
shall see, it is to be analyzed in biological rather than ethical terms. The point is that illnesses are merely a 
subclass of diseases, namely, those diseases that have certain normative features reflected in the institutions of 
medical practice. An illness must be, first, a reasonably serious disease with incapacitating effects that make it 
undesirable[…].’ See Boorse, C., ‘On the distinction between disease and illness’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Autumn 1975, Vol. 5, p. 56, where Boorse discusses illness as a sub-category of disease. This is an unconvincingly 
argued distinction, as one and the same disease can be experienced as ‘reasonably serious’ and ‘incapacitating’ 
by different people (as I have already shown in previous chapters and will demonstrate again in Chapter 6). 
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disregarding these existential aspects leaves the naturalist view narrow, incomplete and one-
sided, as its focus on objective parameters and departure from the ‘norm’ implicitly portrays 
the body as a passive ground or environment in which disease develops as a process. In reality, 
the body seldom remains unresponsive to the changes taking place in it – it reacts, attempting 
to adapt to new conditions or compensate for loss (for instance, people who go blind usually 
report that they have experienced a heightening of their other senses, most often in their 
hearing) and so on. By refusing to acknowledge this natural adaptive mechanism and the 
compensational behaviours of ill people towards their conditions, the naturalist view 
misrepresents disease.  As already explained, in illness the habitual relationship between the 
biological and the lived body changes and life is no longer what it used to be while the person 
was still healthy. Actions that required little or no efforts, like walking, could change into tasks 
of immense difficulty. The usual ways in which the person connected to her environment and 
social circles are lost, and a new way of living and socializing must replace them. Adaptability 
and creativity play a crucial role in the process of creating a new, modified version of comfort, 
allowing for what Carel’s paper ‘Can I be Ill and Happy?’ has appropriately named ‘well-being 
in illness’289. Carel’s book Illness explains in even greater detail how as the ill person starts to 
form new habits, the body adapts to the new situation by means of complex biological 
mechanisms for compensation which are activated in order to ensure optimal functioning and 
resource distribution. In Carel’s case, the body of a person suffering from LAM ‘learns’ to avoid 
difficult movements that require a lot of effort on behalf of the lungs and heart. At the same 
time, goals and plans are changed, tasks are carried out more carefully and in compliance with 
the ill body’s diminished strength or capacity. It is important to point out that in this context 
adaptability is seen not as an exclusively physical trait, but as a complex characteristic with 
biological and psychological components possessed by both the ill and the healthy person; a 
characteristic which ensures that the obstacles encountered in a person’s social and physical 
environment are met with maximum efficiency and flexibility. In the next section, I will show 
that the insufficient attention paid to certain dimensions of adaptability is not unique to 
naturalism – normativism and hybridism are also guilty of this charge, although while 
                                                          
289 Carel’s paper ‘Can I be Ill and Happy?’ suggests that well-being and illness are not mutually exclusive, arguing 
that people with chronic conditions, such as a wheelchair user or a person with Down’s syndrome, for example, 
can lead fulfilling lives, and be healthy in the sense that they are both well-adjusted to their conditions and free 
of other diseases. See Carel, H., ‘Can I be ill and happy?’, Philosophia, 2007, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 95-110 
128 
 
 
naturalism disregards the psychological and social aspects of adaptation, hybridism and 
normativism are very likely to leave out ‘biological normativity’ (i. e. living organisms’ 
tendency to respond to internal or external stimuli selectively, and to regulate their own 
states, functions and behaviours accordingly). I will also show that, while important, the 
adaptability factor – even when considered in all its aspects – still does not qualify as an 
exclusive necessary and sufficient condition for labeling a certain state as either ‘health’ or 
‘disease’.  
 
e) Health as adaptability, disease as maladaptivity. 
There are, of course, some authors who identify health with biological notions of fitness and 
adaptation, which explains why the sixth criterion of health critiqued by Boorse in ‘Health as 
a Theoretical Concept’ is adaptability, and he does not hesitate to share his observations that 
most times an organism which is well adapted for one environment might not be well adapted 
for another, and that fitness would always be relative to the organism’s environment. Thus a 
condition otherwise considered a disease might turn out to be advantageous in a certain 
environment, because it would make the one affected by it more likely to survive – as in the 
example provided by Boorse, where a person who has cowpox would be lucky during a 
smallpox epidemic, but that would not make her healthy, or mean that cowpox is no longer 
considered a disease.  
 
However, there are further reasons why a definition which accounts for health purely in terms 
of fitness or adaptivity may warrant a philosophical critique, the most obvious of which is that 
the concept of adaptation describes a behaviour, rather than a trait. In that sense, while 
‘adaptability’, or the characteristic of being successful in one’s behaviour of social adaptation, 
could indeed be causally related to health (in the sense that it could contribute to it, or stem 
from it), this is not a sufficient reason to center an account of health on it. Cowardice, 
Machiavellianism or egoism are among the many examples of behaviours which could 
potentially contribute to survival and health, but which are nevertheless not regarded as 
necessary or sufficient criteria of health, despite requiring the least amount of strain for the 
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subject (since they are essentially strategies  for avoiding obstacles and danger, rather than 
overcoming or adapting to them).  
 
Now, let us consider the appeal of physical adaptability (understood in terms of ‘biological 
normativity’) as a criterion for health. The resulting definitions would place health and disease 
on a wide spectrum, suggesting that health and illness may not be entirely mutually 
exclusive.290 However, they would also imply objectively established criteria for determining 
the degree to which a physical state or trait can be considered conducive to adaptability (and 
therefore to health). Normativists whose theories gravitate towards notions of devaluation 
and social labeling would not be willing to entertain the possibility of objective rules for 
concluding whether a specific biological trait would guarantee adjustment to a specific 
environment or not. Naturalists who tend to define health negatively, i.e. as the absence of 
disease and dysfunction, would not be willing to see it as an ability or activity with varying 
degrees (a view which would not only leave it without an upper limit, as pointed out by Boorse 
himself,291 but also problematize the very notion that disease could be entirely absent). In a 
chapter on experimental pathology Canguilhem remarks that certain writers ‘claim continuity 
between health and disease in order to refuse to define either of them’ and ‘say that there is 
no completely normal state, no perfect health’ 292, noting how this would mean that there 
could be only sick people. Let us briefly return to Chapter 3 and consider the following example 
of a theory that suggests continuity between health and disease – Bernard’s claim that the 
‘pathological’ phenomenon is but a quantitative variation of the ‘normal’ phenomenon – or, 
in other words, that the difference between a diseased and a healthy state would be in units 
for objectively measurable parameters. Canguilhem has explicitly stated his support for this 
theory, and even formulated similar explanations of his own, allowing that symptoms could 
be ‘the quantitatively varied product of constant mechanisms of the physiological state’, or 
that ‘it is possible for some mechanisms to be the same in the state of health and in the state 
of disease.’293 The difference, he notes, lies in the outcome:  in his example with stomach 
                                                          
290 An idea that we have already encountered in Carel’s work; see my previous footnote. 
291 Boorse, C., ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, p. 570-572 
292 Canguilhem, G., The Normal and the Pathological, p. 77 
293 Ibid, p. 82  
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ulcers, the stomach is no longer normal not because of the presence of hyperchlorhydria294 
per se, but because it is literally digesting itself. It is then the disrupted independence of 
functioning that is identified as a sign of pathology, rather than the ‘abnormal’ parameters 
detected in the organism: ‘a function could be said to be normal as long as it is independent 
of the effect it produces’, and thus ‘the stomach is normal as long as it digests without 
digesting itself.’295 
 
This holistic-spirited example reintroduces the Ancient notion about the indivisible totality of 
functions, where a problem with just one can damage or block all the rest – a notion familiar 
both to practitioners and to historians since the early days of humoral medicine.296 
Coincidentally, humoral medicine’s notion of health as a well-balanced totality of the body’s 
inter-related, inter-dependent functions is where homeostatic notions of health and life have 
their theoretical and conceptual origins. Homeostasis, which I discussed in Chapter 3, is a term 
first put to use by biologists and physiologists to describe a particular form of adaptive 
behaviour where the organism attempts to regulate its own functions when one or more of 
them deviate from their habitual pattern. The term is typically applied to contexts where the 
physiological changes in question have been produced by ‘stressors’ or dramatic shifts in one’s 
environmental circumstances, but nevertheless describes a reaction that is directed inwards, 
rather than at the organism’s external milieu. It is not the environment that the organism is 
attempting to regulate, but itself. Adaptation, in contrast, involves a wider range of responses 
to one’s state – modifying oneself, but also attempting to influence and modify one’s 
environment through various strategies and techniques, just as beavers are capable of both 
modifying their body temperature and building complex lodge structures to protect 
themselves from harsh weather conditions. Therefore, an adaptivity-based account of health 
would place high priority on the successful relationship to one’s environment. 
 
However, when our account of a particular state is framed in terms of actions, we are 
                                                          
294 High gastric acid levels. 
295 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 82 
296 Porter, R., The Greatest Benefit to Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity from Antiquity to the Present, 
Fontana Press, London, 1997, p. 9, also p. 56-58 
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essentially defining a behaviour rather than a constitutional trait. This implies that, rather than 
being ‘healthy’ or ‘sick’, one acts in a ‘healthy’ or ‘sick’ manner; that diseases are the product 
of an inadequate relationship between organism and environment, where the organism’s 
actions are not on par with the ‘requirements’ of its surroundings. Unlike the case with the 
social model of disability, where hostile architectural environments are construed as the result 
of careless urban planning which ignores the differently abled persons’ needs, adaptivity 
accounts of health would locate the problem within the ones affected by it. That is in no way 
made clearer by Boorse, who appears to favour a more ‘passive’ reading of adaptivity: his 
example focuses on traits rather than behaviours, showing how the presence of one type of 
pathogen could guarantee immunity against another, morphologically similar, pathogen.297 
But while a state can no doubt play a role in adaptation, the latter is ultimately determined by 
behaviour. For instance, the ‘cowpox’ infected individual from Boorse’s example may indeed 
be advantaged during a possible ‘smallpox’ epidemic, when her already present infection will 
protect her from contracting a new and more devastating one. What happens, however, if the 
‘cowpox’ victim is unaware that her status will offer her protection, and promptly decides to 
flee the city at the first sign that a ‘smallpox’ epidemic is approaching? What if she, then, heads 
somewhere else, where her infected state causes her to experience social isolation, starvation, 
extreme abuse, and ultimately death? Or what if ‘cowpox’ ends up taking her life, instead of 
allowing her to acquire immunity to future ‘cowpox’ or ‘smallpox’ infections?  
 
Clearly a trait should not have to depend entirely on blind luck in order to be considered 
adaptive – as also suggested by Boorse, who distinguishes between accidental and non-
accidental causal contributions to survival.298 Furthermore, we speak of ‘advantage’ when 
referring to situations (i.e. occasions), but we use the term ‘adaptivity’ when referring to 
environments. While it is possible to conceive of the occasional scenario where ‘cowpox’ or 
myopia could be beneficial, that makes them only circumstancially convenient at best. 
Advantage is contextual and often depends on little more than blind luck, whereas biological 
adaptivity involves consistent goal-orientedness. As this is the goal-orientedness at a cellular, 
                                                          
 
298 As we have seen in Boorse, C., ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, p. 557, ‘[o]ne squirrel might catch its tail in 
a crack en route to being run over by a car, but that would not make defense against cars a function of the 
squirrel tail’. 
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organic, systemic and behavioural level that Boorse has referred to in his description of bodily 
systems, one might argue that it is in every way consistent with his account of health. His 
argument that circumstancially convenient conditions would cease to be considered diseases 
within situations where they are advantageous is thus unconvincing. Advantage and 
adaptativity are two distinct categories referring to trait-occasion and organism-environment 
dynamic respectively. As disease is not a form of behaviour, it should not be considered as 
adaptive even on the relatively rare occasions where it does prove itself to be of some 
momentary advantage.  
 
Furthermore, as I showed in Chapter 2, the work done by Carel and Lindsey successfully 
demonstrates that adaptability and creativity are common responses to disease and disability, 
and that the persons affected by these conditions are capable of ‘transcending’ them. Rather 
than being a constitutional trait exclusive to ‘healthy’ individuals, adaptivity is a response to 
the demands of one’s body and environment, an example of ‘biological normativity’ in action. 
To conclude this part of my analysis, Boorse has been correct in regarding adaptivity-based 
health/disease accounts as unreliable, but has not succeeded in identifying the proper reason 
why. This sub-section was intended to further develop his insight on the matter, then expand 
it into a proper, detailed argument against adaptivity-based accounts of health/disease. 
 
5. 4. Going forward: a revised understanding of hybridism. 
Sections 5. 2. and 5. 3. have assisted me in developing a more productive way of systematizing, 
evaluating and comparing the most common tactics for defining health/disease by allowing 
me to focus on particular groups of strategies rather than basing my opinion of them entirely 
on the ideological or philosophical commitments they have been shaped by. This method of 
assessment has been inspired by the paper ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, where 
Christopher Boorse has grouped different approaches to health/disease definitions in terms 
of focal points (i. e. the features they consider to be central in disease phenomena), instead 
of merely pitting different schools of thought against each other. I have recreated the 
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structure, albeit not the content, of Boorse’s critique, and used it as a tool in my comparative 
analysis, where it has helped me:  
1) … to investigate where and how different methods can overlap conceptually; 
2) … to establish which particular strategies are best equipped to reflect ‘biological 
normativity’ and the reactive nature of disease; 
3) … to appreciate the contributions offered by different theories, rather than overemphasize 
their flaws. 
The most useful contributions now need to be re-combined and used in the creation of a 
revised version of hybridism, an example of which will be presented in Chapter 6, and then 
defended in Chapter 7. This optimized hybrid account will be capable of expressing the 
complex multidimensional nature of disease (including the aspects outlined in point 2) from 
the list above) without exacerbating issues such as negative stereotyping or stigmatization. It 
will also be formulated in a relatable ‘language of pain and reactivity’ similar to the one 
employed by phenomenology of illness. Chapter 6 will be dedicated to an examination of 
phenomenology’s potential to aid me in developing the required formulation by supporting a 
very important philosophical distinction I am going to make – the one between the categories 
of ‘symptoms’ and ‘clinical signs’. As a bonus, Chapter 6 will also show how this distinction 
could enhance some of the existing phenomenological theories about health and well-being 
within disease or disability. 
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6. What might we expect a discussion of ‘signs’ and ‘symptoms’ to 
add to our understanding of health and disease? 
 
6. 1. Filling in the explanatory gaps. 
From what we have seen so far, disease phenomena are dynamic and multidimensional, and 
living with disease is characterized by reactivity – by various complex processes driven by 
‘biological normativity’ as well as social, psychological and existential flexibility. A similar 
notion underpins Carel’s article ‘The Philosophical Role of Illness.’299 In addition to showing 
how life as a diseased person may unlock one’s philosophical potential, the paper indicates 
that reactivity, compensation and adaptation are crucial elements of such a life. This view 
gives more substance to the position that I defended in Chapter 5 – that phenomenology is 
better equipped than naturalism, normativism or hybridism with regards to accounting for the 
‘biological normativity’ as well as the psychological, social and existential flexibility of people 
living with disease. As I have also argued in Chapter 1, the body is both a medium300 of, and a 
participant in, the temporal and spatial relations we have with the world; it is a necessary 
condition for having organized subjective experience.301 Due to embodiment’s crucial role as 
a background of experience, its structure and form are bound to influence the constitution of 
space and time for us.302 Illness has the potential to turn previously enjoyable and 
straightforward activities into difficult and unpleasant ones by introducing radical changes 
which destabilize the content or structure303 of experience. Such changes, however, can also 
force us to confront aspects of our being that we previously did not reflect upon – for instance 
our adaptability, dependency, or potential for edification; they can modify our life 
expectations, or trigger a re-evaluation of our concepts of ‘hard’ as we limit the scope of our 
activities in order to avoid strain or failure, or modify our interactions with the environment 
as an adaptation strategy. When the body ceases to be ‘silent’ and symptom-free, it becomes 
                                                          
299 Carel, H., ‘The Philosophical Role of Illness’, Metaphilosophy, January 2014, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 20-40 
300 Merleau-Ponty, M., The Phenomenology of Perception, Routledge, New York, 1962, p. 146 
301 Zahavi, D., Husserl’s Phenomenology, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2003, p. 99 
302 Smith, D. W., Husserl, Routledge, London, 2007, p. 223 
303 Ratcliffe, M., ‘Varieties of Temporal Experience in Depression’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Vol. 37, 
No. 2, pp. 114-138 
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an object of explicit attention; its problematized relationship to the external world generates 
reflections or questioning of the philosophical kind. Therefore the de-familiarizing effects of 
illness could potentially turn it into a ‘philosophical point of entry,’304 a form of epoché (a term 
popularized by Husserl305, which he applies when referring to the procedure known as 
‘bracketing’, ‘suspension’, or ‘phenomenological reduction’) for the sufferer. It is important to 
note that, in the instance of living with a life-altering disease, the epoché arises as a result of 
alienating experiences, which in turn are produced by both the objectification encountered in 
clinical contexts and the rift between biological and lived body. The very act of seeking clinical 
help implicitly carries the risk of patient objectification exactly because it brings forth some 
features of our physical experiences that can be difficult to make sense of without the 
guidance provided by the professionally impartial, dehumanizing medical insight. In the 
context of orthodox medical thinking, disease is localized within the biological body. This is 
true both for contemporary naturalist accounts of disease such as Boorse’s and for some of 
the first accounts of health/disease which date as far back as Antiquity. Aristotle’s works, for 
instance, present us with a view of health as the optimal state of the human being, a state 
which allows human flourishing and the achievement of typical goals such as survival and 
reproduction in a way which is typical for the species. 
 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, centuries after Aristotle, health is still predominantly 
teleologically construed, defined through functions and goal-orientedness. In Boorse’s case it 
is seen as species-typical functioning306, in Megone’s – as a natural kind’s member’s 
actualization of potentialities.307 The naturalist approach has been criticized for neglecting the 
experience of illness and failing to recognize and explain the existential impact of illness or 
loss of capacities. It has also been under attack for its supposed inability to account for 
diseases which are not dysfunctions (for instance treated asthma) and dysfunctions which are 
not diseases (like artificially induced ovulatory dysfunction in users of oral contraceptives). A 
                                                          
304 Which is how Zahavi interprets Husserl’s epoché; see Zahavi, Op. cit., p. 46 
305 Husserl, E., Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: 
General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1983, p. 61, p. 65, and 
p. 70 
306 Boorse, C., ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, Philosophy of Science, 44, 4, December 1977, pp. 542-573 
307 Megone, C., ‘Mental Illness, Human Function, and Values in Philosophy’, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 7, 1, March 
2000, pp. 45-65 
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phenomenological approach which distinguishes between ‘illness’ and ‘disease’ as two 
separate categories might resolve these problems. In Carel’s case, it presents the category of 
‘illness’ as a cluster of conditions that include symptoms of discomfort, pain or other 
unpleasant feelings produced by the body,308 or bring significant changes into the sufferer’s 
social or spatial world. The category of ‘disease’, on the other hand, is allowed by Carel to 
remain firmly on naturalist territory, as she acknowledges the need for a definition suitable 
for the purposes of the much more limited clinical contexts (such as laboratory 
standardization). Following our observations from Chapter 5, we now know better than to 
define disease as statistical abnormality, maladjustment, or ‘that state which is treated by 
physicians’. A more plausible definition would describe it as a condition characterized by signs 
of drastic deviation(s) from the individual’s typical medical parameters (where said deviations 
are not welcome and are not a matter of choice for the affected individual), regardless of the 
presence or absence of any symptoms. Both these definitions rely on an analysis of the 
distinction between signs and symptoms – a topic which seems to get insufficient attention. 
The present chapter will explore and outline this distinction in order to demonstrate its 
potential to benefit phenomenological approaches by increasing their ability to account for 
‘biological normativity’, as well as cementing their position that ‘illness’ and ‘disease’ are 
distinct categories.  
 
It has been suggested that Boorse’s naturalistic account needs to be augmented by a 
phenomenological approach which also takes into account the impact of illness on the ill 
person.309 Carel, for example, defines illness as ‘not simply a problem in an isolated body part, 
but a problem with the whole embodied person and her relationship to her environment.’310 
She criticizes the narrowness of the naturalist view which leaves this experience out and 
focuses only on disease as an objectively existing state of the organism.  
 
At first glance Carel’s criticism appears to be justified, and it does succeed in presenting the 
                                                          
308 In the case of mental disorders – by changes in the state of the brain and the nervous system. This issue will 
be addressed in the next chapter. 
309 Carel, H., Illness, Acumen Publishing, 2008, p.18  
310 Ibid, p. 73 
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naturalistic view as both incomplete and inaccurate. Indeed, an account which focuses on the 
process which takes place in the body of a diseased person but does not include the effects 
suffered by the person does not represent this process fully. It could also be argued that 
disease is misrepresented by accounts which leave out crucial characteristics of the 
experience of having a disease, such as the numerous ways in which disease could affect a 
person’s relationship with her own body or the environment, or how it triggers reactions of 
adapting to the limits imposed by illness on the body, and as a result complex compensatory 
processes begin to take place in the organism. These insights have been anticipated decades 
before Carel by Canguilhem, who describes the experience of living with disease in the 
following manner:  
 
‘To be sick means that a man really lives another life, even in the biological sense of the word. To return once 
more to diabetes, it is not a kidney disease because of glycosuria, nor a pancreatic disease because of 
hypoinsulinemia, nor a disease of the pituitary; it is the disease of an organism all of whose functions are 
changed, which is threatened by tuberculosis, whose suppurated infections are endless, whose limbs are 
rendered useless by arteritis and gangrene, moreover, it can strike man or woman, threaten them with coma, 
often hit them with impotence or sterility, for whom pregnancy, should it occur, is a catastrophe, whose tears – 
O irony of secretions, are sweet.’311 
 
This excerpt contains very important insights into the nature of disease which typically gain 
little saliency in philosophical debates – for instance the issue of comorbidity. Comorbidity is 
a term referring to the phenomena of two or more disease states occurring simultaneously, 
where causal and correlational links may or may not exist between them (e.g., the states in 
question could share a common cause, or one of them may have led to the other). The 
phenomenon of comorbidity appears to support Canguilhem’s belief that a body’s functions 
can be separated only theoretically, as in real life cases of illness they are connected and 
dependent on each other. This has inspired him to claim that symptoms or signs should not 
be considered separately, in the abstract: ‘…[i]t seems very artificial to break up disease into 
symptoms or to consider its complications in the abstract. What is a symptom without context 
or background? What is a complication separated from what it complicates? When an isolated 
                                                          
311 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 87-88 
138 
 
 
symptom or a functional mechanism is termed pathological, one forgets that what makes 
them so is their inner relation in the indivisible totality of individual behaviour.’312 
 
Indeed, what is a symptom? What meaning has it without the contextual framework provided 
by patient history? Cassell, Canguilhem, Carel and many others have pointed out that 
physicians come into contact with concrete individuals, not with disembodied organs or 
dysfunctions. All of these complete and concrete individuals have a relevant background, both 
within the purely clinical context and outside it, that waits to be examined by the physician. 
Because of their intimate connections to this background, symptoms, when spelled out, can 
illuminate and define it, thereby allowing the physician to gain necessary insights into the 
patient’s condition. Carel is correct in remarking that in personal human experience disease 
cannot be reduced to a dysfunction in an organ or body system. It could be a life-transforming 
event, a situation with enormous and complex social, economic and emotional consequences 
for the affected and the people around them. But with Boorse the focus is on objective 
parameters and departure from the norm, and subjective experiences hold no significance, 
which is why Carel finds his view narrow, incomplete and one-sided. However, three points 
need to be made here.  
 
Firstly, Carel’s philosophical focus lies on the experience of living with disease, on its impact 
on the person’s relationship to her environment. Her work does not really develop a new view 
on disease itself, but rather leaves this task to others. I suggest that we make a further 
distinction between the two. Secondly, her criticism against Boorse seems to be directed less 
at his understanding of disease per se and more at the naturalistic view’s failure to include 
reflections on experiences of disease. By leaving out the natural adaptive mechanisms and 
behaviours of the ill body, the naturalistic approach misrepresents the experience of disease, 
rather than disease itself. Finally, understanding illness involves more than simply recognizing 
it as the subjective side of disease. That is why I think it would be better to further distinguish 
between the two. Boorse’s account is one-sided not so much because of its third person 
stance as because of the way it implicitly portrays the body as a passive ground or 
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environment in which disease develops as a process, while in reality the body seldom remains 
unresponsive to the changes taking place in it – it reacts, attempts to adapt to the new 
conditions, to compensate losses. For instance, people who go blind usually report that they 
have experienced a heightening of their other senses. A closer look at signs and symptoms 
might fill in the existing gaps in naturalistic approaches and provide a more realistic account 
of health/disease.  
 
Cooper has argued that naturalistic disease-as-dysfunction accounts are nearly always 
problematic and cannot fully capture disease. A condition can be a disease without being a 
dysfunction (for example asthma, when treated), and there are also dysfunctions which are 
not diseases (for example infertility caused by intake of contraceptive pills).313 A common – 
and problematic – feature of both these problems with naturalistic accounts is the neglect of 
signs and symptoms as subjectively experienced, both physiologically and existentially 
meaningful, changes brought about by one’s condition. 
 
The naturalistic view pays insufficient attention to signs and symptoms, reducing them to 
mere expressions of disease or ignoring them altogether. But even their supposedly minor 
role of manifestations of dysfunction might turn out to be more important than previously 
thought. 
 
First of all, if all aspects of biological existence and behaviour could be conceived 
teleologically, as the naturalistic view seems to suggest, then so are signs and symptoms. As 
noted by Megone, ‘functional explanation will be possible to the extent that there is some 
perspective from which it has positive value.’314 In that case, why not conceive of symptoms 
as non-accidental causal contributions to the organism’s goals – in other words, as functions 
of the organism’s various organs and systems? Quite often symptoms and signs can be part of 
a complex compensatory mechanism aimed at restoring the organism’s health. This is most 
obvious in endocrine disorders such as diabetes insipidus, where the excessive thirst of the 
                                                          
313 See Cooper, R., ‘Disease’, Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci., 33, 2002, pp. 263–282 
314 Megone, C., ‘Mental Illness, Human Function, and Values in Philosophy’, p. 57-58 
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sick person is caused by a severely diminished production of vasopressin – the antidiuretic 
hormone responsible for retaining water in the body. In other words, it could be construed in 
terms of reactivity, viewed as an attempt at restoring what has been lost. 
 
The idea about health as a kind of biological equilibrium is by no means a new one. Health has 
often been described as homeostasis, or the property of systems to self-regulate and maintain 
a constant stable condition. We have already seen how this idea can be encountered in the 
writings of 19th century French physiologist Claude Bernard who wrote about homeostasis, or 
the stability of the organism’s internal environment (milieu intérieur) as a necessary condition 
for life. Bernard described the homeostasis of the body’s milieu intérieur as a state maintained 
by complex processes of compensation and equilibration of ‘external variations’, a process 
during which all of the organism’s systems are involved, allowing the body to regulate itself 
and ensure its own life and health.315 
 
However, two objections could be made to this idea. Firstly, as argued by Boorse, many life 
functions are not homeostatic and even upset the organism’s balance rather than maintain it 
– perception, growth and pregnancy are examples of this. Therefore he thinks there is no point 
in ‘trying to view corresponding diseases such as deafness…, dwarfism…, or sterility as 
homeostatic failures’.316 Secondly, another difficulty with health-as-homeostasis accounts lies 
in their inflexibility which does not allow for health in old age where changes in the organism 
are just as abundant and frequent as they are during active growth. The kind of flexibility 
needed for a realistic account of health could be derived from Georges Canguilhem’s work. 
 
In Canguilhem’s theory life and health are a type of reactivity, a so-called ‘dynamic polarity’317 
in which certain things or states are avoided, while others are sought, and these all change 
over time in accordance with the organism’s evolving needs. Therefore health could best be 
                                                          
315 Renan, E., Bert, P., Moreau, A.,  L’oeuvre de Claude Bernard,  J. B. Baillière et fils, Paris, 1881,  p. 68, p. 71-73 
316 Boorse, C., Op. cit., p. 550  
317 Canguilhem, G., The Normal and the Pathological, Zone Books, New York, 1991, p. 126 
141 
 
 
compared not to homeostasis but to homeorhesis318, a term which I have borrowed from 
developmental biology. Homeorhesis describes something regulated around certain factors 
and ‘points’ which do not remain fixed, but instead gradually change over time. Bernard 
regards any change as a possible source of disturbance: ‘To him, disease is an alteration in the 
normal functioning of the anatomical element, an alteration which is due either to [the 
element] itself, or to the composition of the blood or internal environment, or to the mode of 
distribution of the internal environment.’319 However, diseases often appear as results of the 
more drastic or peculiar changes which are not a part of the organism’s growth, 
metamorphosis or aging. Signs and symptoms could be said to be expressions and reactions 
to these changes. In any case a slightly more detailed look at signs, symptoms and the 
differences between them would be useful for understanding illness and disease. I will present 
the differences in the two sections below. 
 
6. 2. Signs. 
There is no doubt that cases of having a disease without actually feeling diseased are possible 
– one could be the carrier of a potentially lethal virus like HIV without feeling unwell, or be 
infected with a sexually transmitted bacteria like Chlamydia trachomatis without ever 
experiencing any symptoms or noticing any signs. Signs are the objectively measured side of 
a state. Hormonal levels, blood pressure, bone density and other biomedical parameters exist 
and could be examined at any time, but they only acquire the status of pathological signs 
within the context of a certain condition with which they are associated. This usually occurs 
through examination, when signs become problematized and rendered to scrutiny. As they 
are available for third-person observation, signs represent the objective side of disease. By 
definition they are ‘taken’ separately, dehumanized, detached from the sufferer, because the 
                                                          
318 The term was introduced by English biologist Conrad Hal Waddington to explain the development of animals, 
see Waddington, C. H., How animals develop, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1946.  Today it is often used 
to describe the metabolism of  animal body tissues. For an example see Bauman, D. E. and Bruce Curie, W., 
‘Partitioning of Nutrients During Pregnancy and Lactation: A Review of Mechanisms Involving Homeostasis and 
Homeorhesis’, Journal of Dairy Science, 63, 9, pp. 1514-1529. 
319 My translation. For the original text see Renan, E. et al, Op. cit., p. 74: ‘Pour lui, la maladie n’est qu’une 
altération dans le fonctionnement régulier de l’elément anatomique, altération due soit à lui-même, soit à la 
composition du sang, du milieu intérieur, soit au mode de distribution de ce milieu.’ 
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role assigned to them in the cultural ‘ritual’ of examination requires that they take on the form 
of laboratory test results, blood samples and all other types of objective measuring.  
 
Even though both signs and symptoms could be results of a disease, signs are merely an 
observable characteristic or outward expression which accompanies disease. For example, in 
cases of gastroenteritis laboratory tests may reveal the presence of bacteria and dead 
leukocytes – a clear sign that inflammation has occurred.  However, these are just observable 
traits of the infection – just a fact, and not an event; just a number or level, and not an action 
or reaction. Any changes to them would only occur in accordance with the progress of disease, 
reflecting and expressing its stages. To the patient they indicate, rather than constitute, the 
presence of a pathology. Because of this, signs have sometimes been described as a ‘change 
in bodily or mental functioning which is not reported as a distressful complaint, but which the 
skilled observer recognizes as indicative of such maladaptation as is likely to cause or to have 
caused danger or distress to others or to the patient himself.’320 
 
A further illustration of the distinction between the two categories can be encountered in 
Canguilhem, who engages in an analysis of Leriche’s concepts of health as ‘life lived in the 
silence of the organs’, and disease as that which ‘irritates men in the normal course of their 
lives and work, and above all, what makes them suffer.’321 Here we encounter an idea very 
similar to that of Carel who accentuates the unawareness of one’s body in health, the 
complete alignment between biological and lived body. Again, we come across the notion that 
the healthy person is someone who experiences her body as obedient and inconspicuous; 
someone who does not encounter surprising limits or obstacles created by her own 
physicality. The sick body is a source of trouble, disease is ‘irritation’, an opposition between 
subject and body, habit and disruption, will and reality. There is one very obvious objection to 
this account of health: it is widely known that there are many silent diseases which do not 
produce symptoms in the sufferer. Accepting Leriche and Carel’s similar definitions of health 
as a ‘silence of the organs’ would amount to regarding such people as healthy when they are 
                                                          
320 Foulds, G. A., The Hierarchical Nature of Personal Illness, Academic Press Inc. (London) Ltd., New York, 1976, 
p. 39 
321 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 92-94 
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not.  Leriche himself has shown that an absence of complaints does not amount to absence of 
disease, except from point of view of the sick person. He has also added that, in contrast, in 
order to define disease from a point of view of the physician, disease ‘must be 
dehumanized’.322  
 
But would it be right to assume that there can be sickness without a sick person? As we have 
seen in Chapter 2, Cassell has been adamant that this separation is artificial and does not hold 
up. Canguilhem has also rejected the notion in his critique of Leriche, discussing the example 
of a man who unknowingly has kidney cancer but dies in a car crash: ‘according to Leriche’s 
theory, … one should conclude in favour of a disease, although there would be no one to 
whom to attribute it – neither to the cadaver which is no longer competent, not retroactively 
to the formerly live man who had no idea of it, having had his life come to an end before the 
cancer’s stage of development at which, in all clinical probability, pain would have finally 
announced the illness.’323  
 
Hardly anyone would agree that a symptomless cancer cannot be considered a disease, but 
the claim that we cannot attribute the state of disease to a cadaver appears to hold some 
truth. Indeed, where in the dead body can we find either dysfunction or awareness of 
symptoms, experience of pain, suffering? Disease is dynamic, dependent on life and vital 
functions just as much as health is, therefore the more realistic concept of disease would be 
the sick person’s, and not the pathologist’s, in spite of objections that sensation does not 
possess the same kind of theoretical value or epistemic reliability.324 What becomes clear from 
this account, then, is that disease ought not to be seen as ‘a parasite living in and off of the 
man it consumes’325, but rather as a new biological order to which one must become adapted. 
Leriche’s definition of disease, as rightfully noted by Canguilhem, is one elaborated in terms 
of disease’s effects and the sufferer’s awareness of them – or symptoms. Carel has presented 
a similar view in her phenomenological account, where the state of illness involves perceiving 
one’s body as conspicuous, i.e. experiencing it as one would a previously unfamiliar obstacle. 
                                                          
322 Ibid 
323 Canguilhem, Op. cit., p. 92 
324 Ibid, p. 98 
325 Ibid, p. 97 
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In illness, certain aspects of the body become thematized that were previously 
unacknowledged as important or problematic while they were still being experienced in the 
manner most habitual to the patient. Only the affected have access to those aspects, which 
are experienced as symptoms. The role of symptoms will be further analyzed in the section 
below. 
 
6. 3. Symptoms. 
 Symptoms, in contrast with signs, are subjectively experienced.  Sometimes there would be 
complaints without any particular identifiable cause, and unpleasant symptoms would be 
present in the absence of anything which could properly be labeled a disease. Migraine is 
associated with intense headache, nausea and increased sensitivity to light and sound. 
Although the research of scientists from the Leiden University Medical Center, the 
Netherlands reported in JAMA (Journal of the American Medical Association) in November 
2012 has established a correlation between migraine and an increased risk of brain 
lesions,326the exact cause of migraine is a combination of blood vessel enlargement and the 
release of pain-triggering chemicals that results from it, and neither one of these triggers is a 
disease per se.327 However, the discomfort and pain felt by sufferers are debilitating enough 
to qualify for medical attention.  
 
 Symptoms cannot be separated from illness, while signs can and often are. Symptoms can 
also be related to conditions which are not illness in the sense that we normally attribute to 
that word. Pregnancy could cause lightheadedness and exhaustion; intense feelings of disgust 
could provoke nausea and stomach cramps; an athlete’s sore muscles are a source of pain; 
allergic reactions often go together with swelling, discomfort and skin irritation, etc. That is 
why a phenomenological account may result in a lax, indiscriminate application of the term 
(unless substantiated by additional methods for discrimination). However, so far we have seen 
that illness cannot be separated from its symptoms, except in an artificial way that distorts 
                                                          
326 Palm-Meinders, I. et al, ‘Structural Brain Changes in Migraine’, Journal of the American Medical Association, 
2012, 308, 18, pp. 1889-1896 
327 Vasodilation itself is not a disease. In fact, vasodilator drugs are often used for treating conditions like 
congestive heart failure, hypertension and others.  
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the understanding of illness as combination of physiological and psychological discomfort 
(both highly subjective in nature). 
 
Symptoms could be better described as the person’s unique reactions to the changes she 
experiences under the influence of disease, injury or other states which are capable of causing 
suffering. For example, the nausea and loss of appetite experienced by sufferers from 
gastroenteritis are provoked by an inflammation of the intestines due to viral or bacterial 
infections of the digestive tract. Symptoms have a psychosomatic nature and thus are also 
influenced by the subject’s unique psychological constitution, attitude, emotions and 
expectations about their condition. The gastroenteritis sufferer with low bacteria counts 
might still experience severe nausea due to stress, fear or discomfort at the thought of the 
disease and low tolerance for pain and suffering, while another person with the same signs 
might not experience any nausea at all. 
 
A view which distinguishes between signs and symptoms without separating their realities 
would be better equipped to account for conditions which do not present any observable signs 
upon examination. ‘Mental illnesses’ are a good example. Many of them are still thought to 
lack physical manifestations, but virtually all of them would be accompanied by symptoms. A 
person suffering from a severe personality disorder would have a different experience of life, 
a different social world, a different way of perceiving, engaging with her surroundings and 
with other people. A lot of the time her choices in life, activities, professional development 
and interpersonal relationships would be limited or changed under the influence of her 
condition. At the same time, blood tests or brain scans performed on this person may never 
reveal anything out of the ordinary – no sign of a problem. Yet the condition is harmful both 
to the sufferer and to those around her, and treatment options are available. 
 
A possible counterexample to my definition of symptoms and their relation to illness could be 
that someone being tortured could count as a case of illness.328 My response would be that 
                                                          
328 Many thanks to Dr Peter Vickers for this counterexample. 
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despite the presence of pain and discomfort which clearly indicates a harmful state of the 
organism, the rest of the conditions remain unfulfilled – there is no change in the person’s 
relationship to her body, environment, and social world. The tortured victim is experiencing 
physical damage inflicted on her by another person, and not a change produced by her own 
body; technically she still possesses the physical capacity to get up and run away (insofar as 
she is neither disabled nor infected with an illness-inducing pathogen), and is unable to rely 
on this capacity simply because she is restricted by ropes. Finally, whilst she is clearly being 
abused by her torturer, she is not experiencing social stigma as a result of her body’s condition 
or appearance. The same objection could also be applied to the counterexample with the 
person who goes on an expedition to the North Pole, only to find that her adventure involves 
more pain and discomfort than it does positive experiences.329 Her symptoms – cold, pain, 
loneliness – result from a conscious decision which could easily be changed at any given time. 
Should that happen, they will be reversed. The expeditioner’s social isolation is self-imposed, 
whereas that of the medieval leper is forced upon him by other members of his community 
and prevents him from leading a fulfilling life or maintaining productive relationships; her 
discomfort in an allegedly hostile environment is a natural reaction to be expected, rather 
than a clue that her functioning may be impaired. Finally, like the victim of torture, the 
expeditioner possesses the  her own suffering unaided, as it does not originate from factors 
beyond her control – such as her own constitutional characteristics, or the presence of a 
pathogen in her system. 
 
6. 4. Addressing the implications that the distinction between illness and disease holds for 
accounts of health and disease. 
According to phenomenological accounts such as Carel’s, diseases and illnesses are two 
distinct classes of conditions which may overlap in certain cases. For example, in cases of 
bronchitis both disease and illness are present – a sputum culture test reveals the presence of 
bacteria and the sufferer experiences coughing fits and difficulties in breathing. Combining 
this distinction with the one that I make between signs and symptoms could result in various 
interesting new definitions. For example, illness could be defined as a condition that includes 
                                                          
329 I am very grateful to the late Prof. Jonathan Lowe for this counterexample. 
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symptoms of discomfort, pain or other unpleasant feelings produced by the body which bring 
significant changes into the sufferer’s social or spatial world. Disease, on the other hand, can 
be defined as a condition in which there are signs of drastic unintended deviation(s) from the 
individual’s typical medical parameters that she has no control over; the presence or absence 
of any symptoms is of no relevance in this case. Many of the relatively rapid changes which 
take place during periods of growth are, of course, ‘normal’, and so are the slower ones that 
occur naturally with ageing. Puberty, maturity and old age are natural phases of development 
and, as with every kind of development, the transition between these phases is accompanied 
by gradual changes in most (or all) biological parameters. When I write about ‘drastic 
deviations’ from the organism’s typical clinical parameters, I mean ones which are unexpected 
for the organism’s current ‘phase’. For instance, low hemoglobin counts may be ‘normal’ in 
adult women who tend to lose blood during menstruation, but may indicate anemia, leukemia 
or other problems in newborns whose bodies usually produce high levels of adult hemoglobin 
in order to replace the production of fetal hemoglobin switched off after birth. 
 
6. 5. Cementing the distinction between ‘signs’ and ‘symptoms’. 
So far in this chapter we have been exploring the richly nuanced conceptual world of health, 
illness, disease, and all that lies in between, whilst simultaneously trying to come up with a 
classification that would enable us to see the subtle differences between these states. Certain 
theoretical tools have proved themselves rather valuable – among them the first person vs. 
third person point of view distinction allowing for a distinction between illness as a subjective 
condition and disease as an objective condition; and let us not forget to point out the flexibility 
of a homeorhetic model of health which allows for health in old age, infancy and adolescence 
– unlike fixed homeostatic models. They have helped me create my ‘working account’ of illness 
and disease and base it on a specific way of defining the two distinct categories of signs and 
symptoms. 
 
However, we have yet to establish a set of criteria to be used when determining what 
constitutes a symptom. I would like to propose three of those, listed as follows, and discussed 
in further detail below: 
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A) Ethical – symptoms need to have an effect on our existence as moral agents (i.e. by 
affecting our autonomy, freedom, will, or relationship to others); 
B) Perceptual – symptoms need to have an effect on our physical perception of ourselves 
or other people or objects of the outside world; 
C) Suggestive – symptoms need to be unusual subjective experiences, which produce 
within the sufferer a feeling that help from a professional is needed or appropriate. 
 
Typically all symptoms of illness meet at least one of the first two criteria, but many may not 
meet C), for example because they are minor, or because they get misinterpreted by the 
sufferer as an altogether different phenomenon (e.g., someone may falsely believe that her 
blurred vision is caused by fatigue, when in fact she is experiencing the early symptoms of a 
migraine attack). Therefore, while C) can certainly be sufficient, I do not regard it as a 
necessary condition for an experience to be considered a clinical symptom. That is why I prefer 
to initiate my exposé by focusing on the first two criteria. 
 
A) Ethical - I will begin this outline with a brief clarification that, due to preoccupations with 
practicality and applicability, I shall be using David Seedhouse’s definition of ‘ethical’ as 
presented in his paper ‘Against medical ethics: a philosopher’s view’, where only meaningful 
other-directed actions and events that affect the lives of others count as possessing ethical 
content, insofar as it is exactly the need to conduct oneself with consideration for others that 
provides the very basis for ethics.330 331 Having spelled this out, I would like to introduce a 
requirement that symptoms should have this kind of social-ethical side to them, that is, to 
have the potential of producing moral changes in the sufferer’s world, for instance to influence 
their relationships with others or their outlook on life. For instance a chronic pain in the 
stomach (be it due to an ulcer or another condition) is a symptom that has the potential of 
drastically altering an otherwise relaxed and agreeable individual’s moral composition, 
                                                          
330 Seedhouse, D., ‘Against medical ethics: a philosopher’s view’, Medical Education, 1991, 25, pp. 280-282 
331 I cannot relate to objections to Seedhouse’s characterization of ethics which state that it neglects 
philosophical positions that do not fit within this framework of ‘other-directedness’, such as Kantian ethics. I 
happen to think that most of the ill-fitting examples do not translate very well into medical practice anyway (this 
is especially true for Kantian moral philosophy, due to its impractical concern with the motivation behind 
actions). A good example of this criticism, however, can be found at Cassel, J., ‘Against medical ethics: Opening 
the can of worms’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 1998, 24, pp. 8-12 
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rendering her irritable and prone to conflict, and impairing the quality of her daily social 
interactions. 
 
Before anyone engages in criticism against the slightly one-sided view presented above, I want 
to clarify I do not mean to negate that such unpleasant experiences could also occasionally 
hold a secret potential to unlock our capacities of moral improvement. In two of his recent 
articles, Ian Kidd convincingly argues that illness can be edifying in the ethical sense.332 333 
 
B) Perceptual – This sub-section is intended to be very brief as the idea about spatial, temporal 
and other aesthetic changes has already been introduced in previous chapters. Experiences of 
temporal shrinking of one’s world – such as the feeling that there is not sufficient time left for 
everything that needs to be done, or that everything takes much longer than usual; 
experiences of an altered relationship to space (e.g. a hundred meters is now too big a 
distance to cover by foot) or to one’s surroundings (e.g. everyday objects are more difficult to 
reach and grab due to muscle pain, or have become rather difficult to detect for the person 
with impaired eyesight) are all examples of the aesthetic side of symptoms. A deeper and 
more thorough look at these changes has been provided by Carel in her book Illness.334 In 
addition to the abovementioned complex spatial-temporal changes that concern interaction, 
there could also be much simpler aesthetic changes of a more passive, purely perceptual 
nature: like in taste, smell or tactile sensations, all of which could diminish a person’s quality 
of life or affect the way she regards her normal everyday routine and her overall relationship 
with the environment. A previously loved scent becomes nauseating to the smell-sensitive 
cancer patient undergoing chemotherapy; a young child who is down with a bad case of flu 
suddenly finds the taste of her favourite food disgusting; the darkest and most quiet bedroom 
in existence could never make a day in bed more comfortable for the migraine sufferer, etc. 
 
                                                          
332 Kidd, I. J., ‘Can Illness Be Edifying?’, Inquiry – Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences, 2013, 
Vol. 55, No. 5, pp. 496-520 
333 Kidd, I. J., ‘Transformative Suffering and the Cultivation of Virtue’, draft version on www.academia.edu, last 
accessed on 25 November 2013, 15:01 h. 
334 Carel, H., Illness, Acumen Publishing, 2008 
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C) Suggestive – This requirement reflects the need of intervention and, as it seems to me, is 
very much in line with the original meaning of the Ancient Greek word σύμπτωμα, or ‘that 
which befalls’. The onset of a symptom is something that calls to us through the very power 
of its sheer abruptness; indeed, a symptom’s very emergence demands our attention and is 
capable of generating even more worry than an actual diagnosis from a doctor. The first 
experience of abdominal cramps during pregnancy could be a rather stressful period for the 
inexperienced expecting mother. Are those just the ‘normal’, regular Braxton Hicks 
contractions that everyone else gets, or are they the ‘bad’ kind of contractions that signalize 
a problem, what is the difference and how is it made? To put the process in descriptive terms, 
symptoms typically raise concern, which leads the troubled mind to seek help for the troubled 
body.  
 
A possible objection could hold that the same principle also applies to signs – they, too, are 
perfectly capable of raising alarm. However, the subtle difference here is that symptoms are 
subjective experiences, which gives them a somewhat more direct influence over the 
sufferer’s behaviours and outlooks, while signs could be subjected to interpretation and 
acquire a vast array of meanings as a result of said interpretation. For instance, if one goes to 
get one’s eyes checked, the ophthalmologist might be able to announce the presence of a 
potential eyesight problem only after a thorough visual acuity test that reveals the patient’s 
inability to read the last two lines on the screen. The ophthalmologist might then diagnose the 
patient with mild myopia, and the diagnosis will draw its meaning exactly from that source – 
the objectively established signs. In contrast, the symptoms experienced by the patient would 
usually already possess a certain meaning for her as a sufferer, even before any further 
investigation or consultation with a specialist. The previously unexperienced inability to read 
the subtitles at the cinema, and the previously unfamiliar need to squint when looking at 
distant objects are already a source of concern for her even before she has had a chance to 
book an appointment with a practitioner. Each of us has a specific set of biological or personal 
(social, ethical, professional and other) norms of functioning. Whatever falls outside this 
habitual framework, is regarded with suspicion based on its being unusual and ‘unlike’ us, not 
based on its being ‘abnormal’ in relation to an abstract statistically derived standard of 
functioning. 
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After these lengthy clarifications it is time to turn our attention to another aspect of symptoms 
– their reactive nature, which is best represented in cases of ‘mental illness’ and ‘personality 
disorder’. As already stated, the term ‘symptom’ refers to the suffering individual’s account of 
her distress. This definition can be extended beyond the realm of physical states, and onto 
impairments that the individual experiences in the social, occupational, behavioural, 
emotional areas of human functioning. Many have written, for instance, on the role of mental 
illness symptoms as a way of dealing with demanding life situations. Sir Denis Hill described 
the manifestations of depression (like low self-esteem) as a ‘response to a crisis situation’ or 
‘forms of communication’, which are used by the sufferer in order to signal her distress to 
others.335 Hilgard speculated that symptoms of mental distress could be a product of ‘defence-
mechanisms’336, e.g. against feelings of guilt or anxiety. Even phobia is eligible to be explained 
in terms of reactivity or defence mechanisms, and such explanations can be observed as early 
as the 1930’s when Freud theorized that phobias could be self-imposed restrictions meant to 
avoid anxiety-triggering objects and situations.337 It is not the existence of a defence 
mechanism per se that is troubling, it is the manner through which it is applied to real life 
situations. The disproportionate reaction to a moderate (or, in some cases, non-existent) 
threat may indicate that the line between rational and irrational fear has been crossed. 
Whether that should raise any suspicions of maladjustment or not, what appropriate criteria 
for distinguishing between maladjustment cases which require medical attention and those 
which do not, however, are two questions which require further investigation. A more detailed 
overview of my ideas on the matter, along with some relevant suggestions, will be presented 
in Chapter 7. For now I will limit myself to the claim that a distinction between symptoms  and 
clinical signs could highlight some of the most powerful biases we have with respect to the 
complicated relationship between socially conditioned beliefs about ‘mental health’, cultural 
norms of behaviour, and medical models of health and disease. 
                                                          
335 Hill, D., ‘Depression: disease, reaction, or posture?’, The American Journal of Psychiatry, October 1968, Vol. 
125, No. 4, pp. 445-457 
336 Hilgard, E. R., ‘Human motives and the concept of the self’, American Psychologist, September 1949, Vol. 4, 
No. 9, pp. 374-382 
337 Freud, S., The Problem of Anxiety, W. W. Norton, Inc., New York, 1936, p. 29 
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6. 6. Optimizing hybridism: signs and symptoms between naturalism, normativism and 
phenomenology of illness. 
One of the main arguments in the last two chapters was that ‘biological normativity’ 
(understood as the organism’s tendency to seek or avoid certain states or influences), as well 
as the human propensity to psychological, social and existential flexibility, are crucial features 
of the dynamic of human life, and are thus present in all states along the continuum between 
health and disease. Chapter 5 has shown that, with the exception of phenomenology of illness, 
most philosophical accounts of disease are not well equipped to reflect this reality. Instead, 
they either create the impression that the diseased body is a passive arena of pathological 
processes, or exaggerate the centrality of one’s relationship to her physical environment for 
health, forgetting that sick people can often be very well adjusted. Chapter 6 has developed 
this argument further, partially drawing on Carel and Lindsey’s ideas about well-being in 
disease and disability. It has also shown that phenomenology  of illness can benefit from a 
sharp distinction between the categories of ‘symptoms’ and clinical ‘signs’, which would 
increase its ability to account for the phenomenon of ‘health within illness’  whilst remaining 
logically and conceptually coherent, and psychologically realistic. It is entirely plausible that a 
person may be exhibiting clinical signs of deterioration from her usual ‘health parameters’ and 
still be physically adapted to the limitations that her condition imposes on her life. It is just as 
plausible that a ‘healthy’ person who has not exhibited any such clinical signs could still 
experience debilitating symptoms, which may have a temporary negative effect on her 
habitual well-adjustedness. 
 
The ‘signs/symptoms’ distinction reflects the complexity of disease phenomena without 
sacrificing consistency, and adds multidimensionality by spelling out an entirely 
uncontroversial observation which would fit seamlessly within the majority of accounts – with 
the possible exception of only the most narrowly construed naturalist ones. It would work 
especially well with normativist definitions such as the one designed by Cooper, who has laid 
out the ground for such a distinction with her insightful remarks on the way well-managed 
conditions and harmful non-diseased states problematize naturalist as well as hybridist 
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definitions. With all of that in mind, most philosophers would have to agree that the proposed 
distinction is one worth considering when formulating an account of disease. Moreover, it 
would help with the creation of an account which satisfies the important criteria addressed in 
Chapter 1 and towards the end of Chapter 3:  
 
1) … that the account be relatable, i. e. framed in terms that people living with disease would 
more readily associate with rather than ones which reinforce negative stereotypes or 
contribute to the stigmatization and disempowerment of an already vulnerable group of 
people; 
2) … that the account acknowledge the dynamic polarity of disease phenomena (which I also 
mentioned above when discussing living organisms’ ‘biological normativity’); 
3) … that the account reflect the multidimensionality of disease phenomena, i. e. the 
possibility that they could have effects of a biological as well as a psychological, social or 
existential nature; 
4) … that the account prioritize incorporating a relatable ‘language of pain and reactivity’ over 
delivering a definition of maximum technical precision; 
5) … that the account bring together the two distinctive languages of patient and physician. 
 
What should have become obvious by this point is that all of these conditions cannot be 
satisfied relying on just one approach, nor are they meant to. When combined and used as 
methods rather than theories, the philosophical perspectives we have examined so far have 
the potential to contribute to an integrated account of disease meeting all of the above-
described criteria.  
 
While the main goal of my dissertation so far has not been to deliver such an account, but 
rather to unpack the cultural influences underpinning the disease definitions debate, as well 
as to investigate the conceptual difficulties to deliver such an account, I would now like to 
propose a solution, which I will then defend and develop further in the remaining chapter. I 
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would consider an account of disease appropriate and functional if it relied on the following, 
or sufficiently similar, conditions: 
 
1) … that the patient exhibit clinical signs of deviation from her own usual health parameters 
(as opposed to clinical signs of deviation from a statistically defined average) that cannot be 
explained with growth, pregnancy, or aging, and are not a matter of free choice; 
2) … that, when fully informed and capable of assessing her condition, the patient (or a proxy, 
where adequate)338 would consider her current symptoms, or the ones she might reasonably 
expect to experience in the future, as obstacles to her physical and emotional integrity and 
comfort, or to her participation in society. 
  
This account combines naturalist elements (which can be observed in the first condition, in 
the notion that clinical signs of unintended deviation from one’s usual health parameters 
could indicate a pathological state) with normativist and phenomenological ones (which can 
be observed in the second condition’s focus on subjective experiences and evaluative 
judgments). In the sense that it combines all these elements, the account is hybridist. In the 
sense that it also meets the requirements listed on the previous page (as well as in Chapters 
1 and 3), it represents an optimized version of hybridism, which is better able to account for 
‘biological normativity’, and to present disease in rhetorically neutral terms which capture its 
meaning without relying on negative stereotypes (e.g. associations with ‘harm’, ‘bad’, 
‘incapacitation’, ‘deficiency’, ‘failure’, or ‘defects’). 
 
 Applying this account to one or two paradigmatic examples of disease, for instance 
pneumonia and cancer, is the next logical step. Both of these medical conditions meet the first 
requirement: that is to say that they are both characterized by the presence of clinical signs 
                                                          
338 In a footnote on p. 125 where I discuss Sholl’s critique of phenomenology of medicine, I mention 
anosognosia, or the lack of awareness of one’s medical condition. This is one example which clearly shows the 
need for criteria such as ‘fully informed’ and ‘capable of assessing her own condition’. Further examples include 
states characterized by delusions, hallucinations, loss of consciousness or memory, and other states which may 
permanently or temporarily affect a person’s ability to reflect on her condition. The ‘proxy’ criterion, on the 
other hand, is necessary in order to help us account for young children, babies and fetuses. 
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of deviation from the individual’s own usual health parameters, where the changes did not 
result from free choice, or from ordinary physiological processes like growth, aging or 
pregnancy. The second requirement has been met too: although both diseased persons may 
be partially or completely unaware of their conditions, we can reasonably expect these 
persons (or a proxy, where applicable) to agree that the symptoms would present an obstacle 
to their physical integrity, comfort, and ability to participate in society. It should not take too 
much rumination to conclude that applying the optimized hybrid account of disease to other 
common conditions such as influenza, diabetes and chlamydia would provide the same 
reassuring results. But what about some of the less straightforward cases out there? Would 
rare or atypically occurring diseases be able to slip through the cracks?  
 
 
In a paper from 2000, Amundson discusses a male UK mathematics student with subclinical 
hydrocephaly. The young man, whose case was first described in the 1980’s by the British 
neurologist John Lorber, allegedly had ‘an IQ measured at 126, a normal social life, and … no 
more than 10% of the average person’s brain tissue’.339 Lorber – who, just as Feinstein, 
appears very skeptical about the presumed causal links between structure and function340 – 
was not surprised that the boy exhibited an average level of performance despite the severe 
abnormality. He noted that ‘a substantial proportion of patients appear to escape functional 
impairment in spite of grossly abnormal brain structure.’341 Moreover, the student had never 
experienced any symptoms, and the only clinical sign of his condition prior to getting tested 
was having ‘a slightly larger than normal head’.342 Was the boy diseased or not?  
 
 
According to Lorber’s observations, an individual’s chances to lead a ‘normal’ life while having 
a hydrocephalic brain depend on whether the condition is chronic or acute, and whether it 
                                                          
339 Amundson, R., ‘Against normal function’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2000, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 40 and p. 41 
340 See Chapter 2. 
341 Lewin, R., ‘Is Your Brain Really Necessary?’, Science, 1980, Vol. 210, p. 1232 
342 Ibid 
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has developed slowly.343 In the case of the young mathematician, there was probably never a 
time in his life when his cranium was not filled with cerebrospinal fluid, or when the remaining 
brain tissue was not being pushed by the hydrostatic pressure. Coincidentally, this means that 
the first condition of the optimized hybrid account of disease has not been met, as the student 
did not present with a drastic deviation from his usual health parameters – just with a 
deviation from the structural standard typical for our species. He also fails the account’s 
second condition – he had little reason to worry about any life-altering symptoms, as shown 
by his academic success and his active social life. Had the boy developed the condition at a 
later stage of his life and in a more acute form, he may have met these criteria and been 
considered diseased, but based on the information we have about his case, we would have to 
conclude that he was, in fact, a very healthy young man.344 
  
 
Structural abnormality clearly does not equal dysfunction in all cases, and the optimized 
hybrid account of disease has been created with that knowledge in mind. However, we have 
yet to see what implications this might have for another complex category – that of psychiatric 
conditions. Chapter 7 is going to introduce some problematic aspects of psychiatric nosology 
and diagnosis, and see how the optimized hybrid account can help introduce more 
thoughtfulness and conceptual clarity to the intellectual processes involved, and contribute 
to the resolution of some practical problems such as overdiagnosis and unwarranted 
medicalization. 
 
 
 
                                                          
343 Ibid, p. 1234 
344 Readers who agreed to review an earlier draft of this chapter have pointed out that my account would also 
leave out congenital ‘defects’ like Down syndrome or autism, where there is no demarcation line of ‘before’ 
and ‘after’. I regard that as an implication of my account, rather than a problem for it. I view such ‘conditions’ 
as ways to be, and not as health problems – although, of course, some of them may be associated with a higher 
risk of morbidity; for instance, people with Down syndrome are thought to be more likely to suffer from heart 
disease and certain types of cancer (see Yang, Q. et al, ‘Mortality associated with Down's syndrome in the USA 
from 1983 to 1997: a population-based study’, The Lancet, 23 March 2002, Vol. 359, No. 9311, pp. 1019-1025). 
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7. Applications of the ‘optimized’ hybrid account. ‘Mental illness’, 
nosographical bias, and unwarranted pathologization – a few 
potential areas of reformation 
 
‘The very concept of a distinction between physical and mental illness is but a crude 
convenience for classification…’345   ~Detre and Jarecki 
 
‘Thomas Detre, in his article “The Future of Psychiatry,”…, expresses his view that “the mind and the 
brain are the same”;  he adds that though psychological sensitivity is essential to diagnosis, clinical 
research and patient care, the future of psychiatry, and the comprehension and treatment of mental 
illness will be best served when mental illness is approached as a biological disorder, to be studied with 
criteria of ‘hard science’, not by “social pseudo scientists on semipermanent vacation from 
medicine.”’346  ~Gerard 
 
‘Psychiatry, like beauty, appears to depend upon the eye of the beholder.’347 ~Lefever 
 
7. 1. A few words on certain types of cognitive bias in disease classification. 
The above quote by Lefever betrays a high level of skepticism regarding the objectivity of 
psychiatric diagnoses. While we may be unable to eradicate bias from human reasoning, the 
least we could do is increase our awareness of the way it influences clinical judgement, and 
educate ourselves about the non-medical factors that have helped shape diagnostic criteria in 
the past and present. Here I am going to show how my account can be applied to conditions 
from the category of ‘mental illness’ in order to highlight their complexity and serve as a 
reminder not to take diagnostic labels as neutral representations of reality. When used 
correctly, with the necessary dose of methodological skepticism and a readiness to explore 
                                                          
345 Detre, T. P., and Jarecki, H. G.,  Modern Psychiatric Treatment, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1971, p. 75 
346 Gerard, Donald L., ‘Chiarugi and Pinel considered: Soul’s Brain/Person’s Mind’ in Journal of the History of the 
Behavioural Sciences, Fall 1997, Vol. 33, 4, p. 402, see note number 8 
347 Lefever, R.,  ‘“Decision Making” in Medical Care: Is It a Consumer Good?’, IEA Health Unit Paper No. 8, London, 
The IEA Health Unit, 1990, p. 74 
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the values and sociocultural meanings affecting medical thinking, the optimized hybrid 
account of disease can act as a safeguard against rushed, indiscriminate diagnoses. As it is 
designed in a way that increases our chances of detecting and resisting biased interpretations 
and tendentious diagnostic criteria, it may also be helpful in identifying diagnostic labels that 
serve covert functions of control, coercion, or social oppression. Chapter 7 is meant to serve 
as a demonstration how this can be achieved.  
 
Sections 7. 1. and 7. 2. are going to lay out the sociocultural landscape of psychiatric nosology 
and introduce some key issues with it, such as the underrepresentation of ‘mental illness’ in 
our mental image of prototypical diseases (in large part due to the false dichotomy between 
‘mental’ and physical conditions) and the difficulty of establishing reliable, stable and non-
arbitrary standards as to what constitutes ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ behaviour. This will be done 
in order to expose the need for careful, context-sensitive, psychologically perspicacious 
assessment for each suspected case of ‘mental illness’.  
 
Sections 7. 3. and 7. 4., then, will deal with various problematic aspects of overdiagnosis and 
unwarranted pathologization, before suggesting that one way to alleviate these issues would 
be to apply the optimized hybrid account of disease. As the account offers a more nuanced 
philosophical understanding of the distinct diagnostic roles that the categories of ‘signs’ and 
‘symptoms’ play in a typical clinical encounter, it may be used as an aid in distinguishing 
between conditions which warrant medicalization and ones which do not.  
 
To provide support for this claim, Sections 7. 5. to 7. 7. will perform a ‘test run’ of the 
optimized hybrid account of disease by applying it to four very challenging categories of 
conditions. The examples I will be working with are: stress (Section 7. 5.), drug addiction 
(Section 7. 6.), male hysteria in WWI Germany (Section 7. 7. a)), and eating disorders (Section 
7. 7. b)).  
 
As already stated, my main goal here is to provide a tactic of mitigating, rather than altogether 
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neutralizing, issues such as overdiagnosis and unwarranted medicalization; to detect and 
identify false, inadequate or otherwise problematic clinical judgements in relation to ‘mental’ 
conditions. That is, in itself, already a rather hefty and ambitious task, which must begin with 
a lengthy outline of the main obstacles lying ahead. One of these obstacles is the cognitive 
bias that is implicitly present in psychiatric nosology – especially the kind of bias stemming 
from the Western philosophical notion of mind-body dualism, which has dominated 
professional and lay intuitions alike for a very long time and despite the strong presence of 
reductionist intellectual movements among scientists. 
 
There is an unwarranted, but wide-spread misconception regarding the history of ‘mental 
illness’. The general public tends to assume that ‘mental’ health conditions were most often 
treated as moral or ‘spiritual’, religious phenomena right up until the Enlightenment when a 
psychosomatic approach was taken by doctors like Vicenzio Chiarugi, Philippe Pinel348 and 
Benjamin Rush.349 However, apparently the idea about the organic roots of ‘madness’ was 
anticipated as early as the sixteenth century by the Swiss doctor Paracelsus in his book on 
Diseases which lead to a Loss of Reason.350 
 
In more recent historical tradition, ‘disorders falling into the province of psychiatry have been 
those of unknown etiology, and, as researchers have ascertained etiology, some disorders … 
have often shifted to the province of neurology,’351 as has been observed by Detre and 
colleagues who point to tertiary syphilis as an example. Ultimately, this tendency has resulted 
in a gradual shift towards disease-centered psychiatry.352 The 1980’s represent but a peak in 
                                                          
348 ‘Though Chiarugi’s biological emphases were major forbears of biological psychiatry, in Pinel’s Traité we find 
an emphasis on the theme of controlled clinical research, thoughtfully voiced, long before the late nineteenth- 
century developments in statistics on which today’s clinical research methodology is founded’, see Gerard, 
Donald L., ‘Chiarugi and Pinel considered: Soul’s Brain/Person’s Mind’ in Journal of the History of the Behavioural 
Sciences, Fall 1997, Vol. 33, 4, pp. 381-403, p. 401 
349 ‘Rush’s magnum opus, Medical Inquiries and Observations upon the Diseases of the Mind, held that madness 
was an arterial disease, “a great morbid excitement or inflammation of the brains”’, see Beam, Alex, Gracefully 
Insane: The Rise and Fall of America’s Premier Mental Hospital, PublicAffairs, New York, 2001, p. 23-24 
350 Ackernecht, E. H., A Short History of Psychiatry, Hafner, New York, 1959/1968, p. 22-23 
351 Detre, T. P., et al, ‘The Future of Psychiatry as Clinical Neuroscience’, Academic Medicine, Vol. 84, 4, April 
2009, pp. 446-450 
352I am using Richard Castillo’s expression, check the footnote below for reference.  
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this trend, with the publication of seminal works such as Nancy Andreasen’s book The Broken 
Brain: The Biological Revolution in Psychiatry (1984) where according to Castillo ‘mental 
disorders were conceptualized as specific biological diseases in the brain with the same 
ontological status as diabetes or cancer.’353  
 
Today, with the gradual accumulation of more and more evidence to support that ‘mental 
disorders’ are the result of ‘abnormal’ neural processes, it could be argued that the dichotomy 
mental illness-somatic illness has lived its life. Even the impaired emotional functioning354 that 
characterizes schizophrenia (which features among the most studied conditions in this 
category) is shown to stem from ‘a disturbance of effective connectivity in the neural networks 
linking the midbrain and the medial prefrontal system’355 that may be responsible for the 
‘quasi absence of emotional reactions.’356 For instance, the results of numerous studies 
confirm that the amygdala acts as a ‘seat’ of all affective and social processing, and, if damaged 
– as a source of alterations in affective and social behaviour patterns.357 It could be the case 
that ‘mental illnesses’ are little more than the symptoms of an ‘abnormal’ somatic condition, 
such as the presence of lesions in the brain, or a chemical imbalance. Similar conclusions about 
the somatic nature of ‘mental disorders’ can be drawn from literature on depression, which 
often links anhedonia358 and emotional numbing to genetic vulnerabilities.359 The same goes 
for the etiology of many disorders from the schizophrenic spectrum.360 
 
Based on the aforementioned evidence, adopting a position which reduces ‘mental disorders’ 
to disorders of the brain and assigns to them a status no different than that of any other 
                                                          
353 Richard J. Castillo, Culture and Mental Illness, Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, Pacific Grove, 1997, p. 13 
354 Gur, Raquel E. et al, ‘Flat Affect in Schizophrenia: Relation to Emotion Processing and Neurocognitive 
Measures’, Schizophrenia Bulletin, 2006, 32, 2, pp. 279-287 
355 Fahim, Cherine et al, ‘Brain activity during emotionally negative pictures in schizophrenia with and without 
flat affect: An fMRI study’, Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, October 2005, 140, 1, 30, pp. 1–15 
356 Ibid 
357 Bliss-Moreau, Eliza et al, ‘Neonatal Amygdala Lesions Result in Globally Blunted Affect in Adult Rhesus 
Macaques’, Behavioural Neuroscience, December 2011, 125, 6, pp. 848-858 
358 The inability to experience pleasure. 
359 Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P., and Raulin, M. L., ‘Scales for physical and social anhedonia’, Journal of 
abnormal psychology, 1976, 85, 4, pp. 374–382 
360 Brandon, Nicholas J., and Sawa, A., ‘Linking neurodevelopmental and synaptic theories of mental illness 
through DISC1’, Neuroscience, 2011, 12, pp. 707–722 
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somatic disease might seem as the most appropriate course of action, at least as far as 
definitions are concerned. Such a move might also, at least at first glance, have the benefit of 
solving the major issue of social stigmatization of ‘mental illnesses’, which would arguably be 
less likely to generate such attitudes if it were perceived as a treatable disorder of one’s 
biochemical make-up. Since the idea is neither that recent nor especially ground-breaking, 
one has to wonder why giving ‘mental illness’ the same moral and ontological standing as that 
of somatic conditions continues to meet such stubborn resistance, as demonstrated in 
ordinary communicative language. We still use the same outdated and vague expressions 
which perpetuate myths and clash with scientific evidence: mental problems, maladie 
mentale,361 душев́ная боле́знь,362 enfermedad mental.363 Could that be the result of a 
cognitive bias distorting our judgement?  
 
In his book on medical care, Gary Wright develops a theory about ‘prototype diseases’ after 
referring to cognitive psychologist Rosch’s work in categorization and the prototype effect:    
 
‘Rosch found evidence that people rate certain members of categories as the better examples of those 
categories. … For instance, subjects would more quickly identify a chicken as a true bird than an emu. … And she 
found that when judging similarity, there were asymmetries: penguins were thought of as more similar to robins 
than robins to penguins. …Thus prototypical category members carry more weight in determining our general 
sense of the category… However, typicality is not the only feature of category members which accords them 
differential significance in reasoning. There is also the ideal prototype, … the stereotypical one, and then there 
are salient members of a class: particular ones coming to mind because of recency (you heard of them lately) or 
primacy (you heard of them first) effects, or something else causing them to be especially vivid in the 
imagination...’364 
 
Likewise, schizophrenia and depression may not be exactly the first conditions that come to 
                                                          
361 French phrase. Literal translation would read ‘mental illness.’ 
362 Russian phrase. Literal translation would read ‘spiritual illness.’ 
363 Spanish phrase. Note that ‘enfermedad’ (illness) is a general term applied to various kinds of unpleasant 
conditions. Native speakers of Spanish would use the word ‘trastorno’ (typically in the phrase ‘trastorno 
psicológico’) when referring to the conditions known in English as ‘mental disorders.’ Nevertheless, an equivalent 
to the phrase ‘mental illness’ does exist in the Spanish language as well, just like in the majority of other European 
languages. 
364 Wright, H. G., Means, Ends and Medical Care, Philosophy and Medicine series, Vol. 92, Springer, Dordrecht, 
2007, p. 15 
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mind when one is asked to name a disease. With the possible exception of psychiatrists, most 
persons are significantly more likely to list conditions such as cancer, diabetes, or influenza. 
Therefore, somatic conditions are the prototypical category members in this example – 
obviously different in terms of degrees of saliency, but definitely more influential in terms of 
determining our general sense of the category ‘disease’ than are mental conditions.  
 
This bias, however, demonstrates just one extreme of the attitudes towards the 
conceptualization of ‘mental illness’. I intend to show that the polar opposite – to which I will 
refer as needless pathologization – can be just as harmful to our reasoning about disease and 
disease classifications.  
 
There have been some attempts to stretch the category of disease in order to accommodate 
a particular type of conditions which sometimes masquerade as ‘mental illness’ without fitting 
the label properly – namely personality disorders. These conditions, which are sometimes 
referred to as belonging to the so-called ‘grey area,’ have been unwarrantedly thematized as 
part of the contemporary medical discourse. Philosophers like Papineau, for example, have 
expressed opinions that an absence of ‘physical disorder’ should not exclude ‘mental 
disorders’ from the category of illnesses.365 However, I am going to support the view 
expressed by Adshead and Sarkar, ‘it is commonly argued that personality disorder is not a 
mental illness, and/or that it is qualitatively different from mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia.’366  
 
The abovementioned act of artificially extending the diagnostic label of ‘disease’ onto all kinds 
of ‘abnormal’ behaviour is exactly the topic of this chapter, which will present its 
counterproductive consequences both on a practical and a purely theoretical level. These will 
be discussed in more detail in Sections 7. 3. and 7. 4. Before that, in Section 7. 2. I will briefly 
focus on the difficulty of distinguishing between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour – an issue 
which is widely recognized as the point of departure for all discussions of ‘mental illness’ and 
                                                          
365 Papineau, D., ‘Mental disorder, illness and biological dysfunction’, Philosophy, 1994, Vol. 37, pp. 73-82 
366 Adshead, G. and Sarkar, J., ‘The Nature of Personality Disorder’ in Clinical topics in personality disorder, Bell & 
Bain Limited, Glasgow, 2012, p. 16 
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behavioural problems, but which is in fact results, among other things, from an outdated and 
fundamentally flawed perspective on human behaviour and personality. The optimized hybrid 
account of health/disease presented in Chapter 6, underpinned by an understanding of the 
roles played by the categories of signs and symptoms in clinical judgment, will implicitly guide 
me in the task of exposing the main philosophical challenges encountered in the process of 
establishing the boundaries of ‘normality’ and defining the objectives of psychiatric treatment. 
It will also aid me in shedding more light on the issues of unwarranted pathologization and 
excessive medicalization, which I have promised to discuss in Sections 7. 3. and 7. 4., and draw 
more attention to complex middle ground cases, some examples of which will be presented 
in Sections 7. 5., 7. 6., and 7. 7.  
 
7. 2. Normal vs. Abnormal. 
In the previous section I rejected the somatic illness-mental illness dichotomy based on the 
ever-increasing evidence which reduces ‘mental disorders’ to ‘abnormal’ neural processes. 
For instance, I referred to papers which claim that schizophrenia is largely due to ‘a 
disturbance of effective connectivity in the neural networks linking the midbrain and the 
medial prefrontal system,’367 studies which suggest that brain trauma or defects could act as 
a source of alterations in affective and social behaviour patterns,368 and literature on 
depression which attributes certain symptoms of depression (anhedonia, emotional 
numbness, etc) to genetic predispositions.369  
 
Based on these sources, I suggested that ‘mental disorders’ be reduced to disorders of the 
brain and thus considered as belonging to the spectrum of somatic diseases, where they could 
feature as somatic diseases resulting in cognitive, emotional and behavioural symptoms.  
 
Since I admit that there is need for means of distinguishing clearly between ‘normal’ behaviour 
                                                          
367 Fahim, Cherine et al, ‘Brain activity during emotionally negative pictures in schizophrenia with and without 
flat affect: An fMRI study’, Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, October 2005, 140, 1, 30, pp. 1–15 
368 Bliss-Moreau, Eliza et al, ‘Neonatal Amygdala Lesions Result in Globally Blunted Affect in Adult Rhesus 
Macaques’, Behavioural Neuroscience, December 2011, 125, 6, pp. 848-858 
369 Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P., and Raulin, M. L., ‘Scales for physical and social anhedonia’, Journal of 
abnormal psychology, 1976, 85, 4, pp. 374–382 
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and behaviour stemming from, or signalizing for, the presence of pathology – that is, a 
symptomatic behaviour – I suggest that we use the criteria offered in the 1980’s by Gibbs, 
according to whom such conditions are characterized by a shift from a previously satisfying 
balanced way of life to an unstable one dominated by a single mood or behaviour.370 
Previously in the history of medical thinking a similar conceptualization of normality has been 
defended in the 1940’s by Cameron, who recognized that ‘the distinction between normal and 
abnormal personality … must rest upon the relative adequacy of a given individual’s 
performance in comparison with his previous level...’371  
 
Note that both of these theories appear to rest on an understanding of symptoms similar to 
the one which I have developed and outlined in Chapter 6. An important detail here is the 
flexibility of the concept for ‘normality’. It is almost irrelevant whether the person’s habitual 
behavour could be considered ‘normal’ by the majority of people, because what really matters 
is whether her current condition is symptomatic – that is, whether it is a cause of distress to 
her or the people closest to her.372 This should remove two well known difficulties in 
psychiatry: 
 
a) The difficulty associated with defining elusive, vague terms like ‘normality’, which are 
perceived by some authors as context-dependent and socioculturally manufactured. One such 
example is Castillo.373 Bromley has also argued convincingly that our perception and 
interpretation of others’ behaviour is a function of the terms and concepts acquired during 
the process of social learning and language learning in a particular sociocultural (and linguistic) 
framework.374 In this framework, our impression of another person’s ‘eccentricity’ is largely 
                                                          
370 Gibbs, A., Understanding Mental Health, Consumers’ Association and Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1986, p. 
12 
371 Cameron, Norman A., The Psychology of Behaviour Disorders: A Biosocial Interpretation, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Boston, 1947, p. 7 
372 Gibbs, Op. cit., p. 12 
373 Castillo, Op. cit., p. 245: ‘the definition of bizarreness is a cultural construction… For example, all of the Hindu 
yogis that I interviewed during fieldwork in India, and virtually all the Indian people who are religiously devout, 
believe that persons can have supernatural powers. … To them, and to most people of Indian culture, this is not 
a bizarre belief at all but quite natural.’ 
374 Bromley, D.B., Personal Descriptions in Ordinary Language, William Clowes & Sons Limited, London, 1977, p. 
11 
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the result of a mismatch between the qualities commonly emphasized in our society and the 
qualities we have attributed to the person. 375 
 
b) The related difficulty of defining the exact objectives of psychiatric treatment, or, as 
Adshead puts it, the difficulty of deciding ‘whether the object of treatment is to make people 
behave better; or behave more like others.’376 Unfortunately, this problem can be solved only 
partially in the manner suggested by myself and by Gibbs. It is eliminated from scenarios 
where treatment aims to restore a presently troubled patient’s habitual behaviour, but 
remains for cases where the patient has always had ‘problems’377 and where the question still 
stands whether to make her ‘better’ or make her more like others. Still, clinical care and 
treatment ought to be properly adapted to suit the unique needs of the individual, therefore 
flexible approaches that define normality more idiosyncratically, in terms of one’s habitual 
behaviour, may be preferable to standardized socially generated definitions.  
 
 Of course, there still remains one even greater challenge, and that is the existence of the so-
called ‘grey area problems’. 
 
7. 3. On the troublesome ‘grey area’, the problem with pathologization and the nominative-
categorical problem with the term ‘personality disorder’. 
Philosopher and physician Gary Wright has referred to ‘character disorders’ as a new kind of 
diagnostic labels featuring conditions which he describes as ‘remote from prototypical 
                                                          
375 According to Bromley, our impression relies on a process of meaningful interpretation of selectively perceived 
elements of the other’s behaviour and circumstances, during which we create associations with the person and 
(sometimes unwarrantedly) attribute to him various qualities, intentions, etc. If we are unable to organize these 
consistently, in a ‘meaningful system’, we ‘tend to regard him as inconsistent, peculiar or strange.’ See Bromley, 
Op. cit., p. 5 
376 Adshead and Sarkar, Op. cit., p. 22 
377 Although Adshead, for example, challenges the notion that some people are just ‘born’ with a personality 
disorder, calling it the ‘psychiatric version of St Augustune’s notion of original sin.’ See Adshead, G., ‘Murmurs of 
discontent: treatment and treatability of personality disorder’ in Clinical topics in personality disorder, Bell & Bain 
Limited, Glasgow, 2012, p. 177: ‘if external events in both childhood and adulthood can shape adult personality 
functioning, then it is possible to understand personality disorder as an acquired, rather than an innate 
condition.’ 
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diseases.’ Examples include hysterical personality disorder, sociopathy, borderline personality 
disorder and other types of atypical conduct where agents are often misrepresented as ill 
when the description that would fit their behaviour better would be that of ‘social misfits.’378 
 
Two obvious – though still quite difficult to avoid – dangers here are the temptation to define 
‘mental health’ through behavioural ‘normality’, and the temptation to resort to statistics-
inspired methods of determining exactly what constitutes said ‘normality’. Both dangers have 
been expressed rather clearly by Wright, who notes that ‘normality’ is not an objectively 
identifiable state and that ‘there are problems with using abnormality as the sine qua non of 
disease, not the least of which is the obvious one: Are we going to label [exceptional people] 
as diseased? … There must either be something besides abnormality which renders an 
exceptional trait pathological, or there must be something about the problem which makes 
the “abnormality” criterion sufficient.’379  
 
What is more, depending on the environment and context, the ‘sufferer’s’ own ‘pathology’ 
may as well be her best asset. For example, people with histrionic personality disorder are 
good actors, and sociopaths can be excellent spies, etc.380 Therefore the same principle goes 
for all conditions: pathology is contextual and the connotation of pathology is reinforced by 
the condition’s strong association with symptoms, and not by its mere ‘abnormality’.381 A 
further investigation of the role played by this association in ‘mental illnesses’ and ‘character 
disorders’ might be the key to understanding the distinction between the two. However, such 
an analysis must begin with a few clarifications. 
 
Casting intellectual debates aside for one brief moment, let us recollect how clinical judgment 
– and not philosophy of medicine – operates. If a medical professional is to categorize 
                                                          
378 Wright, Op. cit., p. 68. Another author, Cameron, even defines such conditions as unsuccessful coping 
mechanisms directed at the high amounts of stress and anxiety experienced by the sufferer: ‘of all the behaviour 
disorders, hysteria and compulsions give the clearest evidence of being maladjustive techniques which reduce 
and sometimes eliminate otherwise intolerable anxiety tensions.’ See Cameron, Op. cit., p. 276 
379 Wright, Op. cit., p. 47 
380 Ibid, p. 45 
381 Ibid, p. 48 
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something as a disease, some conditions need to be met. There has to be some sort of 
contrasting pre-existing state of the organism that was present before the onset of the disease 
(usually identified as ‘health’); the condition needs to be treatable (if not curable); last but not 
least, there need to be identifiable causes382 for the condition. Perhaps most importantly in 
the case of ‘mental illness’, there need to be identifiable causes that cannot be dismissed as 
merely parts of the ‘sufferer’s’ personality, i.e. they cannot be character traits. For instance, 
the depressed person’s profound misery (or apathy) is not an ‘illness’ per se, and treatment 
does not focus on the feeling (or lack thereof)383 but rather on restoring the lost balance in 
serotonin levels which caused it.384 
 
However, unlike the case with prototypical diseases, with mild ‘character disorders’ there is 
no identifiable pre-morbid state of ‘health’, the primary causes have not been identified (or 
at least have not been identified as physical) and are manifested as a ‘part of the person.’ In 
addition, the ‘sufferer’ herself usually finds nothing wrong with her behaviour – one of the 
reasons Wright notes that ‘neither legal nor medical remedies work well to resocialize these 
people.’385 This is precisely where my hybrid account of disease comes in, and where the 
distinction between signs and symptoms, on which it is implicitly based, would be especially 
helpful. Signs of deviation from an arbitrary social standard of behaviour may be a cause of 
concern, but it is ultimately symptoms of deviation from one’s own ‘standard’ behaviour 
which lead patients to seek help. It is only once the mildly ‘disordered’ patient has been 
willingly subjected to the appropriate type of medical examination that clinical signs can be 
detected, investigated, and used to build a diagnosis which explains the symptomatic 
behaviour. For this to happen, the patient (or a proxy, where applicable) needs to have 
                                                          
382 For the purpose of clarity, I suggest that the term ‘identifiable’ here be used in the same sense in which we 
apply it to physical phenomena. 
383 I do not seek to downplay depression symptoms or diminish the importance of therapy in relieving said 
symptoms; however, in order to avoid conflating two different categories, the distinction between cause and 
effect needs to be highlighted through obvious examples – for instance the fact that medical treatment targets 
the somatic causes underlying the symptoms rather than the symptoms themselves. 
384 An interesting comparison can be made with addiction where treatment (replacement or behavioural therapy) 
does the exact opposite and seeks to abolish symptomatic behaviour instead of its underlying causes. Though 
regardless of our definition of disease/illness, establishing addiction’s status would be problematic due to the 
larger involvement of factors such as will power etc: ‘the illness is thought to involve the “will” itself’, users are 
seen as “battling” alcohol or drugs, but not having sufficient “will” or independence to win the “battle”’, see 
Wright, Op. cit., p. 67 
385 Ibid, p. 68 
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reflected on her symptoms and found them undesirable with regards to her physical and 
emotional integrity or comfort – or to her participation in society. Rather than simply 
stemming from her personality, they need to have posed a threat to it.  
 
The uncertainty regarding the optimal strategies for combating ‘grey area’ problems stems 
from this category’s notoriously fuzzy boundaries, to which the imprecise definitions of terms 
like ‘personality’ have no doubt contributed. There is general agreement – both among 
psychiatrists and among psychologists – that personality is, at least to a certain degree, 
acquired, and that even inherited traits could be further developed or minimized by learning 
through habituation or conditioning,386 with close matches between trait and environment 
resulting in intensification of the relevant trait. For instance, people with compulsive 
tendencies who spend many years doing jobs which require attention to detail may become 
increasingly compulsive over time.387 Imitation is another powerful tool for acquiring and 
incorporating previously unused elements in one’s behavioural repertoire, as suggested by 
Bandura and Buss: ‘Imitation … opens up response options that may not already be in a 
person’s repertoire. … In one experiment, children watched an adult attack a Bobo doll by 
punching it and hitting it with a mallet; later, when given the opportunity, they copied these 
responses, which they had not previously used.’388 What this means is that, while often socially 
and ethically problematic, not all instances of ‘deviant’ behaviour can be considered 
symptomatic, and certainly not all instances of ‘deviant’ behaviour can be considered ‘clinical 
signs’ of pathology. 
 
Grey area problems are described by Gibbs as a type of emotional problems which are 
‘understandable reactions to experiences’ but which in some extreme cases could turn into 
‘mental illness.’ They often get conflated with genuine ‘mental illness’ (which is somatic-
based) even in their less extreme forms, due to the recent medical tendencies for 
overdiagnosing and exaggeration of signs – a problem whose consequences will be discussed 
                                                          
386 Buss, A. H., Personality: Temperament, social behaviour, and the Self, A Simon & Schuster Company, Needham 
Heights, 1995, p. 25 
387 Ibid, p. 38 
388 Ibid, p. 23 
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in another section of this chapter as part of the argumentation against the overuse of terms 
like ‘mental illness’. For now it suffices to reiterate that this particular problem can be solved 
by adopting the few simple criteria listed by Gibbs that may help detect the likelihood for 
underlying pathologies in a subject’s symptomatic behaviour: an ‘abnormal’ (for this particular 
individual) duration of one predominating mood or behaviour; the presence of experiences 
that the individual herself finds difficult to interpret; the presence of behavioural and/or 
emotional changes unrelated to the individual’s experiences; difficulties in maintaining 
relationships.389 I do not propose these criteria simply because they lend more credibility to 
the results from my philosophical discussion of symptoms in Chapter 6, but because they also 
happen to correspond to an established existential truth: with illness and disease, there is 
always a ‘before’ and an ‘after’; there is always a change. 
 
The original list of criteria compiled by Gibbs contained an additional couple of elements that 
I chose to omit since they applied equally well to character traits, or even to bodily 
disfigurements. For instance, one might find that the phrase ‘the individual has a negative 
influence on those who surround her’ also applies to disfigured people whose appearance 
may disturb small children, or to people who simply have a more unwelcoming personality. 
However, while a broad definition of health/disease may permit us to regard disfigurement as 
a health problem, it would be a little extreme to regard mere unattractive personalities as 
symptomatic of diseases. Similarly, the phrase ‘the mood or behaviour is a source of suffering 
for the individual’, while not applicable to some actual disorders like psychopathy,390 can be 
extended to healthy persons whose altruistic nature and dedication to others leaves them at 
a disadvantage, but that should not mean that these persons are disordered in any way. From 
now on I will refer to any such implications or claims as ‘unwarranted pathologization’ or 
‘needless pathologization’. 
 
When dealing with the realm of ‘mentality’, we should be aware of the dangers posed by 
                                                          
389 Gibbs, Op. cit., p. 12 
390 ‘These men and women don’t seem to worry. Ironically, with the Age of Anxiety supposedly oppressing 
civilized mankind, they have been diagnosed as “deficient in anxiety.”’ – see Harrington, A., Psychopaths, Simon 
and Schuster, New York, 1972, p. 16 
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unwarranted pathologization. These dangers can be roughly grouped into two kinds of 
undesirable consequences depending on their presentation, which could be either on a 
practical or a purely theoretical level. As I have tried to show, unwarranted pathologization is, 
in its very essence, a problem of miscategorization, misrepresentation, and misuse of 
terminology. Were it obvious to more people, this type of pathologization’s enormous 
potential for negative impact on nosography and philosophy of disease would be enough 
motivation in itself to make us reconsider our current indiscriminate use of the terms 
‘disorder’/‘illness’ and reserve this use for conditions of a confirmed somatic-based origin. 
However, this is a theoretical type of danger, which resides on a more abstract level and thus 
concerns fewer interests. The practical consequences of unwarranted pathologization, on the 
other hand, are of a more palpable nature. Therefore, I will focus on them to derive my 
argumentation against the overuse of mental infirmity labels and the related problem of 
needless medicalization – two issues which may gradually be reduced over time if we were to 
start applying my hybrid account of disease and the notion about the distinction between 
signs and symptoms. 
 
7. 4. The disastrous consequences of excessive pathologization for society and health care 
services. 
On a theoretical level, needless pathologization could lead to the already discussed categorical 
mistakes that damage the accuracy of classification, and on a practical level – to problematic 
approaches that jeopardize the reliability, availability and cost-effectiveness of treatment, the 
image of doctors, and the patient’s social functioning. Since my research on accounts of 
disease is motivated not only by philosophical curiosity, but also by a concern for applicability 
to real life contexts (including health care policies, social interaction and legal matters), a large 
part of my argumentation against overdiagnosis and excessive medicalization will necessarily 
focus on the practical difficulties. Here I will present several of them without claiming that the 
list is in any way exhaustive. The specific regard and treatment reserved for psychiatric 
conditions should not be extended to any problem that could be solved by character training, 
education or sheer will power.391 Emotional states, culturally determined behaviour and 
                                                          
391 I do not mean to be dismissive of these tactics’ significance, but simply to accentuate that their role in 
[medical] treatment has undergone a dramatic historical shift. Today they serve more as 
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personal qualities need not be labeled or classified as anything more than that by psychiatrists 
and therapists for the following reasons: 
 
1) It is neither just nor productive to medicalize mere character flaws or mild behavioural 
‘imperfections’ resulting from inadequate upbringing,392 inability to adapt to cultural 
differences, or minor misunderstandings. 
For instance, the quiet loner in the classroom is not necessarily suffering from ‘schizoid 
personality disorder’ – he may simply be more independent, ambitious and focused on his 
studies rather than socializing with others; analogically, the wallflower at the party is not 
necessarily an example of ‘avoidant personality disorder’ – she may be the result of strict 
religious upbringing that promoted female modesty, or she may just be naturally shy. There is 
a myriad of factors that may or may not have helped to shape her behaviour.  
 
It appears that society (re)shapes human conduct by promoting certain types of behaviour 
while at the same time discouraging others. The latter are sometimes thematized as potential 
‘clinical signs’ – that is, they become known as ‘maladjustments’, ‘deviant behaviour’, 
‘eccentricities’, or ‘abnormalities’, depending on the degree to which they differ from what is 
accepted by the public.  The former, however, become ‘norms’ and are continuously 
maximized in the sociocultural environment, sometimes in such subtle ways that allow them, 
over time, to permeate our lifestyles completely and shape our expectations from ourselves 
and others. In short, they not only condition us to treat situations or persons who do not fit 
                                                          
complementary/additional therapy and sometimes focus on problems that are not medical in the strictest sense. 
However, traditionally, they have been known as classic forms of therapy back from the time when psychological 
approaches were still predominant. For an interesting glimpse on how hypnotism and suggestion therapy used 
to be regarded during the early days of psychotherapy, see Maehle’s overview of the work of German physician 
Moll: Maehle, Andreas-Holger, ‘The powers of suggestion: Albert Moll and the debate on hypnosis’, History of 
Psychiatry, 2014, Vol. 25, 1, pp. 3-19 
392 One of the best examples is this paragraph on induced paranoid disorders:  ‘Any child, in adopting the 
prevailing attitudes of his early environment, is likely to develop habitual suspicion, resentment … and 
overconcern …, if these are the habitual attitudes of his elders. For example, in an isolated mountaineer 
community where strangers are always treated as suspect and unwelcome, the average child will exhibit an 
attitude of suspicion and hostility towards strangers that would be considered pathological in the child of an 
ordinary rural or urban community,’ see Cameron, Op. cit., p. 439 
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this predictable behavioural framework with alarm, distrust, or disapproval bordering with 
hostility; they also open the door to unwarranted pathologization.  
 
To deal with our own negative attitudes, we engage in processes of rationalization in which 
we justify them by (often falsely) attributing negative values to the persons or behaviours we 
reject. For instance, the fact that females exhibiting a marked disinterest in motherhood are 
often regarded with suspicion and dislike can be (falsely) explained on the basis of such 
females’ supposed ‘selfishness’, ‘cold-heartedness’ and ‘immaturity’ – regardless of whether 
or not they actually possess these qualities. Similarly, ‘illnesses’ can be attributed, or 
pathologies can be ‘made up’ where there are none present. This would be a lot more difficult 
to do in the presence of strict criteria that need to be met in order for a specific characteristic 
or behaviour to be considered symptomatic of a potentially clinically significant pathology. As 
I have argued throughout all chapters so far, the criteria in question do not need to be 
‘objective’ or ‘culturally blind’; quite the opposite, they need to account for the presence of 
sociocultural influences in order to be better able to detect potential cases of unwarranted 
pathologization – an idea that has also been embraced by some medical practitioners. In his 
book from 1997, Castillo reveals the influence of socioculturally conditioned beliefs and 
internalized cultural ideals on people’s behaviour, advising fellow clinicians to ‘see the client 
and her eating behaviour within the total sociocultural context’,393 as well as to regard sexual 
disorders as ‘maladaptations occurring within a particular sociocultural aspect’ rather than 
intrinsic characteristics of the patient.394 To him diagnosing, just like any other type of human 
behaviour, is culture-based, and he describes medical practice as a process in which 
‘indigenous clinicians assess and diagnose the problem consistent with local culture,’395 
implying that most often certain influential sets of culturally conditioned stereotypes and 
expectations are the reason the ‘problem’ even exists in the first place. There is a fairly 
straightforward way to avoid, or at least diminish, the threat described by Castillo, and it 
involves becoming more receptive to the notion that a legitimate diagnosis requires that signs 
and symptoms be fully contextualized within a particular clinical case rather than a statistically 
                                                          
393 Castillo, Op. cit., p. 155 
394 Ibid, p. 146 
395 Ibid, p. 29 
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or socially derived ‘norm’.  However, the first step to that is to acknowledge our human 
tendencies to regard characteristics and behaviours departing from the socially accepted 
‘norm’ rather unfavourably. 
 
In nearly every human society, members demonstrate a notable need, even dependence, on 
the predictability, clarity of intentions and agreeability of others. The majority of participants 
have to be able to meet these needs, if a society is to continue existing as such. Therefore, to 
a certain degree, qualities such as personal integrity and predictability, as well as behaviours 
which conform to the current predominant ‘norm’ in a society, shape the foundations of social 
life. To ensure their stability, members jointly pursue ways of minimizing the number and 
severity of even the slightest cases of ‘deviance’. As a result, individuals who exhibit different 
mannerisms, speech, or even appearance, are pressured into conforming, or shunned when 
they fail to do so. The more severe the mismatch, the bigger the need of society to exercise 
control over these individuals, so when these measures do not suffice to neutralize the 
undesirable effects of the ‘deviant’s’ behaviour on her social group, her perceived ‘issue’ may 
be medicalized in order to give more weight to the demand that she change her ways, and to 
restrict the scope of her potentially ‘dangerous’ influence on others. As noted by Foucault, 
diagnosis can be turned into a powerful tool for social-political control and abuse.396  
 
The ‘dark’ bits of psychiatry’s history reveal its abusive potential as a tool of oppression over 
vulnerable ‘deviant’ minorities like gay men,397 and of social tyranny keeping ‘in check’ major, 
yet just as vulnerable, groups – like women.398 A lesser-known, but just as valid example 
concerns men – the situation described by Paul Lerner in his book on war neurotics. Hysterical 
Men describes the development of German psychiatry during the ‘insanity boom’ period 
between WWI-WWII – a period when economic factors dictated the idealization of war and 
the pathologization of men’s normal emotions like fear, pity and desire for peace.399 Section 
                                                          
396 Foucault, M., Madness and Civilization, Vintage Books, London, 2006 
397 See Bayer, R., Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of Diagnosis, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1987 
398 See Russell, D., ‘Psychiatric diagnosis and the oppression of women’ in International Journal of Social 
Psychiatry, 1985 Winter, Vol. 31, 4, pp. 298-305 
399 Lerner, P. F., Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry, and the Politics of Trauma in Germany, 1890-1930, Cornell 
University Press, New York, 2003, p. 2 
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7.7. will discuss this example further in order to illustrate how psychiatry’s conventions with 
regards to the concept of ‘deviation’ are, so to speak, historically contingent, which is among 
the reasons we need an account of disease as the one I promote – an account which defines 
pathological states in relation to a ‘norm’ set by the unique experiences and physiological 
properties of a particular patient, and not in relation to an arbitrary set of generalized ‘norms’. 
The social pressure to ‘fit in’ can be damaging enough to an individual’s welfare even without 
the additional stress of stigmatization associated with ‘mental illness’ and ‘personality 
disorders.’ Civilized societies which value non-judgmental fair treatment ought to be striving 
for a safe, tension-free atmosphere. While there may still be a long way to go until humanity 
eradicates unfair practices like stigmatization or shaming, the least that could be done is to 
make sure that incorrect profiling does not add even more people to the number of victims of 
such practices. Therefore, it is vital that medical practitioners remember their moral duty is to 
promote the health and well-being of society as a whole, not to contribute to the exclusion 
and mistreatment of certain groups. While my optimized hybrid account of disease and the 
philosophical distinction between ‘signs’ and ‘symptoms’ that it is based upon do not offer 
any quick and easy solutions, they can certainly help cultivate the right attitude – one of 
psychological sensitivity, attention to cultural frame of reference, concern about the 
individual, and philosophical acumen. 
 
2) It is both inaccurate and inappropriate to medicalize understandable behaviour and to 
promote ‘treatment’ for it (even when it does cause distress to the behaving subject or 
others). As a consequence, the public’s trust and respect for medical professionals may be 
diminished, and some persons might become too afraid to seek help when they do develop 
problems.  
It is tactless to present someone’s grief over a lost relative as ‘depression’. It is disrespectful 
to reduce someone’s rightful fears of illegal eviction from a dishonest landlord to ‘anxiety 
disorder’. It is unacceptable to label every child with high energy levels as a sufferer of 
attention deficit disorder simply because it is more convenient for teachers and parents alike 
to drug the child into passive obedience. What is more, it is unprofessional to demand that 
such people start medication, or to blame their problems on a lack of treatment. 
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The recent tendency in Western medicine to pathologize an increasingly wider variety of 
reactions and behaviours not only leads to ethical problems as the ones described in sub-
section 1), it can also erode the social status and authority of practitioners, and turn away 
potential future patients. In a recent paper on personality disorder in adolescence, Adshead 
et al argue that diagnosis is a stigmatizing label which makes young adults vulnerable to 
rejection – an issue worsened by the unfortunate reality that diagnoses of this kind tends to 
“stick”and not be revised as the young person changes.’400 Overdiagnosing may hint at a lack 
of empathy and understanding, deficits in knowledge, or dishonesty and greed. In any case, it 
is not hard to see why many would prefer to avoid the doctor who finds an issue with 
everyone. The account of disease which I have proposed is formulated in a manner that 
promotes genuine concern about patient well-being, and, when combined with the necessary 
amount of critical thinking, context-sensitivity and psychological intuition, can thus contribute 
to solving this problem. 
 
3) Needless pathologization could have detrimental effects on personal responsibility and 
self-government.  
An issue that sub-sections 1) and 2) did not address was that of personal responsibility. 
Contemporary science has paved the way for vigorous attempts to subject not only ‘mental 
illness,’ but also all aspects of personal subjectivity, to a complete reframing in biomedical 
terms. However, excessive theoretical emphasis on claims regarding the exclusively biological 
roots of all behaviour may be downplaying the significance of human will and the importance 
of personal responsibility. Let us consider how this translates for some of the practical areas 
where responsibility matters the most – therapeutic jurisprudence and law. 
 
Carson and Heginbotham have argued that legal rules and procedures are social forces with 
enormous therapeutic or anti-therapeutic potential for affecting ‘disordered’ people – an 
issue to which therapeutic jurisprudence has helped promote more attention.401 Two of the 
                                                          
400 Adshead, G. et al, ‘Personality disorder in adolescence’ in Sarkar, J. and Adshead, G. (Eds.), Clinical topics in 
personality disorder, Bell & Bain Limited, Glasgow, 2012, p. 130 
401 Carson, D. and Heginbotham, Ch., ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Psychopathy’ in Heginbotham, Ch. (Ed.), 
Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychopathy: Personal identity in mental disorder, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, 
2000, p. 131 
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more obvious effects – that of labeling (a social phenomenon which we have already discussed 
in Chapter 4) and that of diminished liability – are closely related, due to the considerable 
exculpatory scope of certain diagnostic labels. 
 
Labeling theory, especially the works of Scheff, has shown how people often adapt their 
behaviour to fit the expectations that are placed upon them together with labels like 
‘madness.’402 Therefore, when convinced that they are ‘ill,’ very few members of society 
would remain capable and willing to accept personal responsibility for their own well-being or 
their actions towards others. The ‘illness’ then becomes a justification for erroneously 
tolerating what could only be described as thinly veiled deliberate wrongdoing.  
 
This issue has been brilliantly captured by Thomas Szasz, who objects to people without 
confirmed biological malfunctions being declared as ‘ill’ simply because of the mistakes they 
make, and warns readers about the possibility that the use of ‘mental illness’ as a convenient 
socially acceptable excuse for deviant conduct may generate a whole ‘class of irresponsible 
persons.’403  
 
The same problem has also been addressed in literature on the ethical, social and legal aspects 
of drug addiction, for instance Sporken and ten Have’s article on heroin use where the authors 
point out the flaws of medicalizing social and moral problems like addiction.404 Their critique 
reveals this strategy as both futile and fundamentally counterproductive on a social level. It is 
futile because it discourages rehabilitation of ‘patients’ by diminishing their sense of liability 
and the confidence in their own self-control. It is fundamentally counterproductive on a social 
level because it decreases their responsibility to others and makes them unlikely to ever 
contribute to society in any meaningful way. 
                                                          
402 See, for example, Scheff, T. J., Being Mentally Ill: A Sociological Theory, Aldine Transaction, Piscataway,  1984, 
p. 158 
403 Szasz, T. S. et al, ‘Mental Illness as an Excuse for Civil Wrongs’, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, August  
1968, Vol. 147, Issue 2 , pp. 113-123  
404 Sporken, Paul and ten Have, Henk, ‘Heroin Addiction, Ethics and Philosophy of Medicine’, Journal of Medical 
Ethics, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), pp. 173-177 
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In addition to eroding people’s sense of personal responsibility and legal liability, the emphasis 
on their status as ‘disordered’ could contribute to their victimization and promote unfair 
treatment. There have been observations that such persons often become targets of unjust 
attitudes and are likely to be judged unfavourably in court proceedings. Moore has drawn 
attention to the matter by pointing out the paradox in situations where ‘disordered’ offenders 
can manifest as ‘fearsome perpetrators and traumatized victims’ at the same time.405 An 
account of disease like mine, which promotes an empathetic and responsible patient-centered 
ethics of diagnosis, highlights the possibility of decreasing or mitigating such tragic 
occurrences through a simple change in attitude. 
 
4) Needless pathologization can lead to dysfunctional resource distribution in health care by 
focusing expenses and medical attention on cases that do not genuinely need them, and 
thus depriving the cases that do. 
In the growing number of economically challenged countries over the globe, it is often the 
case that health care systems are already struggling to provide all patients with the necessary 
support. Any additional burden comes at the cost of cutting down certain services, or wearing 
out the few providers who are ‘spreading themselves thin’ under the pressure of unceasing 
demands for care. 
 
While we may have little control over the numbers of people who develop genuine diseases 
every year, we could at least alleviate the pressure on health care systems by making sure we 
exclude needless and artificial categories from the already wide-stretched spectrum of health 
care receivers. Extending health care to persons who ‘suffer’ from what can only be described 
as character flaws neither helps those persons nor leaves sufficient time and resources for 
patients who truly need care: ‘we have moved the diagnostic thresholds lower and lower, we 
tend to bring many more people into the fold of patienthood … without understanding … that 
                                                          
405 Moore, E., ‘Personality disorder: its impact on staff and the role of supervision’ in Sarkar, J. and Adshead, G. 
(Eds.), Clinical topics in personality disorder, Bell & Bain Limited, Glasgow, 2012, p. 190 
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the marginal benefit may in fact be very marginal.’406 One relatively recent example is a study 
from 2008 which revealed that over half of 700 patients who had received the diagnostic label 
of ‘bipolar disorder’ did not in fact meet the criteria for the condition.407 Other examples 
include the numerous cases of ADHD overdiagnosing in children, discussed in an overview of 
studies which was authored by American pediatricians and showed evidence of this 
substantial overdiagnosing’s adverse effects on education.408  
 
Dealing with the challenges posed by overdiagnosis and unwarranted pathologization in the 
context of ‘mental illness’ is going to require complex measures, but Section 7. 4. has shown 
that the first steps in that direction involve acknowledging the existence of the problem, and 
adopting an outlook which will promote more responsible attitudes towards diagnosis, as well 
as a more empathetic approach to patients. One of the ways these attitudes could be 
cultivated involves introducing changes to the way we construe disease – this is to say that, 
with the right account of disease at hand, we should be able to solve significant practical 
problems generated by a lack of conceptual clarity. The account I have proposed in Chapter 6 
is eligible for this task, due to its sensitivity to the distinction between signs and symptoms, 
which would increase our ability to spot diagnostic criteria or labels that are inadequately 
formulated, unnecessary, or redundant. While I do not claim that the optimized hybrid 
account of disease offers quick and easy solutions, or that it functions as an automatic 
detector of inadequate diagnoses, I am confident in its aptitude to function as detector of bias, 
and an aid in keeping track of intellectual and clinical tendencies that may lead to the 
production of problematic diagnoses and diagnostic labels. I also believe that, when applied 
critically, it would help us detect and resist diagnostic criteria and labels that have been 
produced artificially as a covert form of state control or social oppression, as I intend to show 
in Sections 7. 6. and 7. 7. Before this, Section 7. 5. will perform a ‘test run’ on my proposed 
account by applying it to a truly obscure group of conditions, namely the category of stress. 
                                                          
406 Lichtenfeld, L., ‘Book Review – Overdiagnosed. Making people sick in the pursuit of health’, Journal of Clinical 
Investigation, 1 August 2011, Vol. 121, Issue 8, pp. 2954 
407 Zimmerman, M. et al., ‘Is Bipolar Disorder Overdiagnosed?’, Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 2008, Vol. 69, pp. 
935-940 
408LeFever, G. B. et al., ‘ADHD among American Schoolchildren: Evidence of Overdiagnosis and Overuse of 
Medication’, The Scientific Review of Mental Health Practice, Spring/Summer 2003, Vol. 2, No. 1, available online 
at http://www.srmhp.org/0201/adhd.html, last accessed on 6 December 2016, 19:39 h. 
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This ‘test run’ will function as a demonstration of the account’s potential to bolster conceptual 
clarity, both in the sphere of clinical reasoning and outside it.  
 
7. 5. ‘Grey areas’ and the case of stress: From adaptation and external stimulus to stress as 
a symptom. 
One of the questions that need to be addressed is where stress stands according to a disease 
definition which relies on the distinction between signs and symptoms. Does it classify as a 
disease, does it count as a symptom, or could it, perhaps, be either or both, depending on the 
particularities of specific cases? The answer would largely depend on the way we are going to 
respond to the main question: whether the concept of stress describes A) the influence of 
external factors, or B) the sufferer’s reaction to them. A brief historical overview of the studies 
and theoretical developments involved in this investigation seems to point that B), rather than 
A), is the case. 
 
The 20th century brought about a significantly increased (and ever growing) awareness of the 
long-term ill-health risks associated with stress, especially in relation to veterans and victims 
of war – an example which will be discussed further in the first half of Section 7. 7. As noted 
by Mark Jackson,409 increasing numbers of scientists began demonstrating preoccupation with 
the ‘aetiological significance of emotions, adaptation, instability, and stress.’  Among them 
were Franz Alexander – who was certain that many among the currently unexplained diseases 
would be revealed as resulting from chronic distress410 – as well as Noel H. M. Burke411 and 
Helen Flanders Dunbar,412 two other pioneers of psychosomatic medicine who both regarded 
destabilized emotional states as detrimental to health and warned their readers against the 
dangers of worries. The idea that ‘spiritual’ distress could result in somatic ill-health was not 
original, as numerous physicians had already intuitively reached the same conclusion ages 
                                                          
409 Jackson, M., The Age of Stress: Science and The Search for Stability, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013 
410 Alexander, F., Psychosomatic Medicine: Its Principles and Applications, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 
1965 
411 Burke, N. H. M., ‘Some aspects of the inter-relation between bodily and mental disease’, British Journal of 
Medical Psychology, 1926, Vol. 6, pp. 110-120 
412 Dunbar, H.F., Emotions and Bodily Changes, Columbia University Press, New York, 1935 
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before the first official scientific investigations into the matter. As we have seen in Chapter 3, 
in the philosophy of French physician Claude Bernard life meant survival by means of 
regulation and compensation of external influences – a theory to be further developed by 
biology professor Lawrence Henderson in the beginning of the 20th century. Henderson, 
however, made a point that biological stability was not to be understood as ‘absolute 
constancy’, but rather as something ‘cyclical’ and ‘adaptive’.413  This idea was reflected in the 
works of many prominent later researchers, such as Hans Selye who developed an account of 
the so-called ‘general adaptation syndrome’. In his book The Stress of Life, Selye introduced 
the reader to a relatively simple classification where the general adaptation syndrome was 
‘only the visible manifestation of stress’, and stress itself was but ‘the common denomination 
of all adaptive reactions in the body.’414  
 
It appears that Selye was not the sole example for this trend to equate adaptation and good 
health. The first half of the 20th century brought along a rather large group of authors defining 
health through either adaptability or homeostatic stability (or, in some cases, both). American 
surgeon George Crile attributed a variety of conditions, ranging from indigestion and 
cardiovascular disease to insanity, to ‘chronic emotional stimulation’.415  Walter Bradford 
Cannon, who studied in the Harvard Medical School and was supervised by Henry P. Bowditch 
(a student of Claude Bernard’s), conducted laboratory research which successfully 
demonstrated a causal link between emotional reactions like fear and the activation of adrenal 
glands. These results led him to the firm conviction that emotional disturbances could cause 
both psychological and organic disorders, and therefore had to be incorporated into medical 
practice, especially in relation to cardiovascular disease and digestive disorders.416  Scottish 
physician James Halliday’s work is known for articulating concerns about the stress-inducing 
influence of social problems like poverty or unemployment, and drawing attention to the need 
                                                          
413 Henderson, L. J., The Fitness of the Environment, Nabu Press, Charleston, 2010 
414 Selye, H., The Stress of Life, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1956 
415 Crile, G. W., ‘A Mechanistic View of Psychology’, Science, New Series, 29 August 1913, Vol. 38, No. 974, p. 289; 
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of desperate measures for solving them.417  Formally echoing Selye’s line of thought, the 
American neurologist Harold Wolff also considered stress to be a kind of reactivity or 
resistance to external influences, and recognized the presence of models of reaction similar 
to the above scheme. The main difference concerned the theoretical content: while Selye’s 
preoccupation lay mainly within the area of physical influences, the American physician 
identified and positioned sociocultural factors as the primary sources of anxiety and stress-
related somatic conditions:  uncertainty regarding the rapidly evolving normative and social-
political foundations of contemporary societies, as well as insecurities about one’s own social 
status, sense of belonging and personal relationships were a cause of frustration and 
exhausting struggle which did far more than simply upset one’s spirit, and caused just as much 
damage as the physical pressures from a cruel and demanding environment.418  
 
So should we consider stress to be a symptom rather than a kind of illness? We have already 
established that stress is a response of the subject (as an organism, or as a person) to 
challenging factors arising from without (in other words, stressors).  There exists a wide variety 
of factors which could lead to the experience of stress; patterns in the temporal duration of 
stress episodes also vary, both between separate episodes experienced by the same subject, 
and between different subjects. The extent to which each individual is capable of tolerating 
stress depends on factors which are too complex and numerous, reactions are hard to predict, 
and health outcomes are often very difficult to causally link to stress. However, one thing is 
certain: virtually every kind of stress experience has the potential to satisfy at least two of the 
conditions I have listed in Chapter 6 as part of the criteria for symptoms. Firstly, stress can and 
does exercise an influence over interpersonal relationships, communication and moral 
constitution (including moods), therefore it does possess an ethical dimension. Secondly, 
stress is associated with the release of hormones like cortisol that could increase cravings for 
high-calorie foods and promote high sensitivity to smells, therefore it does possess an 
aesthetic dimension. Finally, stress, regardless of its particular manner of manifestation, 
comes down to a feeling that something is not right, that the body or mind is under unusual 
strain that needs to be alleviated – often through seeking professional medical help. This 
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means that it also satisfies the condition of ‘suggestivity’ (for lack of a better word) – that a 
need of intervention or change be needed. Therefore, stress could be classified as a symptom 
and, like with all symptoms, can be experienced in a variety of ways depending on the sources 
and the sufferer.  
 
Stress, however, cannot be classified as a disease per se; neither can it be said to belong among 
the clinical signs of one, as it cannot be objectively measured and translated into a deviation 
from the individual’s usual health parameters. While it does feature among the diagnostic 
criteria for conditions such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or acute stress disorder 
(ASD), it does not exhaust them, and one could easily argue that it is not the stress-related 
symptoms that act as obstacles to the subject’s physical and emotional comfort or her 
participation in society, but rather the ‘stressors’ themselves. Therefore, stress does not meet 
either one of the two criteria which make up the hybrid account of disease I have proposed in 
Chapter 6. I consider this a success, as it means that my definition is sufficiently conceptually 
developed not only to deal with obscure categories, but also to avoid the common problem 
of overinclusiveness by filtering out non-medical problems. The next section is going to test 
these features of my account further by applying it to the case of drug addiction, where it will 
perform a different task – identifying the challenges which bias and social stigmatization pose 
to disease classification. 
 
7. 6. On conceptualizing substance addiction as a disease. 
a) The ‘good’ and the ‘bad’: the difference in portrayal. 
There are no qualitative distinctions between addiction to the widely used kinds of 
recreational drugs – like nicotine or alcohol – and addiction to the less popular, illegal class of 
drugs – like cannabis, cocaine or heroin. The behavioural patterns exhibited by addicts are 
similar; the health and safety risks associated with them are equally common and likely to 
occur (albeit allegedly different in their manifestations). However, there appears to be general 
agreement that certain kinds of addictions are more dangerous than others, and therefore 
need to be treated medically. The response of contemporary health care systems, which have 
widened their patient spectrum by introducing rehabilitation programmes for addicts, is more 
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notable for its paternalistic tendencies than it is for its effectiveness. Every year hundreds of 
persons labeled as systematic drug ‘abusers’ in China and the U.S. face mandatory 
rehabilitation as a form of punishment for their unconventional lifestyle choices. Similarly, 
non-users are deliberately led to believe that all forms of drug consumption constitute 
pathologies which need urgent corrective measures. This stereotype is reinforced by the fact 
that upon first glance drug addiction fits well both within the biological and the social models 
of disease, being both an observable inherent property of the organism and a relational 
property of an individual to the sociocultural context of a particular environment (insofar as 
ultimately it is societies who dictate which ‘addictions’ are intolerable and require 
intervention).  
 
b) On the categorization of medical problems. Addiction as a ‘health problem’ vs. addiction 
as a ‘disease’. 
The medicalization of a certain condition in itself though, be it based on solid scientific 
evidence, professional agreement or social postulates, is not sufficient reason to include said 
condition in the category of disease. As I have shown in Chapter 5, physicians deal with 
numerous complaints, bodily processes or manipulations which fall outside these 
ramifications – such as painful menstruation, childbirth, circumcision, fertility monitoring, or 
family planning. To present the matter in logical terms: from the judgment that a condition is 
conceived of as a medical problem (or can be dealt with as one) does not follow automatically 
that said condition is necessarily a health problem; any such induction would be a non-
sequitur, not to mention an example of incorrectly derived premises (failure to provide 
adequate analysis and translation of relevant empirical data into the logical procedure). 
Consequently, since ‘disease’ is not an umbrella term for all health problems but a specific 
niche in the category of health problems, addiction is even less likely to fit there than in the 
loosely defined boundaries of general ill-health.  
 
c) Contextualizing drug addiction within the wider framework of contemporary philosophy’s 
accounts of disease. 
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Even at first glance it becomes obvious that, with the possible exceptions of normativist 
accounts such as Cooper’s (disease must be treatable, a ‘bad’ thing to have, and the afflicted 
person should be considered ‘unlucky’419) or Megone’s (‘incapacitating failure’420), the 
proponents of most other definitions of disease would be very keen to exclude cases where 
the affected person exhibits all of the following characteristics: 
- She can choose to function differently (by abandoning her toxic habit); 
- She consciously maintains her state through regular use of her preferred stimulant (it did not 
occur through any natural means, such as through mutation, or via contagion); 
- She put herself in the state of being an addict (whereas persons with genuine diseases usually 
do not have this type of choice).  
A naturalist approach is also not sure to provide adequate categorization in the case of drug 
addiction – or any other form of substance abuse. For instance, drug abuse would be quite 
problematic for Boorse’s biostatistical theory in the context of societies where this behaviour 
is especially common (albeit still illicit). In Punjab, India, non-users would be a small minority 
since even school-age children enjoy consuming small opium paste balls on a regular basis. 
This would mean that, as long as there are no dysfunctions present among the drug-abusing 
majority, the condition would not be problematized as a state of disease, even if medical 
consensus or the opinions of the affected construed it as such. 
 
Stereotypical hybridism, e. g. Wakefield’s ‘harmful dysfunction’, might seem like a more 
plausible candidate at first. It can be expected to let drug addiction and substance abuse ‘off 
the hook’ due to the fact that they result from a very natural neurobiological mechanism 
present in virtually all of us.421 Classical hybridism, though, is very likely to extend criteria such 
as ‘dysfunction’ to the domain of symptoms instead of their underlying etiology, and since 
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drug addiction and substance abuse are capable of bringing about rather ‘harmful’ effects and 
‘dysfunctions’, they would qualify as diseases. 
 
A phenomenological account of illness, such as Carel’s, is also quite likely to label drug 
addiction and substance abuse as diseases, as many of the effects which people experience 
after drug consumption could fit the description of a ‘rift’ between biological and lived body. 
While this description cannot be extended over to the phenomenon of drug addiction itself, it 
must be reminded that phenomenological accounts are centered around the concept of lived 
experience of illness rather than that of its underlying pathology, and are therefore highly 
likely to conflate the two – unlike my hybrid account. 
 
d) Sociological dimensions of medicalization: the relationship between drug abuse and 
crime. 
Part of the serious issues with classifying drug abuse stem from the practice’s links to the 
criminal world – a rather unfortunate association, which is bound to influence not only any 
practical attempts to handle drug problems, but also any attempts to engage in non-biased 
philosophical reflections on drug addiction. Nevertheless, the topic of public moral 
perceptions offers intriguing ground for theoretical research, as it seems to suggest that our 
relationship to substance abuse and all afflicted persons is purely contextual, based entirely 
on socially constructed meanings (hence the different attitudes we demonstrate to a heroin 
addict and an alcoholic, for example). The public’s perception of substance abusers appears 
to be incredibly sensitive to several factors: 
- The way the substance is produced – is it an illegal, non-certified business? 
- The way the substance is obtained – was it bought secretly from a shady dealer rather than 
a government-approved source? Did the user commit offenses in order to gain access to it, 
e.g. engage in theft or prostitution, etc.? 
- The way the substance is consumed – does the user try to avoid getting caught while 
consuming the drug (presumably because there will be legal consequences)? 
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Typically the higher the number of questions that were answered positively, the more likely 
we would be to define the substance user not only as an individual of dubious moral or social 
status, but also as someone who  is in need of medical attention. The effect of this prejudice 
is that illicit drug users are more likely to be labeled as ‘sick’ than are users of legal substances 
such as alcohol – despite the rather obvious similarities in the ways that both kinds of 
addiction habits are developed and ‘fed’. As a result, illicit substance abusers are stigmatized 
and shamed until they become afraid to seek the help they presumably ‘need’, while the 
dangers of alcohol and nicotine are, by comparison, virtually downplayed and trivialized. 
 
But the questions we have listed above are not the ones that need answering – they help 
shape our attitudes towards the substance, which are then transferred onto our attitudes 
towards addicts. This act of projection is a categorical mistake that could easily be avoided if 
we were to apply my optimized hybrid account of disease which draws on a philosophical 
understanding of the diagnostic roles played by the categories of signs and symptoms in 
clinical judgment. This account would be asking: 1) … whether the addict exhibits clinical signs 
of deviation from her own usual health parameters (as opposed to clinical signs of deviation 
from a statistically defined average) that cannot be explained with growth, pregnancy, or 
aging, and are not a matter of choice; 2) … whether the addict exhibits (or may reasonably be 
expected to experience) any symptoms which, if fully informed and capable of assessing her 
condition adequately, the addict (or a proxy) would regard as obstacles to her physical and 
emotional integrity and comfort, or to her participation in society. Since remaining in a state 
of drug addiction422 is sometimes a matter of choice, the answer to the first question may be 
negative; and since the predominant proportion of the addict’s negative social or emotional 
experiences are frequently a product of stigmatization rather than of her own symptoms, the 
answer to the second question may also be negative; most importantly, the answers to both 
questions will require careful interpretation of evaluative judgements. In short, the optimized 
hybrid account of disease has been successful in showing that including drug addiction in the 
category of disease may or may not be appropriate, depending on the details of the case. 
                                                          
422 As opposed to seeking professional help in order to overcome one’s addiction. 
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However, the next test that the account will undergo involves identifying even more complex 
and problematic examples of bias: the use of deliberately created, discursively supported 
gendered ‘mental illness’ labels. This practice has a long history of being used as a tool of large-
scale social oppression and, occasionally, of covert state control. Two of the most interesting 
and challenging cases will be presented in Section 7. 7.  
 
7. 7. The influence of sex and gender: gender norms and gender-specific discursively 
produced ‘mental illnesses’. 
a) Hysterical males? Pathologization of natural emotional responses in males. 
During the outbreak of WWI and the German ‘war neurotics’ hysteria, previously thought to 
be a female problem, came to be seen a manifestation of stress or fear experienced by the 
‘constitutionally feeble’ man. Historian Paul Lerner presents the development of the German 
‘war against hysteria’ and convincingly argues that male hysteria emerged as a result of a 
cluster of political and socioeconomic influences unique to late-nineteenth-century 
Germany,423 when hysteria began to be diagnosed with an ever-increasing frequency, 
especially in male survivors of war and railroad or factory accidents. I will use the events 
described by Lerner in his book Hysterical Men as a case study which will allow me to 
demonstrate how psychiatry’s theoretical apparatus does not operate in isolation from its 
historical and sociocultural contexts, but is instead very dependent upon them for the 
production of diagnostic labels, as well as for the processes of determining diagnostic criteria 
and treatment objectives. I will also argue that we need an account of disease that is designed 
with awareness of this, which could help us avoid future ‘insanity booms’ resulting from 
discursively produced overdiagnosis. Naturally, such an account would have to operate in 
conjunction with a heightened sensitivity to the issues of social control, oppression, and the 
disturbing potential of psychiatry to be used as a tool of disempowerment – or, in this case, 
of insidious manipulation meant to send people to their deaths. 
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Historical and sociological literature often construes the phenomenon of hysteria either as a 
manifestation of the misogynist side of psychiatry, or as ‘a form of proto-feminist protest by 
disenfranchised Victorian women’, but almost never as a male problem. It is difficult to say 
how male hysteria should be depicted. To Elaine Showalter, for example, the hysterical soldier 
was a ‘wartime counterpart of the powerless Victorian woman’424, and she translates his 
psychosomatic symptoms as suppressed emotions that he would not allow himself to express 
due to cultural norms and restrictions. However, in psychiatric writings on male hysteria in 
Germany there is no explicit feminization, in fact, ‘for the great majority of psychiatrists, the 
operative opposition lay between healthy masculinity and a pathological lack of male 
behaviour’, rather than between masculinity and explicit femininity.425  
 
Male hysteria  is related to the so-called ‘insanity boom’ which coincided with the time when 
psychiatry was undergoing professionalization and Germany was moving towards modernity, 
and the second industrial revolution (associated with the production of steel, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals) was taking place. The economic and demographic changes which went hand 
in hand with these three processes led to increased rates of suicide, mental illness, crime and 
alcoholism, which many authors, like Bonhoeffer and Gaupp, blamed on the anxiety and 
corrupted values of life in the big cities. 
    
At the same time there was also a rapid expansion of rail networks, which also brought a lot 
of changes into European life as stunning numbers of the injured workers developed nervous 
maladies. The English physician John Eric Erichsen tried to explain this with his theory about 
posttraumatic neurosis (widely considered as a diagnostic ancestor of PTSD or posttraumatic 
stress disorder): he saw it as an organically induced neurosis resulting from physical trauma, 
lesions of the spinal cord (also known as ‘railway spine’).  
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Jean- Martin Charcot, however, also having observed the same disturbances in war veterans 
and victims of workplace incidents, decided that the real cause behind them was a 
combination of an ‘environmental agent provocateur’ and ‘an inherited, constitutional 
disposition, or diathèse’. Charcot’s theory, which gave primacy to the emotional effects of 
trauma, had a huge international success, becoming especially influential in neurologist circles 
in Germany (more specifically by inspiring the works of Nonne and Oppenheim). 426 Then 
Hermann Oppenheim developed another theory (the TTN or Theory of Traumatic Neurosis) 
which offered two explanations for the observed symptoms.427 One of them merely repeated 
Erichsen’s conclusions, while the other one was based on the purely psychological 
consequences of fear, shock and anxiety.  Oppenheim emphasized the former, which earned 
him criticism from Alfred Hoche who observed that the recognition of TTN led to ‘an epidemic 
of nervous weakness.’428 Since many German physicians appeared to agree, TTN fell in 
disfavour, mostly because of fears that it could lead to malingering or benefit fraud. That is 
why hysteria quickly became an attractive diagnostic alternative to traumatic neurosis since it 
was a diagnostic label which relied on proper somatic localization. However, the works of 
Gaupp and Bonhoeffer suggested that there were no objective scientific criteria for 
distinguishing between normal and hysterical people, as observations seemed to show that 
both a normal and a hysterical person would react hysterically to the same stimuli. Thus the 
line between normal men and hysterical men was blurred and an ‘insanity boom’ ensued.429   
 
Around the same time, doctors began to establish and perpetuate myths about war as a cure, 
as well as about the perfect soldier as an ideal of masculinity. War was postulated both as a 
way of achieving the ideal and as a way to counteract against mental and physical 
degeneration, as a way of cultivating strength, discipline, courage and other valuable traits. 
What is more, it was presented as a cure for everything from nervous crisis to impotence. 
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Warfare became ‘masculine medicine’ while peace was feminized.430 The health and 
masculinity ideals that prevailed during that time served as a means of manipulating men into 
accepting war; war was seen as a way to restore themselves to their ‘rightful role’.  Peace, 
charity and pity, as well as emotions like fear, were pathologized, and even from the distance 
of time, it is not difficult to infer that the main reasons behind all this were of a purely 
economic nature. Since war was a costly enterprise, there was an always present concern that 
an epidemic of ‘pension hysteria’ would add to the already tremendous expenses, hence 
Germany’s vigorous opposition to the inconvenient diagnostic label of traumatic neurosis.  
 
Building an outlook that is more mindful of the diagnostic purposes served by the ‘symptoms’ 
and ‘signs’ categories in clinical judgment could help us avoid unwarranted pathologization 
and excessive medicalization, and thereby the threat of manipulative tactics as the one 
presented above. This involves putting to use an account of disease capable of detecting 
disingenuous diagnostic criteria – i. e. diagnostic criteria that serve a function other than 
establishing what the individual’s typical performance is like, and whether or how she has 
‘deviated’ from that. Applying my optimized hybrid account from Chapter 6 to the case of the 
‘hysterical’ German soldier from WWI, I would have received rather unconvincing results, as 
the man would not have met either of my conditions. He would not have exhibited a deviation 
from his typical clinical parameters, and he would not have exhibited symptoms that threaten 
his ability to participate in society, or his physical and emotional comfort. If anything, his 
reaction of fear in the face of certain death would be conducive to survival, not to mention 
completely understandable – perhaps much more so than if he had actually expressed a 
passionate desire to fight in WWI. Thus it would have been hard to accept or justify a 
diagnostic label which pathologizes his ‘condition’, even if that would have contributed to the 
interests of the state. 
 
b) Pathologizing the rebellion of the oppressed woman: The case of anorexia. 
While the question whether medical authorities cause the phenomena of medicalization out 
of rational self-interest or in an effort to respond to broader social tendencies can be a divisive 
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topic, there can be little doubt that they currently exercise an enormous influence on nearly 
all aspects of the lay populace’s lives. The power of medical authority over non-medical 
problems and areas of human experience such as sexual orientation, family planning or 
lifestyle choices (in the respective contexts of homosexuality, childbirth, and substance 
consumption, among others) has been discussed extensively.  Having offered examples and 
examined the ways in which medicalization can be subordinated to the goals of surveillance 
and oppression, I now turn to the ways in which it can be applied for the purposes of shutting 
down rebellious behaviours. 
 
In this sub-section, I will be dealing with female eating disorders – a deeply meaningful social 
phenomenon, the complexity of which has traditionally been downplayed, and its crucial 
features – chalked up to either mere vanity or ‘behavioural problems’. The hybrid account of 
disease presented in Chapter 6, which draws on the distinction between signs and symptoms, 
possesses the conceptual ‘receptors’ necessary for the purposes of detecting such unfair 
interpretations, and promotes the kind of attitude needed for resisting them. Before 
demonstrating how this works, however, I would like to engage in a brief analysis of the 
connections between corporeality, autonomy, gender roles, and health in the context of 
femininity. These links play an important role in Western social expectations of women, and 
are thus among the key factors which influence diagnostic criteria, as well as the creation of 
‘gendered’ diagnostic labels applied to females. 
 
It could be argued that, in Western cultures and the industrialized world, women’s lives and 
bodies are more intimately tied to the phenomenon of medicalization. Medical surveillance 
accompanies or even defines many aspects of femininity and the female body:  sexuality, 
contraception, pregnancy, childbirth, reproductive technologies, and lately even aesthetic 
appearances.  Occasionally women reclaim their autonomy by becoming active participants 
in, and proponents of, medicalization as a tool that lets them control choices related to their 
bodies – for example in the cases of pregnancy termination rights, or when fighting for 
increased access to fertility treatments. However, in the context of psychiatry, which by 
definition involves questioning the patient’s sense of reality, health care can turn into 
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oppression of an already vulnerable group by dismissing evidence of the symptoms’ social 
aetiology. 
 
Feminist literature has demonstrated an unpreceded level of awareness of patriarchal 
culture’s role both in psychiatric disorders’ aetiology and in their interpretation, rightfully 
insisting that medicine, psychiatry and psychology are by no means the only perspectives from 
which pathologized experiences and states could be explored.  As this particular sub-section’s 
objects of interest will be eating disorders such as bulimia and anorexia, they will be taken in 
all the complexity of their social and ontological ambiguity as conditions that are perceived 
simultaneously as gender-specific and as highly individual pathologies. However, they will also 
be contextualized within the broader discourse relating to patriarchy’s toxic effects on 
feminine health and well-being, because, as I have previously argued in this chapter, 
psychiatry’s diagnostic criteria and treatment objectives are always highly contingent upon 
their particular historical and sociocultural frames of reference. It is crucial that practitioners 
and laypersons alike maintain adequate levels of awareness of this contingency in order to 
detect and resist instances of overdiagnosing and excessive medicalization – a task which 
could be greatly facilitated by an optimized hybrid account of disease such as the one I 
presented in Chapter 6. As we are about to see, there are some occasions when non-
compliance with treatment could conceivably be interpreted as a form of resistance to social 
oppression, or as a personal rebellion against the negative influences in one’s private life. 
Therefore, I am going to suggest that localistic attempts to tie the phenomenon of eating 
disorders exclusively to a particular group by explaining it as gendered pathology would limit 
our ability to understand the wider context within which they are socially and discursively 
produced.431  
 
 The sociocultural roots of eating disorders have not escaped the attention of the world’s 
leading experts on anorexia in the 1960’s: Hilde Bruch, A. H. Crisp, M. S. Palazzoli and R. Slade. 
The four writers have, albeit admittedly in varying degrees, managed to show that the 
unquestioned assumptions with which psychiatry and psychology work include the notion 
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about ‘sanity’/’normality’ as the ability to function in a bourgeois patriarchal culture, i.e. the 
ability to ‘perform’ as one’s assigned social role unquestioningly and without hesitation, in 
compliance with the norms set for one’s gender.   Due to its implicit male-centeredness, the 
Western standard of ‘normality’ is not a gender-neutral one, hence the internalized conflict 
experienced by women, who attempt to fit both the man-oriented general notion of 
‘acceptable’ behaviour and the radically different notion of ‘well-adjusted’ femininity. The 
clash between ‘normality’ and its apparent complete opposite – ‘femininity’ – produces a deep 
sense of inadequacy, helplessness and inability to achieve social validation as the woman 
struggles with demands both to be an independent self-contained individual and to center her 
life around meeting the needs of others, all at the same time and within the same sociocultural 
context.  The lack of control over oneself and one’s life becomes a major source of anxiety and 
uncertainty, surpassed only by the fear of responsibility, and both are often ‘managed’ 
through subconscious attempts to avoid existential challenges by reversing, delaying or 
altogether avoiding biological adulthood.  
 
Crisp, for instance, has described some anorexic behaviours as a form of ‘biological regression’ 
to a slim child-like form, or a ‘distorted biological solution to an existential problem’, which 
has little to do with the woman’s general attitude to food. She would eat if it did not affect 
her shape or size, he argues, explaining that the ultimate goal of anorexia is not the avoidance 
of food per se, but rather the ‘flight back into psychobiological childhood’, which protects the 
person from a ‘maturational crisis.’432 Conceptualizing eating disorders as a gender-specific 
phenomenon trivializes the problem by presenting it merely as every female’s ‘natural 
propensity’ to develop extreme dieting habits.  The negative attention is moved away from 
the behaviour, and onto the perpetrator; thus femininity is construed as inherently 
pathological and characterized by irrational self-destructive inclinations, of which the act of 
starving oneself is but a predictable consequence; something to be explained by virtue of the 
dieter’s sex. Feminist accounts of the social psychology of anorexia attempt to rectify such 
misguided attitudes by exposing their problematic ‘commonsensical assumptions’433 about 
self, experience, gender roles and social interactions, and by demonstrating that psychiatry 
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and psychology, rather than problematizing negative stereotypes, tend to take them for 
granted in the same shape in which they are already present and readily available in our 
culture.  There is a palpable influence of post-structuralism present throughout nearly all 
examples of the literature, with many relying on additional theoretical frameworks such as 
psychoanalytic theory to help with their critical analysis of mainstream ‘commonsensical’ 
assumptions about the roots of anorexia, or to uncover the reasons for the obvious gender-
bias in eating disorder diagnosis distribution.  
 
The psychoanalytical approach may have been inspired by the apparent similarity between 
gender-biased notions of anorexia and hysteria, which has also provoked authors like Lacan 
and Mitchell to re-read Freud in their theorizations of masculinity and femininity, before 
reaching the conclusion that gender identity is ultimately ‘an effect of signification and 
interpretation’ (as noted by Lacan who firmly rejected the notion of femininity as a natural 
category and maintained its anti-essentialist ‘symbolic position’434). Such interpretations 
facilitate Ramas’s conceptualization of hysteria as a ‘quasi-feminist refusal of patriarchal 
heterosexuality’435, as well as Cartesian-inspired dualistic accounts of ‘anorexia as a discursive 
production of control’436, where the control exercised by the Self over her body translates into 
(or makes up for a lack of) control over all aspects of her life as a form both of individualistic 
‘self-production’ and of rebellion against societal oppression: you cannot control me, only I 
get to make decisions about myself and my body.437  
 
Indeed, hysteria and anorexia nervosa appear to have been closely linked in theoretical 
medical literature since as early as the nineteenth century. In 1873 Charles Lasègue’s De 
l’anorexie hystérique provided one of the first accounts of anorexia, in which the condition 
was associated with the ‘pathological contentment’ which hysterical young girls derive from 
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becoming their concerned family members’ and friends’ center of attention.438 However, even 
prior to that point, nineteenth century medicine was already biased against women as a result 
of developments which heavily populated the clinical discourse with medical tropes such as 
‘gendered nerves’ (female nerves were thought of as ‘weaker’ and more ‘delicate’) and the 
‘natural invalidism’ of women (the femaly body was ideologically construed as ‘incapable of 
surviving the sexual equality demanded by the suffrage movements’). This historical period’s 
overall obsession with the then-fashionable nervous disorders entered an unholy union with 
the hostility towards suffrage movements, resulting in attempts to pathologize femininity as 
fundamentally ‘sick’ and ‘irrational’. 
 
Femininity’s presumed biological and intellectual inferiority in relation to masculinity was 
supposed to justify the disempowered social role ascribed to women – lesser human beings 
dependent on (and therfore owned by) those who fathered or wed them as they were too 
‘weak’ to survive on their own; second-class citizens undeserving of legal rights as they lacked 
the epistemic capacity to make valid judgments. As noted by Orbach over a century later, 
abnormal body size and eating habits have become a  symbolic ‘language of protest’ for some 
of those who are not given a voice in society; a way to express feelings and positions that were 
otherwise impossible to spell out.439  This conclusion is also compatible with the mixed results 
that would be obtained if we were to apply my hybrid account of disease to the conditions of 
oppressed, ‘hysterical anorexic’ females in nineteenth century Western Europe. Firstly, clinical 
signs of deviation from the individual’s typical parameters were present, but they were also 
sometimes the product of a conscious decision to resist control. Secondly, in some women 
this conscious decision had not resulted from delusion or an unrealistic body image (which 
would have made it symptomatic of an underlying pathology). Finally, the resulting symptoms, 
albeit eligible for medical attention themselves, were not in all cases the true source of the 
affected individual’s inability to adapt to the demands of her life; sometimes they simply 
reflected this inability. My account leaves sufficient room for both types of cases, 
acknowledging that sometimes the nineteenth century ‘hysterical anorexic’ woman’s 
                                                          
438 Lasègue, C., ‘De l’anorexie hystérique’, short excerpt published in Journal Français de Psychiatrie, 2009, Vol. 
1, No. 32 (Anorexie-boulimie: Approche clinique et théorique), pp. 3-8 
439 Orbach, S., Hunger Strike: The Anorectic’s Struggle as a Metaphor for Our Age, Faber&Faber, London, 1986, 
p. 17, also see p. 48 
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disordered eating was a genuine disease, and other times – an expression of her deep 
unhappiness with the unfair social order.  
 
A somewhat different perspective is that of social determinism as encountered in Slade, who 
attributed extreme dieting habits directly to the specific ‘ethics of body regulation’ ascribed 
to each socially imposed gender role via Protestant upbringing and its constant reinforcement 
of values like individual hard work, achievement, effort, and ability to delay gratification.440  
Yet another view, expressed by Bruch, ties anorexic behaviour to a dysfunctional family 
dynamic where self-denial is associated with virtue and the influence of parents (especially 
mothers) who consistently place too many demands on the emotionally fragile daughter 
whilst neglecting her needs and expecting her to selflessly put them second to those of 
others.441  However, MacSween has criticized both of the abovementioned approaches for 
‘[ignoring] the social significance’ of the disorder by failing to pose (and, consequently, to 
answer) the question ‘what having an adult female body means in a culture which 
simultaneously eroticizes, degrades and devalues both women and their bodies, and how the 
transformation of the formally asexual child’s body into the ambiguous icon of the female 
body is experienced...’442  Thus it appears that Crisp’s approach, while not particularly sensitive 
to the exact triggers of anorexic behaviour, still provides a more adequate understanding of 
the basic cycle they operate: 
1) A problem arises which requires the Self to deal with it. 
2) The Self experiences fear, anxiety and a pronounced desire not to face the problem. 
3) The Self starves her body in an attempt to achieve ‘psychobiological regression’. 
4) The Self withdraws in her child-like state and thus successfully avoids dealing with the 
problem, while still maintaining a minimal sense of control over her choices in life. 
                                                          
440 Slade, R., The Anorexia Nervosa Reference Book: Direct and Clear Answers to Everyone’s Questions, Harper 
and Rowe, New York, 1984, p. 135 
441 Bruch, H., The Golden Cage: The Enigma of Anorexia, Open Books, Wells, 1978, p. 106 
442 MacSween, M., Anorexic Bodies: a Feminist and Sociological Perspective on Anorexia Nervosa, Routledge 
London and New York, London, 1993, p.  41 
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This explanatory model also has the additional benefit of accounting for anorexic persons’ 
alleged tendency to ‘get worse’ during times of existential crisis, work-related stress, financial 
problems or personal and family difficulties, which has led some scientists to believe that 
anorexia and anxiety disorder may be more closely related than previously thought, or even 
share a ‘common genetic pathway’.443  It is also in line with the psychoanalytic model 
presented by Palazzoli, which views having an adult female body itself as the challenge that 
many anorexics would rather avoid. But potential complications such as unwanted attention, 
however unpleasant or common in the context of an almost pathologically ‘increased visibility 
and objectification [of the body] within late capitalist consumer society,’444 are not the main 
source of the anorexic female’s anxiety. Palazzoli’s ‘object body’ theory posits the adult female 
form as the maturing girl’s actual phobic object – a threatening joint representation of the 
maternal object’s worst aspects (e. g., as a controlling or silencing influence).445  
 
This ‘overpowering’ presence reflects the Self’s traumatic past experiences caused by the 
mother’s inadequate parenting skills, and, claims Palazzoli, produces or perpetuates ‘deficient 
body cognition’, usually in the form of a failure to recognize and meet one’s own emotional 
and biological needs – including hunger. Perhaps even more disturbingly, mature feminine 
corporeality is revealed by Palazzoli to be the source of the Self’s deeply-seated fear of her 
own sexuality and the undesirable (to the Self) passive, receptive position it entails: ‘the 
adolescent girl ... experiences her feminine sexuality in a passive and receptive way: she is 
exposed to lewd looks, subjected to menstruation, about to be penetrated in sexual embraces, 
to be invaded by the foetus, to be suckled by a child.’446  This inactive, impersonal role is 
                                                          
443 Berg, K. C., ‘Overgeneralization of Conditioned Fear as a Pathogenic Marker of Anorexia Nervosa’, study 
verified by University of Minnesota and the Clinical and Translational Science Institute in December 2014, 
available online at http://psychcentral.com/cgi-bin/ct.cgi/show/NCT02148042?term=anorexia&%20=11, last 
accessed on 30 May 2015, 13:59 h 
 
444 Strathern, A. and Lambek, M., ‘Introduction Embodying Sociality: Africanist-Melanesianist Comparisons’ in 
Strathern, A. and Lambek, M. (Eds.), Bodies and Persons: Comparative Perspectives from Africa and Melanesia, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 5 
445 Palazzoli, M. S., Self-starvation: From the Intrapsychic to the Transpersonal Approach to Anorexia Nervosa, 
Human Context Books, Chaucer Publishing Company, London, 1974 
446 Ibid, p. 70 
199 
 
 
experienced by the young individual as a threat to her developing autonomy, and is therefore 
rejected in the act of containing bodily growth to the best of one’s ability. 
 
As in other theories we have observed, in Palazzoli’s work the restricted intake of nutrients is 
not the direct result of a genuine dislike of food or an unrealistic view of one’s physique, but 
rather of the desire to exercise control over one’s personal boundaries; again, a protest 
against one’s disempowered state of inactivity is present. Thus it is not hard to conclude that, 
even if a social change may not be all it will take to control eating disorders, promoting 
woman-positive views and attitudes may at least help combat the feelings of inferiority and 
helplessness experienced by females – feelings which often trigger or perpetuate unhealthy 
behaviours.  
 
The image of the female body as a passive, incomplete recipient object stems from women’s 
secondary, inferior social positions, and is therefore ideologically and culturally shaped in the 
material practices of everyday oppression, rather than derived from objective realities in the 
physical world. Therefore society shares a collective obligation to destroy its own mythical 
creation – the trope of the imperfect, incapacitated female – before it even begins 
medicalizing and ‘treating’ some females’ rebellious psychobiological practices such as 
restricted eating. The second half of Section 7. 7. has examined this issue and hinted at a 
potential solution – the hybrid account of disease presented in Chapter 6.  
 
Since the account is founded on the distinction between signs and symptoms, it possesses the 
conceptual tools required for detecting and resisting instances of overdiagnosis and incorrect 
medical profiling, as well as the unfair and negative stereotypes from which they stem. 
However, there is a very important caveat here: in order to operate successfully, the account 
needs to be backed up by awareness of psychiatry’s contingency upon historical and 
sociocultural factors – in this case, for instance, upon the complex relationship between 
feminine corporeality, social oppression, and gender normativity in Western and 
industrialized societies. No account of disease, however well developed, can function well in 
the absence of awareness of one’s cultural frame of reference; in conditions of willful 
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ignorance about the way diagnostic labels are produced and applied. Acknowledging the 
existence of these problems is the first step, which needs to be followed by adopting a more 
responsible and empathetic attitude towards patients and the art of diagnosis.  
 
7. 8. Chapter Summary. 
In the present chapter I have demonstrated how in psychiatric discourse the phenomena 
known as ‘mental illnesses’ are defined not in terms of behavioural ‘abnormality’ (which is but 
a secondary characteristic of these phenomena) but rather in terms of somatic aetiology. 
‘Mental illnesses’ are therefore often not viewed by psychiatrists as strictly ‘mental’, and are 
only referred to in the described manner as ‘a crude convenience for classification’, as pointed 
out by Detre and Jarecki.447 One of the contributions of this chapter has been to show that, if 
that is true, then ‘personality disorders’– and other examples of the so-called ‘grey area’ 
problems defined in terms of socially constructed notions of ‘normality’ – should not be 
medicalized and conflated with genuine ‘mental illness’ (Sections 7. 1. and 7. 2.).448 Based on 
this, I have suggested that the category of ‘personality disorders’ with an unidentified 
aetiology does not belong in nosography or among the topics of medical philosophy (Section 
7. 3.). I have also shown that assigning the status of diseases to ‘personality disorders’ may 
generate inequality in society, unjustifiably diminish the sense of personal responsibility, and 
threaten the quality and standards of health care. I have referred to the problems outlined in 
Section 7. 3. as the ‘theoretical dangers’, and to the problems outlined in Section 7. 4. as the 
‘practical dangers’ of unwarranted pathologization. 
 
Throughout the entire chapter, I have argued that the only way to solve these issues would be 
to cultivate a more responsible attitude towards diagnosis and medicalization, as well as an 
                                                          
447 Detre and Jarecki, Op. cit., p. 75 
448 Current scientific knowledge is insufficient to determine whether (and which) ‘disorders’ have a somatic 
aetiology. The claims I have made in this chapter only apply to those of them which are, for the time being, 
thought not to have such aetiology. However, that in no way implies that these conditions are somehow a less 
legitimate cause for concern and suffering – or that they do not require intervention. The only 
recommendation to be drawn from the present analysis is to withhold judgements that may result in 
medicalization, unless and until an underlying pathology is identified (or the existence of such a pathology is 
strongly suspected) that could be effectively targeted by licensed psychoactive drugs, or through other 
conventional forms of therapy.  
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awareness that psychiatry’s diagnostic criteria and manner of determining treatment 
objectives are contingent upon historical and sociocultural context. In short, what is needed 
is a different perspective – one that may be facilitated, at least to some extent, by an adequate 
account of disease, combined with a willingness to step outside the medical tendency of 
‘cultural blindness’.  
 
Sections 7. 6. and 7. 7. have successfully shown that my account of disease has the potential 
to counteract, or at the very least identify and problematize, the phenomena of unwarranted 
pathologization and excessive medicalization by means of increasing our ability to detect and 
resist biased interpretations, or artificially imposed diagnostic criteria and labels intended to 
function as a covert form of state control or social oppression. Before this, in Section 7. 5. I 
performed a short ‘test run’ on my proposed account by applying it to the rather complex and 
obscure category of stress, in order to reveal the account’s potential to deliver conceptual 
clarity. 
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8. Conclusion. 
 
When philosophers ask what X is, they usually do not just seek to define it. They seek to 
provide an ‘account’ of it – to understand and explain it. The humanities’ concern with 
medicine, health and disease is a concern about the emotional and social aspects of these 
phenomena and all related or resulting practices and behaviours. It is a concern about how 
we think and feel about them – what our intellectual, psychological and philosophical 
responses to them are; how we construe, conceptualize or perceive them; how we interpret, 
experience or discuss them. A philosopher and scientist asking ‘What is disease?’ utter the 
same words, but respond to different questions. Although each answer will carry its own 
value, neither will suffice on its own; they will need to inform and complete each other if we 
are to gain full understanding of the incredibly complex phenomenon of human disease – a 
phenomenon which has the power to shape not only the lives of people, but also the destinies 
of nations. However, whereas a complete understanding would be optimal, it is neither 
possible nor necessary. I have shown that by identifying and highlighting the influence of 
values implicitly or explicitly present in all sides of the health/disease definition debate, we 
should be able to subjugate their transformative potential to the goal of producing a 
functional, non-problematic account of disease which would not only serve the purposes of 
policy making and clinical practice, but also those of promoting more general social goals (such 
as equality or empowerment of the more vulnerable segments of society, among others).  
 
Of course, the obstacles to gaining the necessary insight are many, and a large number of 
them masquerade as established truths. I have addressed this issue in Chapter 2, where I have 
examined the dangers of failing to question science’s presumed objectivity and acknowledge 
the culture-specific context which produced the ideal about ‘value-free’ science or the legacy 
of Cartesian mind-body dualism (which continues to be deeply ingrained in Western culture, 
science and medicine); I have also presented evidence that, despite biomedical scientists’ and 
clinical practitioners’ commitment to high epistemic standards and intellectual rigor, their 
fields of competence are also subject to the threat of ‘intellectual infirmity’ (and thus just as 
likely to produce and reinforce harmful stereotypes or false information as every other area 
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of knowledge). Furthermore, in Chapter 5 I have argued that while a one-sided, ‘objective’ 
perspective may be practically useful in some respects, it is philosophically uninsightful. In 
addition to the purely intellectual obstacles faced by those seeking to define disease (which 
manifest as implicit biases), in chapters 1, 4, and 5 I have also discussed the problematic 
practical implications of some of the most prominent philosophical accounts of disease 
currently available. For example, I have brought forward the issue of social expectations and 
the ways in which health/disease definitions have the potential to shape the social roles 
assigned to patients and practitioners (is their relationship one of cooperation, or one of 
control; does it take place in a context of discussion or in one of power struggles?), as well as 
dictate different trends in health care services delivery and consumption (should patients be 
passive recipients or proactive consumers in full control of their choices?). In Chapter 4, I have 
explained the importance of maintaining the discussion that eliminativism attempts to shut 
down, and outlined its potential beneficial outcomes for a society which already shows strong 
tendencies towards obscuring or invalidating patient perspectives. I have exposed the links 
between negative stereotypes (e.g. construing illness in terms of incapacity, dysfunction and 
failure), dismissing the cultural and emotional meaning of disease (and thereby also of the 
emotional and physical stress associated with some forms of treatment), and the promotion 
of unempathetic formats of health care and doctor-patient relationships. But first and 
foremost, I have delivered a profound, if somewhat unusual, critique of naturalism and 
eliminativism in the philosophy of medicine. 
 
I have successfully shown that, rather than a paragon of neutrality, naturalism is another 
value-laden approach. This position has also been defended by Fulford449, but what makes my 
critique of naturalism different is how far-reaching it is - the focus of my attention does not lie 
simply on the flaws of some of naturalism’s particular instances (i.e. the flaws of specific 
naturalist theories), but rather on the very cultural landscape in which naturalism was 
conceived and encouraged to flourish – on its history as an ideologically driven reaction 
against vitalism. 
                                                          
449 Fulford, K. W. M., ‘“What is (mental) disease?”: an open letter to Christopher Boorse’, Journal of Medical 
Ethics, 2001, Vol. 27, pp. 80-85 
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My critique in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, then, is directed not only at naturalism per se, but also 
more broadly at the scientific and naturalist pretense of neutrality and infallible objective 
knowledge, which disregards a wide array of covert biases already existing in medical thinking. 
As these biases often parade in the disguise of intellectual ‘legacy’ passed down from one 
generation of scientists and practitioners to the next, Chapter 2 has had to lay out the social 
and cultural mechanisms operating behind this exchange, as well as the motivation of those 
who participate in it – a task in which Alvan Feinstein’s theory of ‘intellectual infirmity’ in 
clinical judgment has been of great aid to me (Section 2. 2.). Thus I have had to address a 
variety of postulates in medical thinking, such as the tendency to equate biological normativity 
to strict scientific laws (Section 2. 3.), and the myth about science’s infallibility (Section 2. 8.). 
 
When working on Chapter 2, I have always tried to keep my criticism balanced, fair and 
constructive. For instance, I have acknowledged the role of societies as enablers of dogmatic 
and authoritative medical models where covert bias is most likely to flourish (Section 2. 6.); I 
have also pointed out that some of the humanistic ideals about medicine and medical thinking 
are, in fact, misguided, as well as socially, practically and psychologically unrealistic (Section 
2. 5.) – this includes ideals about the physician or scientist as a an endlessly insightful and 
empathetic figure. Additionally, I have speculated about the possibility that the seldom 
discussed additional purposes of medical language – such as elitist ambitions of consolidating 
the ‘trade’s’ reputation, or the attempt to weed out those deemed less qualified – may have 
contributed to the social and epistemic chasm between the lay populace on one hand, and 
practitioners or scientists on the other hand, thus increasing the chance of misunderstandings 
between the two sides (Section 2. 4.).  
 
However, one of the most important messages of Chapter 2 was introduced at its very 
beginning, where I discussed medicine’s reliance on specialization, objectification, and 
orientation – a reliance originating from the dawn of medical professionalization, which 
guarantees the productivity and effective distribution of labour across all sub-fields of 
medicine, but also adds limitations to the scientist or practitioner’s area of theoretical 
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competence (Section 2. 1.). These (actually very necessary) limitations, in turn, diminish the 
likelihood that a significant number among the specialists in question would be fully capable 
– or willing – to dedicate sufficient effort to understanding the complex philosophical, 
sociocultural, conceptual and linguistic dimensions of their work with human diseases. Instead 
of treading this somewhat uncertain terrain, they focus on the seemingly predictable ‘value-
free’ realm of facts and quantifiable information, where science yields the power to detect, 
explain and correct instances of disease by means of reducing them to ‘deviations’ from the 
‘norm’.  
 
This issue has been given more attention in Chapter 3, which has examined the historical roots 
of fact fetishization (Section 3. 1.), disease objectification and disease quantification, tracing 
them back to nineteenth century physiological theories (Section 3. 2.) which were meant to 
counteract the influence of vitalism and eliminate all metaphysical terms or speculations from 
the public discourse on medicine by proving the physicochemical nature of life phenomena 
(Section 3. 3.). Thus Chapters 2 and 3 have given strong reasons to question the validity of the 
‘value-free science’ ideal, which naturalism appears to be implicitly based upon, and have 
exposed the obvious (albeit presently forgotten by many) ideological motivations that it stems 
from, historically. 
 
Chapter 3 bears the additional burden of setting the groundwork for a rejection of 
eliminativism, as according to my interpretation, eliminativism operates on similar 
philosophical assumptions as naturalism: for instance, that values or subjective experiences 
are not central to the debate of health/disease definitions, or that they are needless 
‘distractions’ which decrease the productivity of clinical decision-making.  
 
These two arguments have been examined in more detail in Chapter 4’s Sections 4. 1., 4. 2., 
and 4. 4, then invalidated in Section 4. 3. and Section 4. 5., respectively. The remainder of 
Chapter 4 has focused on counter-arguments, for which I have relied on a wide variety of 
sources and disciplines exposing the powerful connection between definitions and social 
dynamics. Section 4. 6. has been inspired by labeling theory and draws on the notion that the 
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language we use can affect our social expectations of others, and influence the way we 
perform our own social roles. Section 4. 7. has developed these views further, and seen them 
crystallize into the hypothesis that rhetoric (and especially social metaphors of illness) can 
impact laypersons’ experiences of living with disease – a hypothesis which drew on Jackie 
Stacey’s reflections on negative stereotypes about disease, Ian Williams’s work on metaphors 
and the ‘iconography of illness’, and K. Maynard’s theory about medical identities. 
 
Section 4. 8. has taken all this a step further with a detailed demonstration how the notions 
we hold about health and disease translate in the real life context of public health, where the 
effectiveness of a particular campaign is always influenced by the way health and disease are 
construed by the target audience (which is precisely the reason I have ended the section with 
the suggestion that the hidden transformative power of language and rhetoric could easily be 
manipulated in order to guarantee different results). This exposition has served a double 
function – it has cemented my refutation of eliminativism whilst also adding more power to 
my critique of naturalism’s insistence that values can and should be excluded from the debate 
on health/disease definitions. 
 
I have briefly revisited the latter critique in Chapter 5 before turning my attention to other 
approaches – namely normativism, hybridism, and phenomenology of illness. Just like with 
Chapter 4, which has dealt with eliminativism, in Chapter 5 I have drawn on my conclusions 
from the first three of my chapters, and using them as caveats in order to ensure a clearer 
point of observation that has allowed me to identify the main conceptual challenges 
associated with each of these approaches. I have started out with a short introduction in 
Section 5. 1., where I have asked readers to join me in contemplating the truly remarkable 
stability of lay intuitions as to which conditions belong in the category of somatic disease – 
intuitions which, with a few exceptions, have remained more or less unchallenged over many 
centuries, allowing us to agree that syphilis, for example, is a ‘disease’. 
 
In spite of bearing the title ‘The chicken or the egg?’, Section 5. 1. does not trap us into a 
philosophical vicious circle, but rather helps us escape one by highlighting the absurdity of 
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questioning whether a concept of ‘disease’ was ever present before the existence of medicine 
and led to the creation of the trade, or was in fact ‘invented’ by it. My rejection of this common 
false dilemma, combined with my rejection of radical post-structuralist and normativist 
interpretations, has provided a hint of what is to follow next in the chapter – namely a section 
on the importance of asking the right questions, avoiding the pressure to ‘pick a side’ in the 
discussion, and resisting the temptation to perceive or frame the health/disease definitions 
debate in terms of a conflict between conceptual opposites (e.g. by tying it to the fact-value 
dichotomy).  
 
Confident that I have already exposed the conceptual similarities and shared historical-
cultural origins of the two ‘main’ sides in back in Chapters 2 and 3, have used Section 5. 2. in 
order to propose a more productive and less intellectually misleading manner of systematizing 
and comparing the established approaches to health/disease definitions: grouping them 
based on what they consider to be a central feature of diseases, rather than based on the 
author’s allegiance to a particular ideology. As this has been attempted previously by 
Christopher Boorse in his original paper ‘Health as a Theoretical Concept’, my next section was 
intended as both an overview of the paper’s main idea and an attempt to recreate the format  
- but not the content – of Boorse’s critique (Section 5. 3.); this attempt has been largely led by 
my desire to address particular problematic strategies (e.g. defining health purely in terms of 
values, construing disease in relation to medical intervention, equating health to statistical 
normality, making uncritical generalizations which link disease to pain and disability, or 
representing disease as maladaptivity, as discussed in sub-sections a), b), c), d) and e), 
respectively), instead of addressing the broader ideological and philosophical contexts within 
which they are situated. 
 
I have criticized the strategies described in sub-sections a), b) and d) (which are usually 
associated with normativist and hybridist approaches) for failing to reflect ‘biological 
normativity’ – a term I have borrowed from Georges Canguilhem, which describes the way all 
life forms seek certain influences and states whilst avoiding others; this type of selectivity 
observed across all species in nature is a reliable indicator that the way we perceive the 
phenomena of health and disease is not purely a matter of sociocultural influences. I have also 
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criticized the strategies described in sub-section c) (which are usually associated with 
naturalist approaches) for failing to reflect the dynamic aspects of life with a disease, instead 
offering an inaccurate and simplistic representation of the affected organism as a passive 
vessel. The strategy of defining disease as a form of maladaptivity has been criticized in sub-
section e) for a similar reason – its inability to account for disease as a phenomenon that 
involves adaptation and compensation on behalf of the affected individual. 
 
Just like with my other chapters, I have tried to approach my work on these sub-sections as 
an investigative critique – a curious and appreciative analysis ultimately resulting in 
constructive criticism, which identifies flaws and seeks to correct them without tearing down 
an entire project. Virtually every attempt at defining disease that I have come across during 
my research has been characterized by at least some valuable insights or compelling 
arguments.450 The question, however, does not boil down to who has created the most 
philosophically astute theory per se – indeed, it does not even have anything to do with 
creating a theory at all. As I have stated – first in Chapter 1, and then once more in the 
conclusion of Chapter 3 – the goal is to provide a functional and relatable account of 
health/disease. Such an account would ‘unify’ the separated languages and practical realities 
of patient and practitioner without contributing to the negative stereotyping, stigmatization, 
social exclusion and disempowerment of persons living with disease; it would also reflect the 
multidimensional nature of disease as a biologically, psychologically and socially complex 
phenomenon, and account for the body’s ‘biological normativity’ (also known as its ability to 
respond selectively to external and internal states and stimuli, avoiding some and seeking out 
others).  
 
Whilst incredibly helpful for such a task, philosophical finesse and precision alone could not 
deliver these results without the assistance of a ‘language of pain and reactivity’. That is why 
                                                          
450 The situation has been summed up rather well by Lennart Nordenfelt, who notes that ‘some diseases picked 
out by the holistic criteria will not be counted as diseases by the Boorsian ones. A person may be in pain and 
disabled by internal bodily causes without this condition lowering the probability of the person’s survival. But 
the converse may also hold, there may be diseases picked out by the biostatistical criteria which are not picked 
out by the holistic ones.’ See Nordenfelt, L., ‘The concepts of health and illness revisited’, Medicine, health care, 
and philosophy, March 2007, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 9. 
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I have dedicated Chapter 6 to phenomenology, which I find to be better equipped in that 
regard as it can account for the two most neglected aspects of disease – the phenomenon of 
‘biological normativity’, and the dynamic processes of equilibration, compensation and 
adaptation of the diseased individual. Drawing on the works of Havi Carel, Eric Cassell, Fredrik 
Svenaeus, Anna Luise Kirkengen, and S. Kay Toombs, I have been able to develop my argument 
about the reactive nature of disease further (Section 6. 1.). I have also introduced a clear-cut 
distinction between the categories of ‘clinical signs’ and ‘symptoms’, which could be used to 
upgrade Havi Carel and Elizabeth Lindsey’s theories about well-being within illness,451 as well 
as Havi Carel and Ian James Kidd’s ideas about the philosophical role or the edifying potential 
of illness, respectively. These philosophical projects are relevant not only to our goal of 
producing a relatable, non-stigmatizing account of disease (as specified by the criteria 
presented in Chapters 1 and 3); they can also offer valuable guidance in the broader process 
of phasing out the stigma or negative stereotypes associated with disease, which is why I 
regard my own addition to them, however modest, as another philosophical contribution put 
forward by my research. 
 
In this case, my contribution has consisted in facilitating the conceptual distinction between 
signs and symptoms – a distinction which has the potential to separate issues relating to 
biomarkers and clinical parameters (clinical signs) from issues relating to the subjective 
physical experiences of living with disease (symptoms), and which can thus neutralize the 
threat of apparent contradiction from theories about well-being in illness. As I have pointed 
out in Sections 6. 2. and 6. 3., a view which distinguishes between signs and symptoms is better 
equipped to account for the fact that biomedical parameters such as hormonal levels or bone 
density exist and could be examined at any time, but only acquire the status of pathological 
signs within the context of examination, where they become objects of scrutiny. (Section 6. 
2.); it would also be better equipped to account for conditions which do not present any 
observable signs upon examination, such as those instances of ‘mental’ illness which are 
                                                          
451 Both of which were introduced early on in Chapter 2 as part of the bid against the ‘deficit’ perspective often 
adopted by physicians. 
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currently still thought to lack distinct physical manifestations in spite of being accompanied 
by subjective symptoms (Section 6.3.). 
 
Section 6. 4. has explained the distinction between signs and symptoms further, while Section 
6. 5. has cemented it by introducing criteria for determining whether a certain subjective 
experience constitutes a symptom, as well as by presenting useful philosophical applications 
of the distinction, e.g. the reactive nature of symptoms in ‘mental illness’, where they are 
sometimes construed by specialists as maladjustment to extreme circumstances, or as a 
subconscious form of defence against unacknowledged feelings of guilt, fear, discomfort, or 
anger.  
 
Section 6. 6. has summarized the conclusions of Sections 6. 1. to 6. 5. and used them to 
construct what I consider to be an appropriate and functional hybrid account of disease relying 
on the following criteria: 1) … that the patient exhibit clinical signs of deviation from her own 
usual health parameters (as opposed to clinical signs of deviation from a statistically defined 
average) that cannot be explained with growth, pregnancy, or aging, and did not result from 
a conscious choice to make such changes (as in the case of weight loss by liposuction or 
dieting, the case of low or nonexistent sperm count due to vasectomy, or the case of 
anovulation due to oral contraception) ; 2) … that the patient consider her symptoms as 
obstacles to her physical and emotional integrity and comfort, or to her participation in 
society. This account’s naturalist element can be observed in the first condition, which 
operates on the assumption that clinical signs of deviation from one’s usual health parameters 
could point to a pathological state; this naturalist element has been successfully combined 
with normativist and phenomenological ones, as shown by the second condition’s focus on 
subjective experiences and evaluative judgments. Insofar as the account has incorporated all 
these approaches, it can be considered an example of hybridism. In the sense that it also 
meets the requirements specified in the beginning of this thesis (Chapters 1 and 3), it 
represents an optimized version of hybridism, designed to reflect the phenomenon of 
‘biological normativity’, bridge the communication gap between patient and practitioner, and, 
last but not least, present disease in rhetorically neutral terms which capture its complex 
211 
 
 
multidimensional nature without explicitly relying on negative stereotypes (such as the 
traditional associations with ‘harm’, ‘failure’, ‘incapacitation’, ‘deficiency’, or ‘defects’). 
 
Instead of stopping there, in Chapter 7 I have proceeded to check how this version of 
hybridism applies to the context of ‘mental illness’, especially in relation to a few very 
problematic types of bias in disease classification, such as the false dichotomy mental illness-
somatic illness or the underrepresentation of ‘mental illness’ in our intellectual schema of 
‘prototype diseases’ (Section 7. 1.). As a follow-up on that, Section 7. 2. has introduced the 
related issues of a) drawing the line between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour, and b) 
identifying the ‘proper’ objectives of psychiatric treatment. 
 
Just like the problem of defining disease, both of these issues require a great deal of flexibility 
on our behalf: they need fair and ‘objective’ solutions, yet have been found to be highly 
context-sensitive. Therefore, I have tried to show that any attempt to tackle them could 
benefit from the optimized hybrid account of health/disease I have proposed near the end of 
Chapter 6, along with an improved philosophical understanding of the diagnostic roles played 
by the categories of signs and symptoms in clinical judgment. As the procedure of psychiatric 
diagnosis tends to rely predominantly on an assessment of symptoms rather than signs, I have 
also had to shed some light on the problems that could arise from conflating the two 
categories and granting all symptoms with the status of ‘clinical signs’. Thus Sections 7. 3. and 
7. 4. have warned against the dangers of excessive pathologization – or the act of artificially 
extending the diagnostic label of ‘disease’ onto all kinds of ‘abnormal’ behaviour. This 
phenomenon’s counterproductive consequences for nosography and medical thinking has 
been pointed out in Section 7. 3., while its undesirable potential effects on society, health care 
services and justice have been listed in Section 7. 4. The remainder of Chapter 7 has been 
dedicated to various demonstrations intending to show how the account of disease proposed 
in Chapter 6 can be expected to contribute to the resolution of such issues. 
 
Section 7. 5. has initiated the ‘test run’ of my account by applying it to the category of ‘stress’, 
in order to assess the account’s capacity to produce conceptually clear results when 
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introduced to a vague and loosely defined niche of conditions. After a reassuring result, my 
focus in next two sections has shifted onto even more challenging targets – I have looked at 
the medicalization of substance addiction (Section 7. 6.), and the ‘production’ of discursively 
shaped gendered ‘mental illnesses’, like the WWI ‘insanity boom’ among German men or the 
‘feminization’ of anorexia (Section 7. 7.). These tasks explore my optimized hybrid account of 
disease’s potential as a theoretical tool – a sort of epistemic safeguard against bias. While they 
have not delivered neat and simple conceptual solutions, they have, at the very least, shown 
that a culturally and psychologically perspicacious approach to philosophical definitions of 
disease can play an important and productive role in combatting overdiagnosis and 
unwarranted medicalization. This can be achieved by means of problematizing the manner in 
which diagnostic labels come into existence, or by means of questioning their applicability and 
adequacy. 
 
Therefore, I consider my work with the examples from Sections 7. 5. to 7. 7. a success, as it 
illustrates that my definition is well cut out for identifying controversial categories where the 
likelihood of misapplication is high; for highlighting and counteracting clinical preoccupation 
with non-medical issues, and for escaping the traps that unconscious bias and social 
stigmatization create for disease classification. Sections 7. 5. to 7. 7. have shown how the 
hybrid account I proposed in Chapter 6 can be expected to increase our chances of detecting 
and resisting biased interpretations, as well as artificially imposed diagnostic criteria and labels 
meant to function as undercover forms of coercion, political control, or social oppression. I 
have thus been successful in demonstrating the practical applicability and usefulness of my 
account of disease, which has a potential of expanding our conceptual arsenal against a wide 
array of philosophical, social and political problems. 
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